In a Win for Noah, the United States Approves the Sale of P-8s to Denmark
Noah Note

In yet another win for Noah and his Northern bloc, the United States has approved the potential sale of up to three P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the Kingdom of Denmark. While we knew that this deal was in the works for a while now, this is the first confirmation we've had in some time that the P-8 is what Denmark will be acquiring.
Of course, there aren't exactly many options available for interoperable Maritime Patrol Aircraft. That doesn't mean there aren't any options. We have other concepts on the market or coming, like the Airbus A321 MPA, Airbus C295, various Dash and Global-based MPAs, and the Kawasaki P-1.
Yet truthfully, none of them are to the standard of the P-8, at least in my books. There is no combination of capability, availability, and user base that any one platform can leverage to the extent that the Poseidon can.
Of course, I'm happy with this development, as many of you can expect. The inclusion of Denmark into the Poseidon family completes a vital missing link in the North Atlantic chain that includes other P-8 users along with the United Kingdom and Norway.
With this, the major countries that make up NATO's Northern Atlantic front (Canada, Norway, UK, Denmark) will all, if approved, operate the same Maritime Patrol Aircraft. With this comes expanded opportunity for Joint Training, Supply Chain integration, Aircrew Exchanges, and opportunities for Capability/Obsolescence Development.
It means expanded opportunities for cooperation and a common platform to build a proper strategic arrangement under. That last part might sound a bit silly to say on its own; however, we are frequently seeing common platforms being leveraged for wider agreements.
We have already recognized the opportunities in leveraging procurement for wider agreements. A major focal point of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project is leveraging the eventual decision as part of a wider economic and security agreement with either Germany or Korea.
As many of you will remember, Norway and the United Kingdom recently signed the Lunna House Agreement, itself a wide-reaching security agreement built around the Norwegian acquisition of the Type 26 Frigate—another platform that now three of us share.
It’s also an agreement that made me first rant about this issue, primarily the feeling of exclusion from this growing Northern Atlantic Partnership that is looking ever increasingly like the beginning of a proper bloc within the wider NATO.
I love these kinds of blocs. Many of you already know that. I also believe it is vital to Canada’s Continental Security and the Defence Industrial Base to pursue this Northern bloc as an active, dynamic community that can see Canada not just as a partner, but as a wider contributor.
As Canada looks to launch a new Foreign Policy in the coming years—the first since the 2005 International Policy Statement under the Martin government—the time to have these conversations has never been more prevalent.
The challenge, of course, is that a policy too conservative and aversive risks missing the opportunity to lay out a proper goalpost beyond the ad-hoc nature that we've been operating under. That risk can quickly lead to Canada missing the vital but limited opportunities that will present themselves over the coming years.
However, being too broad in scope risks stretching vital resources too far, ensuring that while Canada might have a broad presence, the policy will never be able to be leveraged to take a more significant position in vital areas we might want to prioritize.
While it might be tempting to want to position Canada as a wholly global player, I firmly believe that the next Foreign Policy needs to avoid trying to take a 'Global' approach and instead take renewed focus on the specific partnerships and areas we deem most valuable, even if that means sacrifices elsewhere.
The Northern Bloc, by far, is the area I would prioritize first on the list to strengthen strategic partnerships and alliances. It represents the optimal mix of supporting our NATO commitments while leveraging the existing commonality and existing partnerships that already exist through things like the P-8, Type 26, and potentially future platforms like the Type 212CD.
It also helps to reinforce Canada's Continental Security by positioning the Northern Bloc as NATO's 'Arctic' core. It strengthens Canada's desire for an increased allied presence and multinational approach to Arctic Security, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand recently spoke about.
This is primarily through increased cooperation with states like Denmark, where Canada can leverage increased Danish infrastructure and interoperability to better strengthen our year-round presence in the Arctic.
It also opens up the conversation of including the Canadian Arctic into wider discussions of the future of the GIUK-N gap, of which it is often excluded. While some here will take aim at me trying to push the Canadian Arctic into this grouping, I firmly believe that NATO needs to take a 'Whole-of-Arctic' approach not just to conversations but also to planning.
That only comes with a Federal Government willing to put in the effort, and the political force, to fight for such a thing to happen, and to push Canada into the broader conversations we're seeing develop around things like Lunna House, which is surely only the first step in a wider, long-term strategic partnership between the UK and Norway.
To their credit—and I have given it to them many times—I think the Canadian government over the last few months has been excellent at trying to get this message across, and at putting in the diplomatic effort to try and make this a reality. We have already secured new Strategic agreements with Korea and Sweden, both of which to me were comprehensive, well-thought-out, and set the stage like Lunna House for wider agreements in the future, even if the initial agreements might be lacking in the hardware side of things.
It shows, though, that we are capable of doing these things, and we have the sway to push our agenda far more than we often do. Canadians are naturally risk-aversive. I have heard that for what feels like my whole life. It is perhaps one of our biggest faults.
So I commend the Federal Government for being aggressive the last few months on this front. I hope to see it become the norm, though I am apprehensive to give that benefit at this point. It’s easy to fall into past, well-established habits.
However, these developments help push this idea greater than my words can. The more common platforms we share, the easier it is to justify cooperation. In my mind, we should absolutely be encouraging allies like Denmark to make the choice of commonality. It should be actively lobbied as intensely as possible.
It’s a net benefit to everyone, especially us! Part of the reason I argued we should have been more direct in promoting Norway's decision to go with the Type 26. It’s also why I support discussions on Joint Procurement specifically with the UK and Norway when it makes sense. To me, active consideration should be put into finding as much commonality as possible.
Luckily for us, that usually happens through no effort on our part. It kind of just falls in line. That is partially because options in many cases are so limited, and naturally lean one direction over others.
However, I do believe these are conversations—fairly tough ones at times—that need to be had before we get to the point that a Foreign Policy is released. I want to get my opinions known ahead of time, so that way when this comes to the headlines I'm already prepared.
There are many opportunities to leverage each other's capabilities and assets to better strengthen our collective security. I have long advocated for a wider agreement with Denmark on the use of Nuuk as a supplement to our own lack of Arctic Infrastructure, if I can use one example.
These kinds of choices just push us a little closer in that direction, give us a little bit of opening to step into the door. They're leverage, to be a bit blunt. The more we see great news like this, the better off we are in my books.



An NATO Arctic bloc wide A2/AD coordinated strategy from sea-floor to space would be lovely
Kind of seems like an awkward purchase politically, considering the rhetoric coming out of Washington these days towards the Danes and Greenland. Speaking of the P-8, do you think the RCAF will exercise the options for the two extra airframes?