Canada’s Patrol Submarine Project: A view from Australia
By Rear-Admiral Rowan Moffitt, AO, RAN (Ret'd)
Canada’s decision to acquire up to 12 new patrol submarines is applauded in Australia. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has always been welcome in the Pacific and the prospect of Canada being here more is of global strategic importance at a time of intensifying great power competition. More friendly submarines in the Pacific will help balance China’s rapid military growth, increasing reach and assertiveness: a changing balance of power globally, not just in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australians were surprised when three Chinese naval ships circumnavigated our island last year, conducting live weapon firings off our east coast. Chinese warships have been made welcome in Australian ports, but they didn’t stop over this time.
Canada’s NATO membership and history naturally draw its attention eastwards but as a Pacific nation too, Canada has vital interests in what’s going on out this way.
Canada’s submarine plans have broad strategic implications. The competitors for that prize — Germany’s TKMS, offering the Type 212CD, and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean, offering the KSS-III design — will be tough to choose between. Submarines are challenging and aiming to have the first new boat in service by the mid-2030s complicates the situation. Canada will need to make its choice quickly and that adds risk.
Submarine acquisition is inherently complex. Decision-makers will need hard heads and inquiring minds to understand the risks and ensure they are managed well by procurement bureaucrats and the Navy. As the first head of Australia’s submarine acquisition project earlier this century, and having watched it unfold since, I learned there are some fundamental but very important matters to consider.
One is cost. Not just purchase price, but total cost of ownership, which is roughly 30% acquisition and 70% running costs through life. If that 70% is not rigorously understood and funded from the outset, the result is predictable: less availability because operating costs exceed what Defence budget planners provide.
Then there is the submarine itself. Canada has shortlisted two very different boats. For a start, they are quite different sizes —the South Korean KSS-III is the larger submarine and is the only one of the two at sea today able to demonstrate performance. The German Type 212CD will be the evolution of an existing design. Unproven sub-system designs are inherently riskier than choosing what is proven at sea, regardless of pedigree and technology. An example is Australia’s experiences with submarine diesel engines, a proven and mature technology that caused us massive headaches. The reputation and recent track record of the two companies are important too. Both are unquestionably sound, but are they equal?
Both companies will give assurances, but can they meet Canada’s required delivery date with certainty? Being sceptical of claims not backed by recent, demonstrated and consistent performance would be wise. Do the designs meet Canada’s high level performance requirements? If they don’t, which will you change, your requirements or the design? Each approach brings different risks. Can they deliver on Canada’s requirements for operations under ice? That’s a challenging mission even for a nuclear-powered submarine.
Apart from ice, do the designers understand the real implications of Canada’s operating environment? On that question, best to look at the world globe, not a flat map, which distorts proportions and distances. TKMS’s recent design experience is concentrated in the relatively confined Baltic and North Seas and adjacent waters, generally close to friendly ports. Rough conditions in those areas are nowhere near as severe as the wide-open oceans off both Canada’s coasts. Hanwha Ocean’s submarines operate in the Philippine, Yellow and East China Seas, and the Sea of Japan, as well as adjoining oceanic waters prone seasonally to typhoons. Home ports are more distant, and other ports are not all friendly. These are important operational considerations. What sea conditions is each submarine designed to handle?
The distances Canadian submarines must cover are comparatively huge too, which, combined with tough sea conditions, make for very challenging operational demands. Long distances require endurance, which is mainly a function of crew size. Real world experience tells us that the number of days of practical endurance for a conventional submarine is roughly the same as the number of people in the crew. The submarine design Canada chooses must have all the life support systems required by the number of people needed to deliver the endurance specified for Canada’s missions.
Canada’s choice must especially consider the capacity of Canada’s Navy and industry to absorb the new boats and turn them into operational capability that is reliably available for use. Canadian industry has some worthwhile experience but like Australia’s Navy, the RCN is not flush with submariners, even for today’s smaller force. Generating the growth in submariners needed for the larger future force will be a big challenge.
There have been reports that Canada is considering splitting the contract — dividing the acquisition between Germany and South Korea. I hope not. Prime Minister Carney’s dismissal of that option last September was wise. Buying and operating submarines is hard enough without adding the complexity of two supply chains and support arrangements, including training submariners and industry in two different submarines. Submariners — the vital element of the capability — would not be readily interchangeable under that scheme. A mixed fleet would add significantly to the total cost of ownership and difficulty operating it.
Australia has scar tissue from our submarine experiences and we’re always willing to share our lessons to help you avoid more.
About Author
Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt RAN (rtd) was Deputy Chief of Navy, Fleet Commander and the first head of Australia’s new submarine project. He remains active in business supporting Australia’s Navy.