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Bryan B's avatar

I was pulling for the South Korea bid so I'm disappointed. I wonder if this was a political decision as opposed to a naval one. I think Canada lost an opportunity to cement its influence in the far east. We may be getting the first subs in 2033 but with two other countries on the build list, I wonder how far down the list we will be for the rest of them. Noah, it would be interesting to see what industrial benefits to Canada will be realized.

Harry Neutel's avatar

I was pulling for the Korean bid as well, so I feel a similar sense of disappointment. But while I am a little nervous about build priority if Russia pulls some new stunt in Europe, I have no doubt that TKMS will be pulling out all the stops to make this happen. Similar to you, I mourn the lost opportunity in the Pacific. While both Russia and China are looming threats, I can't help think that Russia's threat is that of a dying animal lashing out as it slowly realizes it's bleeding out. Still plenty dangerous, but I sort of feel like it's direct threat level to Canada is limited due to those factors. Any threat it poses will be limited in duration, as it is struggling to maintain its war on a much closer front in Ukraine. Whereas China... China is still in control. The real estate crisis hurt them, but nobody thinks their might is at risk of collapsing in the near term. If they choose to do the crazy thing they keep insisting they are going to do, and invade Taiwan, they are far more likely to succeed. And even if they don't succeed as quickly or as cleanly as they might like to believe they will, they have the strategic depth and economic might to make the whole world, including Canada, hurt much more and for much longer than Russia is capable of. Barring Russia launching nukes, they simply aren't as scary as China. And for all those reasons and more, I wish we were focusing more on the Pacific.

But just because China scares me more than Russia doesn't mean that strengthening the already existing ties we have with Germany is a bad idea. In the end, a rising tide raises all boats. If we come out of this with new submarines like is planned, we will be a much creditable threat in the Pacific. SK and other potential Pacific allies will continue to court us because they still need those allies. So this isn't an end to opportunity in the Pacific, it's just the end of this one.

And they did keep Hanwha in our back pocket, in case negotiations with TKMS don't go as expected. It would add a year to timelines, which is less than ideal, but it's better than an "all or nothing" situation, where we needed to keep throwing good money after bad. That's something!

Tony's avatar

I was hoping for the Korean option, I have very little faith TKMS will deliver even remotely on time.

That said, if it works out, its a great sub and awesome news.

Derrin Urban's avatar

Noah can confirm, but I thought either TKMS CEO or maybe Pistorius said that they would give / negotiate for Canada to get the 4th and 5th hulls already in the production queue to ensure they had a similar delivery timeline to SK. According to the WIKI that would put the deliveries in 2033 and 2034. Never a dull moment in Canadian military procurement.

Brad B's avatar

"We will deliver."

They'd better, and without making a lemon in their rush to meet these timelines. 4 subs between 2033 and 2034? I think we're setting ourselves up for Victoria-level maintenance problems if they rush the builds. And if that happens, everyone will be wearing egg on their faces.

Kevin's avatar

Not to mention it'll make Canada the first operator of unproven and untested boats. Meaning we will be the customer dealing with all the inevitable issues on first builds that need to be ironed out on our dime. I believe is a typical Liberal political choice that will be a mistake of epic proportions. Not to mention the 212CD is no larger than the Victoria's which the Navy clearly stated was too small for our needs.

Suman Suhag's avatar

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Harry Neutel's avatar

I feel like you might have accidentally posted your comment on the wrong article?