Canadian Army releases Capstone Operating Concept, the second major document of restructuring.
After a few weeks of delay the Army has finally released its Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept. This is the second document tied to the ongoing restructuring process. For those of you who might have missed the first, Inflection Point 2025, you can find my summary of things here.
This is the second of three major pieces we can expect to see regarding reorganization. The last of these will be the Canadian Army Modernization Order (CAMO) which we should be getting details on publicly soon.
Like Inflection Point, Capstone (as we will be referring to it) is a very long, wonderfully detailed look at the Army’s expectations for the world of 2040, and what they need to do to be prepared for it. The one thing I will praise these documents for is the level of detail.
I already did a read-through of this beforehand, so I'm not writing this blind as I did with Inflection Point. The level of detail, and the topics and issues discussed are exactly the kinds of things I was hoping for out of this document. There is an acknowledgment of threats, both conventional and asymmetric. There is acknowledgment of needing to be in tune and aligned with other L1s. There is healthy, realistic acknowledgment of the threats faced in the Arctic.
To the people who have worked on this Capstone, you should be proud. This was a wonderful read and fulfilled at least my expectations.
While Inflection Point asked “Why,” Capstone looks to answer the “What” — what to expect, what future threats will look like, and what we need to be prepared to do to be ready for the world of 2040. This builds off the modernization plans that were laid out in Inflection Point and looks beyond the current modernization plans on the books.
As we did before, we won't be jumping into everything in the document. I will include multiple links both here and at the end for you to go read it in full yourself. I will be going over the major points though, and giving my thoughts.
Anyways, into the thick of it!
The Case for Change
Similar to Inflection Point, we start Capstone by making the Case for Change. It starts by highlighting the evolving nature of global conflict, noting the implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s increasing integration of all instruments of state power.
Authoritarian adversaries are not only willing to conduct open conflict but are increasingly skilled at operating below the threshold of war, targeting us and our allies in new ways that we are not optimized nor equipped to effectively respond to.
While specific threats are detailed later on in the document, the words here echo loudly to many of us watching recurring, near-daily incursions by Russian drones into the sovereign airspace of our European allies. This, combined with increased acts of sabotage, both physical and digital, against our collective industry, undersea infrastructure, and institutions has become a part of the regular playbook our adversaries are using to target us outside of direct conflict.
The strategic environment is expected to intensify, meaning the Canadian Army can no longer rely on allies to provide high-demand, low-density capabilities. This urgency is compounded by the need to maintain readiness for domestic operations, with particular attention to the Arctic, where climate-driven accessibility increases both opportunity and vulnerability.
The Army must be prepared to assert sovereignty and protect national interests in Canada and across multiple theatres, ensuring that it can operate effectively in sustained high-intensity conflicts.
The message here is clear. Canada can't afford to wait until the outbreak of armed conflict to begin scaling up and building modern capabilities to fight in Major Combat Operations.
Capstone reiterates what Inflection Point laid out, that preparation for major combat operations must occur at the division level, where the full spectrum of modern tactical capabilities can be organized and synchronized. It stresses the importance of developing an agile and scalable combined arms force capable of operating in joint, interagency, multinational, and public contexts across all domains.
Learning must be accelerated and investing in future capabilities now is essential to ensure that the Canadian Army remains valued, credible, and capable of defending national interests alongside allies.
Capstone reinforces the principles of a focused, high-value warfighting approach, moving away from a multi-purpose mindset toward clearly defined high-value warfighting roles.
It underscores the importance of operating as One Army, integrating Regular Force units, Army Reserves, Canadian Rangers, and Public Service employees, aligning with national policy and ensuring interoperability across three key theatres: Canada and North America, the Euro-Atlantic, and the Indo-Pacific.
The last parts of this chapter focus on the fact that modernization cannot occur in isolation. The Canadian Army must work in lockstep with the rest of CAF, DND, and other government departments and agencies to be successful. We need to be in lockstep with our international allies to enable successful pan-domain operations.
Building the necessary capabilities, structures, and readiness requires both institutional reform and external collaboration. It is a whole-of-government affair that will require both sacrifice and radical thinking to achieve results.
The first chapter of Capstone lays out the needs for change while also once again pressing why this restructuring is so important. It reaffirms our multi-Theatre commitments without giving primary attention to any one area, a push against our traditional Euro-Atlantic focus.
It sets out the future threat environment as one with increasingly asymmetric threats taking precedence over traditional methods of conflict. This is a topic many of you know I've been on a lot lately. I would say I've become a bit obsessive in talking about it, and for good reason. That is for later though.
It’s overall a great intro and sets the goals clearly. We acknowledge that we will likely be called upon to act in multiple theatres whether we like it or not. Our position guarantees it. Acknowledgment of this fact is welcome compared to trying to make a circus out of reality and creating complex scenarios for how to act.
Of course, no matter what, the Army will also have a European focus in reality. That just comes from the commitments the Army has in Europe that don't, and likely won't ever, extend to the Indo-Pacific in the same way. However, that doesn't mean that the Pacific will be a “Navy war” to be fought without the potential for major contributions from the Canadian Army.
This is similar to Inflection Point making heavy reference to DomOps and people being a bit upset at that. While you might not like LENTUS as it is, I don’t think anyone besides the Premiers does. To ignore it or pretend it won't be an issue that will continue to grow in importance is ignorant and ignoring reality.
You can’t ignore reality, and while many might wish to see more put on “warfighting,” the fact is that CAF will always play a role in civil defence, and that includes disaster response. To acknowledge it and be pragmatic is needed if we want to fix the systemic issues LENTUS faces.
The same concept applies here. While they may not take the lead, and the threat might be minimal, the Army still needs to acknowledge its role, and the potential of needing to operate in these other Theatres..
There's a lot of reiteration from Inflection Point, as to be expected. From here though, we get into the next chapter.
The Army's Challenge
Capstone moves from laying out the why and what of change into a detailed assessment of the challenges the Canadian Army will face in the future operating environment.
It should always be reiterated that this is not a prediction of exactly what will happen or what the world will exactly look like in 2040, but rather a structured look at potential conditions, trends, and pressures that will shape land operations.
Its value lies in guiding planning, force generation, and capability development so that the Army is ready for the demands of a pan-domain battlespace. The environment will be complex, contested, and continuously evolving, and the Army must evolve faster than the threats it faces.
The critical deduction from the Future Operating Environment assessment is that land forces will need to operate across all domains simultaneously while sustaining high-intensity operations over long periods.
This has significant implications for both force generation and force development. Current models are insufficient for a world where adversaries can move quickly, exploit technological gaps, and challenge Canada and its allies in ways that are hybrid, multi-domain, and asymmetrical. These tactics will include missile threats, small- to large-scale attacks, sabotage, and maritime and air threats.
Divisions will need to be prepared to detect, defend against, and defeat adversaries while maintaining operational endurance and scalability across multiple theatres.
Russia and China are expected to continue deepening their military integration, sharing technology, conducting joint exercises, and supplying forces in theatres of conflict. Their cooperation means that crises in one area can quickly ripple across the globe, escalating rapidly and unpredictably.
Non-state actors will also remain a persistent concern, whether operating independently or under foreign influence. Terrorism, espionage, sabotage, organized crime, and subversion will continue to undermine public trust and government authority, with the potential to destabilize civil order and indirectly weaken military effectiveness.
The transparency of modern technology and information flows further amplifies the risk, enabling adversaries to use misinformation and disinformation to degrade legitimacy, influence populations, and complicate operational planning.
Capstone acknowledges emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, uncrewed systems, and additive manufacturing are becoming increasingly accessible and cost-effective tools able to challenge us.
Capstone delivers several points here that I feel are better to share in full:
These technologies will enhance adversaries’ ability to conduct pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, increasing the transparency of the battlespace.
Technical evolution will produce more lethal and effective weapon systems, accessible to a wider range of state and non-state actors.
Advances in weapon reach, targeting speed, and sustainment in contested logistics environments will provide adversaries with operational and decision-making advantages.
Increasing adversary capabilities in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains will threaten land forces, particularly systems reliant on position, navigation, timing, and communications-enabled weapons.
These technological and operational trends are compounded by environmental and resource pressures. Climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, strain access to food, water, and critical resources, and drive migration patterns that destabilize regions.
Authoritarian states may exploit these crises to expand influence, requiring the Canadian Army to respond quickly to prevent adversaries from capitalizing on instability.
From here we actually get a little treat. The wonderful folks who have worked on Capstone have provided actual individual point-form assessments for each domain.
These assessments are an interesting peek into the perceived threats the Army faces in each Theatre, and I would love to go over each one and sort of pick it apart. Perhaps I will do that later this week in another article. I don't want this to be half opinion and half information. I do want to primarily keep this as a summary, as I did before.
A few thoughts though never hurt anyone. Capstone’s list of threats has a very heavy focus on the asymmetric. This includes the use of civilian infrastructure and operators to test our response capabilities in the Arctic. It acknowledges that commercial and scientific operations can pose a dual-use threat to Canada's Arctic and that our adversaries will target civil infrastructure in an attempt to degrade our response capabilities and turn public perception against getting involved in a broader conflict.
Threats like cutting undersea cables, targeting railways, and energy infrastructure. Even more obscure threats like the use of containerized missiles, mines, or unmanned systems to target our seaways and ports. All are viable, credible threats to Canada and well within the capabilities of our adversaries to do.
In a globalized world, disrupting the flow of supply and trade through targeting key infrastructure, primarily ports and seaways, can quickly lead to a crisis scenario where Canada could be cut off from friendly states in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic.
A civilian vessel armed with several dozen mobile mines or deployable sensors, maybe both even (modern naval mines are scary like that), can quickly disrupt traffic and flow in key chokepoints across Canada like the St. Lawrence, Cabot Strait, and Juan de Fuca Strait.
And while this is a Navy concern, the point is that our adversaries have the means to target us in new, evolving ways that we are unprepared to handle. Something like Operation Spiderweb, the Ukrainian covert targeting of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet using containerized drones, is something that a few people with the time and resources could easily replicate on our own soil, undetected.
3D printing, advances in artificial intelligence, and slow adoption of countermeasures mean that threats like this will need to be a constant consideration in talking about what capabilities our adversaries have to target us, and the proliferation of these capabilities will only grow with time.
I am also very happy to see that we get an acknowledgment of the lack of a proper alliance system in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges they bring in intelligence-sharing, support, theatre transit, and so forth. It is something that absolutely needs to be acknowledged.
It also can't be fixed by bolstering relations with current allies. While it is certainly important to continue to work with our traditional partners, we need to take a much more proactive approach in building credibility and fostering good relations with other potential partners in the Pacific.
We see that with recent agreements and cooperation with the Philippines, including in major areas like Dark Vessel Detection. We got more of that two weeks ago with the signing of a new, comprehensive relationship agreement with Indonesia that included new defence agreements.
These are highly important to developing Canada’s Indo-Pacific capabilities. It not only diversifies the perspectives and challenges of our specific partners, allowing us a better opportunity to learn and expand our knowledge base, but also gives new opportunities to better train and prepare for a future Pacific conflict. It allows us access to better intelligence and new ways to push back against Chinese encroachment.
That isn’t just military. It comes through things like the Dark Vessel Detection Programme and pushing back against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. It means bolstering economic security. That isn't Army-related; however, the acknowledgment here that we need to take these steps and work on building a more comprehensive, tight-knit Indo-Pacific alliance is important.
From this point, Capstone gets into the institutional challenges. This is a central theme in Capstone, and a large chunk is dedicated specifically to this section. As such, I highly recommend reading this section in full yourself.
At the core of this challenge is the necessity to cultivate a culture, policies, principles, processes, and organizational structures that promote rapid adaptation to changing technology, tactics, and operational approaches.
With the character of conflict expected to shift as frequently as monthly, the Army must be capable of acquiring, updating, and integrating capabilities faster than its adversaries, ensuring it can maintain a decisive advantage in all operational domains. This is not a simple matter of procurement or technology; it requires systemic thinking where changes in one area of the organization are understood to have cascading effects across others, demanding a coordinated and agile institutional response.
Innovation is inseparable from a robust learning mindset. The Army must systematically draw lessons from allies, other elements of the CAF, and industry, institutionalizing those lessons quickly and effectively. Capstone stresses that this process must occur faster than the adversary’s learning cycle, with the understanding that operational and technological innovations in one part of the system require complementary adaptations in doctrine, force structure, and leadership practices.
Professional Military Education (PME) forms a key part of this foundation. While Canadian officers have benefited from PME in allied nations, Capstone acknowledges that such programs do not fully address the unique operational context of the Canadian Army. To remedy this, PME and tactical education must evolve to cultivate leaders and soldiers who are proficient in division-level warfighting, capable of critical thinking, and motivated to drive innovation within their units.
Procurement processes are highlighted as both a constraint and an enabler of innovation. Understanding and optimizing internal and external inputs to procurement will be critical for the Army to maintain operational parity with technologically capable adversaries.
Capstone emphasizes that effective innovation is not solely a matter of acquiring advanced systems; it requires the Army to synchronize procurement with force development, operational requirements, and interagency collaboration. Achieving this will necessitate stronger coordination with partners within DND/CAF as well as external industry collaborators, fostering a shared understanding of needs, timelines, and operational priorities.
This is also something that the recently announced Defence Investment Agency also lists as a core part of their mandate. The need to foster understanding and work better with industry is such a commonly referred-to bottleneck that you almost expect it, at least if you're me.
There’s an acknowledgment that how everyone engages and communicates is broken. I spoke more about it in my DIA post, but it's worth mentioning here again. Procurement is more than money and contracts. It is a complex system of relationships that needs to be rebalanced if we want to be able to rapidly keep pace with our adversaries.
Digital transformation also emerges as a cornerstone of institutional effectiveness. Sustained digitalization will allow the Army to operate faster, more precisely, and with enhanced situational awareness across multiple domains.
Capstone envisions an integrated data environment where sensors, effectors, and decision-makers share information seamlessly, supported by automation and intuitive digital tools. This will enable a transition from a single-domain kill chain to a multi-domain kill web, allowing cross-domain engagement and a rapid, iterative decision-action cycle.
Critical to this effort is ensuring redundancy, reach-back capabilities, and the protection of C5ISRT systems, balancing advanced automation with accessibility and resilience. Digital transformation also requires cultural adaptation: personnel must become proficient in handling large volumes of information efficiently, focusing on leadership, decision-making, and action rather than bureaucratic information flow.
Achieving mature digitalization will necessitate sustained investment in processes, software, data management, infrastructure, and training in both classified and unclassified environments. The Army must embrace risk-taking associated with innovation while developing a digital culture that encourages initiative and learning from failure.
Integrating knowledge from the Army Reserve and connecting personnel across CAF commands and industry partners will support this effort. When developing its own software solutions, the CA is advised to adopt agile and lean practices from industry to maximize effectiveness and responsiveness, ensuring that digital initiatives remain aligned with broader CAF operational objectives.
Digitalization is the most talked-about point here, and for good reason. The massive amount of digital projects, from Joint Fire Modernization to Pan-Domain Command and Control, are the heart of the modern Army.
They are what bring everything together, create the digital web that Capstone envisions. They lay out the needs and the seriousness well here. There is a major reason why I often tell people that PDC2 is the most important project on the books right now. If you don't have that capability, you don't have a modern Army that can work. It isn't a want, it is now a basic requirement.
Finally, as we just discussed above, Capstone underscores the strategic importance of access and influence in priority theatres. Persistent engagement through exercises, joint and combined planning, liaison roles, and presence operations will be essential to ensure that land forces can secure rapid access to allied facilities, networks, and supplies if conflict arises.
Achieving this requires legal authorities, army-to-army agreements, and coordinated preparation across CAF and partner services. Relationship-building with allies and partners must be intentional, leveraging embedded personnel, training exchanges, and strategic deployments while managing resource constraints. Additionally, the Army must maintain an active presence in the information environment, countering disinformation, reinforcing public trust, and ensuring alignment with CAF-led strategic narratives.
Together, innovation, digital transformation, and persistent engagement form the foundation for a Canadian Army capable of operating effectively in a complex, contested, pan-domain environment. It is the core philosophy that sets us up for our next chapter.
The Application of Land Power
The last chapter of Capstone outlines in detail the Army of 2040, how it will look and operate. This is a very long section, and full primarily of paragraphs and bullet points. Similar to Inflection Point, I will be taking these in point form, both to make sure this isn’t too long and to provide this in a more accessible format.
I do want to stress again that you should read this whole thing. I will keep saying that. The Army of 2040 is broken down into seven key attributes: ADAPTABLE, PERSISTENT, RESILIENT, RELEVANT, AGILE, INTEROPERABLE & INTEGRATED, and TECHNOLOGICALLY INTEGRATED.
We will be breaking these down into their point forms:
Adaptable
The Army must adjust to varying mission demands and environments to achieve national strategic objectives and support allied operations.
Requires tolerance for risk, openness to change, and the ability to learn from domestic and allied experiences.
Innovation is central; new practices must be institutionalized in doctrine, training, and organizational structures.
An operational mindset underpins adaptability: processes and institutions exist to enable land operations effectively.
Immediate lessons from operations must translate into institutional changes, ensuring continued relevance and competitive advantage.
Culture, training, and evaluation systems should reward initiative and experimentation at all levels.
Professional Military Education (PME) must foster creative and critical thinking, aiming to match or exceed allied standards.
Adaptability also includes integration of technology and tactics into operational planning and force employment.
Persistent
Persistence entails sustaining operations until objectives are achieved, underpinned by adequate resources, resilience, and determination.
Requires comprehensive combat support and combat service support (CSS) to maintain operational endurance.
Force flow management is essential: recruiting, training, and maintaining readiness of personnel at scale.
Brigade and battalion rotations should allow for sustained division-level operations.
Persistence extends to strategic communication with the Canadian public, industry, and government, ensuring understanding of Army missions.
Relationships with allies and partners must be actively managed to maintain operational continuity.
Industry partnerships are crucial to ensure steady, scalable supply chains for munitions, equipment, and platforms.
Resilient
Resilience spans strategic, operational, and tactical levels, ensuring continuity of function under stress.
Strategic resilience: flexibility in personnel, equipment, and training; alignment with policy; investment in infrastructure to withstand hazards.
Operational resilience: adoption of emerging technologies, small/consumable platforms, echeloned and redundant CSS, survivable C5ISRT systems, and leadership trained for full-spectrum operations.
Tactical resilience: soldier survivability, dispersion, and concealment across visual and electromagnetic spectra; intensive casualty care; adaptation after losses.
Counterintelligence, denial, and deception activities are critical to protect institutional and operational effectiveness.
Depth is vital: reserves of personnel, munitions, platforms, and supplies enhance survivability and adaptability.
Integration of Army Reserves (ARes) complements Regular Force (Reg F) units, ensuring replacement, repair, and operational continuity.
Relevant
Relevance requires delivering effects that meet the needs of Canada and allied forces, emphasizing lethality, survivability, and sustainability.
Capabilities must align with national policy, strategy, and threat environments.
Strategic-level relevance includes credible deterrence; operational and tactical levels demand lethal forces capable of cross-domain effects.
Situational awareness, range, speed, and training must surpass adversaries for sustained effectiveness.
Emerging technologies, such as machine learning and uncrewed platforms, will augment soldier and commander roles, creating new operational skill requirements.
Relevance is tied to contributions in coalition operations across the full spectrum of conflict.
Agile
Agility allows balancing multiple ongoing and future missions across theatres while reacting quickly to changing circumstances.
Institutional agility is key: adapting training, tactics, doctrine, and procurement processes in real-time.
Mobilization requires coordinated integration of Reg F, ARes, and Canadian Rangers (CR) with clear roles for strategic, operational, and tactical purposes.
Personnel and equipment readiness must be high; commonality across Reg F and ARes units enhances rapid deployment.
Operational mobility includes projecting forces domestically and internationally, leveraging relationships with other CAF organizations, private contractors, and allied transport partners.
Cultural agility involves accepting risk to implement timely solutions rather than waiting for perfect options.
Interoperable
Interoperability is critical within the CAF, with other government departments (OGDA), and with allies and coalition partners.
Enables achieving strategic goals, increasing multinational capability, and reducing resource strain.
Focused partnerships include NORAD, FVEY nations, NATO allies, and other key regional actors.
Land forces must be self-sustaining while capable of integrated coalition operations.
Shared resources (e.g., ammunition, equipment) enhance operational efficiency and provide redundancy in contested environments.
Training and cultural alignment are required to foster trust, solve tactical problems collaboratively, and operate seamlessly in multinational forces.
Non-traditional missions and below-threshold conflict scenarios demand flexible, interoperable responses with other government and international partners.
Technologically Integrated
Integration of data and technology is essential for optimizing existing systems and leveraging new capabilities.
Enhances efficiency beyond combat, reducing administrative burdens and freeing resources for operations.
Software, machine learning, and AI will streamline intelligence cycles, targeting, and battle damage assessment.
Doctrinal evolution may include novel control measures like “forward line of robotics” to account for uncrewed systems.
Continuous updates to hardware, software, cybersecurity, processes, and training are necessary to maintain alliance and intelligence-sharing relevance.
Many capabilities are dual-use, supporting multiple operational functions depending on context.
Transformative changes across structure, doctrine, procurement, and training are required to fully realize a technologically integrated force.
We also get a look at a very lovely chart that outlines the army we have versus the army that we need. While it is fairly basic and straightforward, there are a few little gems in there, such as the need for optionally crewed, robotic, autonomous, and uncrewed vehicles.
The next and final section of Chapter 3 also takes a lot of the work from me by providing almost everything in its own point forms, robbing me of having to put my own.
This section goes into the Functions of the Army of 2040, listed as Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain. I debated a bit how to do this but have decided to include their points for simplicity:
Command
Generate and reconstitute C5ISRT capabilities that are up to the level of being interchangeable with other DND/CAF L1 organizations and allies;
Generate and reconstitute survivable and mobile division-level and below C5ISRT capabilities that can operate in denied and degraded electromagnetic operating environments;
Integrate and synchronize space, cyber, EMS-enabled and OIE effects at the division level and below, in coordination with the appropriate DND/CAF lead organizations;
Contribute to integrated layered defence (ILD) in Canada and North America or as part of an alliance or coalition overseas;
Generate and reconstitute tactical headquarters to include main and alternate command posts, which are mobile, resilient and able to operate dispersed and with out-of-theatre reachback;
Provide digitalized C2 capabilities to tactical operations, integrated with other DND/CAF and allied data links using common protocols;
Adapt and revise individual and collective training and CA PME to prioritize MCO at the division level, at a pace that matches a rapidly changing operating environment (OE);
Adapt and revise CA doctrine on division warfighting, at a pace that matches a rapidly changing OE;
Generate and reconstitute adequate CA intelligence personnel to support CA and land force intelligence requirements to achieve decision advantage;
Enable C2 through data-centricity, leveraging emerging technologies including automation, predictive analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence for targeting and decision support;
Generate and reconstitute more attritable, technologically enhanced weapon systems at all levels to include different types and sizes of uncrewed systems to conduct a variety of roles across operational functions; and
Develop and use relevant training environments and tools to enable sustained personnel throughput through training systems.
Sense
Support CAF-level intelligence collection plans in all theatres, including in Canada, during competition to increase warning times, through the activities of the Reg F, ARes, and CR;
Integrate and employ predictive analysis tools, artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous systems to enhance specific activities, such as surveillance and reconnaissance, and single-source processing, exploitation and dissemination of large amounts of data and information;
Integrate and employ predictive analysis tools, artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous systems to enhance the intelligence cycle, including multi-source intelligence collection and processing of massive amounts of data and information;
Create, share and receive digital data and information through systems and networks interoperable with joint and allied militaries’ systems and networks;
Develop and maintain information- and intelligence-sharing relationships and agreements with allied armies and regional partners;
Integrate EMS-enabled collection assets that are signature-managed, mobile systems;
Conduct tactical reconnaissance enhanced by robotics and autonomous systems; and
Contribute data, information and intelligence to ILD in Canada and North America or as part of an alliance or coalition overseas.
Act
Generate and reconstitute combat power to conduct operations in simultaneous theatres;
Conduct OIE coordinated with other DND/CAF L1 organizations and allies;
Train individually and collectively on MCO up to the division level;
Employ emerging technologies to enhance targeting effectiveness and reduce sensor-to-shooter time;
Conduct electromagnetic operations to deny and degrade adversary capabilities, through signature-managed, mobile systems;
Deliver long-range-precision strike capability suitable for division-level operations;
Integrate joint cyber-, space-, and EMS-enabled capabilities into land tactical operations, in coordination with the appropriate DND/CAF lead organization;
Create and breach complex obstacles and defensive systems;
Integrate tactical aviation effects;
Balance the application of precision and mass effects;
Conduct MCO in rural and urban environments; and
Create effects from the land domain contributing to ILD in Canada and North America or as part of an alliance or coalition overseas.
Shield
Deny and/or deceive adversaries as to the intent, capabilities and locations of land forces, particularly C5ISRT nodes;
Generate and reconstitute layered all-arms and ground-based air defence capabilities, through active and passive means;
Defend against and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards;
Integrate joint cyber-, space-, EMS-enabled and OIE capabilities to deter and defend against threats, in coordination with the appropriate DND/CAF lead organizations or OGDA;
Generate defensive electromagnetic capabilities to enable signature management across the electromagnetic operating environment, coordinated with CAF Cyber Command;
Establish and maintain reachback capabilities to enhance force protection through physical dispersion and redundancy of systems;
Generate integral force protection capabilities for CSSFootnote11 and combat support elements operating throughout the battlespace;
Generate soldiers resilient to adversarial OIE and cyber activities, leveraging OGDA and DND/CAF resources;
Provide effective threat-based force protection measures in priority theatres, including in Canada, whether on operations or not; and
Provide resilient base infrastructure to enable continuous operations through climate change and security threats.
Sustain
Educate and train land forces to employ, support and reconstitute a tactical echelon system up to the division level, enhanced with emerging technologies to ensure agile and resilient replenishment of the fighting force;
Generate and reconstitute adequate quantities of CSS organizations, personnel and materiel to support operations at scale;
Generate adequate quantities of CSS organizations, personnel and materiel to be able to forward position, enabling rapid transition to armed conflict;
Procure adequate quantities of materiel to support reconstitution;
Respond to CBRN threats and hazards, with decontamination capabilities at scale;
Integrate predictive maintenance capabilities; and
Integrate emerging technologies into CSS activities.
Lastly Capstone talks about dependencies. It acknowledges that moving to division-level operations will affect other parts of the CAF that support the Army. Some dependencies will stay the same, while others will change due to restructuring.
These are fairly common issues that have been discussed openly forever. These are Issues that I have been speaking more about as I've thought about them.
Things like the complete lack of native Sealift capability despite the desire for a Manoeuvre Division, the limited Airlift capability being tied primarily to five CC-177 that will inevitably be taken up in conflict, the coordination of things like Cyber and Space Capabilities that are outside Army control.
Even the seperation presented by Tactical Aviation being under RCAF command and control are brought up here, and they are valid points. The current plans do call for an Aviation Brigade to be attached to the Manoeuvre but only if the RCAF allows and cooperates. That was subtly included here and gave me a giggle.
These are all valid concerns, some of which I have brought up. This is also why Capstone puts such a large focus on cooperation and Integration, something that can often get lost in the shuffle at times.
I was recently speaking to a friend about this same Issue when it comes to Maritime aviation, and how seperate and divided it is from in Navy brethren in terms of training, integration, coordination, etc.
Its a far reaching issue that stretches past CAF. The boys at 3 CSD will gladly tell you about how difficult it is to coordinate with the Canadian Space Agency because of the lack of proper communication between organizations and mandates to push for deeper cooperation.
The system, as it is, is riddled with layers of players and dependencies spread out between the various L1 and beyond that force these bottlenecks in the system.
As always I won't tell you how to fix these. Beats me. Im no Philippe Lagassé or Dave Perry who have spent decades on these topics. Im sure they have awesome ideas, and if I wasnt so socially anxious I would ask them.
Im also sure everyone who has dealt with these Issues would tell you something different, and the fact is that a divide on priorities will always lead to some conflict between everyone.
The Army might need Sealift, however that pulls their personnel, funding, Infrastructure to support that at a time when they have little planned to spare, and ambition in themselves.
It's a careful process, one that will always have wins and losses for everyone involved. Its good to acknowledge those dependencies, and overall I do think Capstone does a great job at imagining the future.
Its timely, insightful, full of detail and aligns with a lot of my own personal concerns and beliefs. Maybe that makes me a bit biased to it. Everyone knows I put a priority on Assymetric Threats, Relationship-Building, Figital Infrastructure, and development of Unmanned Systems.
So there was a lot in here that made me giddy. However, from the Analyst perspective I see very little in here that is ‘wrong’ per say. The point of this document is to be a future-oriented assessment, a hypothetical. It does not pretend to be absolute.
It works with what is best available and tries to predict what the future might look like. I think it gets it spot on for the most part. If you read my content you'll see a lot of similarities, and I love that.
There is talks of needing to be Agile. There is discussion on depth, not just in personnel but supply, munitions. There is talks of needing to be lighter, more dispersed, with a renewed focus in how Unmanned and Optionally-Manned systems can support roles like Recce, ISR, and Medical Evacuation.
There is talks about education and changing the way we learn. I would have loved to see this go into more details, and heard more about the potential for individual education to be bolstered by new technologies.
There is a plethora of talk about Digitalization, bolstering our own sovereign capabilities in digital development. Heck, there is a whole section on relationships!
If they wanted to make a document to make me happy, they succeed there. Of course its always a hypothetical. This isnt policy or commitments. These are recommendations and a framework to go to as part of the decision-making process.
So you can't get yourself overly hyped, even if I might seem like it. Take it for what it is, be happy they are putting out something really good, and it is good. I commend those who have been tirelessly working on these the last few months.
There are some files I wish more time was put into, Innovation, more detailed assessments at the various threats and challenges of each Theatre beyond point form. Again, training and education are sections I would love to hear more thoughts on.
Thats just a personal point though, and not so much a criticism of the Ideas presented in themselves. I think many can read this and walk away happy, feeling like the future is understood, and there is a timely sense of what needs to be done.