Let's Talk A Bit About CUAS

Opinion

We discuss a lot of topics here on the regular.

You guys might not know this, but I actually use the Q&A to gauge interest on topics. Since you guys are the ones engaging, if I can see a bunch of people asking a lot on a certain topic, I can generally guess that it's something you guys are interested in.

Counter-Uncrewed Aerial Systems is definitely an area that many of you are interested in, and for good reason. It's been a topic of domination when discussing emerging technologies since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and only accelerated in the conversation over the last few weeks of American intervention into Iran.

Of course, when it comes to Iran, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish losses from ballistic missiles and one-way effectors like the Shahed family at times. Despite that difficulty, though, we can generally paint a picture.

The recent strike against Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia the other day reportedly utilized a mix of both ballistic missiles and one-way effectors that reportedly resulted not just in the loss of three KC-135s, but also the loss of at least one E-3 Sentry AEW&C aircraft, with unconfirmed reports at this time of a second being damaged.

These kinds of saturated attacks, utilizing a mix of drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles, have been particularly effective the last few weeks. Previous strikes at Prince Sultan Air Base had damaged several other KC-135s.

More significantly, these saturation attacks have resulted in the loss of several critical radar systems in the region, including the AN/FPS-132 Early Warning System at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars in the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, respectively.

Of course, when discussing more Shahed-oriented attacks (and for Canada, this is important), the primary area of success has been the targeting of critical infrastructure.

Oil infrastructure in the region has been successfully targeted, with multiple facilities, including the Mina Al-Ahmadi Oil Refinery in Kuwait, Lanaz Oil Refinery in Kurdistan, Majnoon oil field in Iraq, and Bahrain's Bapco Refinery being struck by Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy drones over the course of the last month.

Dubai International Airport, Mubarak Al Kabeer Port, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and Kuwait International Airport have all been reportedly struck by Iranian drones over the course of the last month.

Even NSA Bahrain was not spared early in the conflict, with several Shahed-type drones breaking through local air defenses in the opening days of the conflict, striking several buildings and radomes on the base.

Of course, when we discuss CUAS, we're more often than not discussing the environment that we find Ukraine currently engaged in. That is a battlespace filled with cheap, prolific UAS like FPVs, fibre-optic guided drones, and man-portable loitering systems over the long-range, one-way effectors that we're talking about with Iran.

At least that's what you guys like me to talk about! Ukraine themselves have the capacity to supply millions of FPV systems, loitering munitions, interceptor drones, and long-range one-way effectors per year. Something President Zelensky has been very open about the last few days in light of increased demand for cheap, scalable CUAS solutions for the Gulf states.

Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said drones accounted for about 60% of all successful strikes on enemy targets back in December, with that number expected to continue to rise, and of course, I am always the one saying to not take too much lessons from Ukraine, to understand that trying to mirror conditions and situations from the ongoing conflict to us isn't the best way to develop efficient lessons and best practices.

However, it's also true that these systems and threats are not disappearing, and no matter how much we cry about the difference of available technologies, modern C5ISR capabilities, and networked IAMD compared to Ukraine (which I would argue to several degrees), the fact is that we will have to contend with a different, though not exclusive, environment.

It is very easy on the other end of the spectrum to say that our operating environment and battlespace will be exclusively different from the Ukrainians, and that we shouldn't look too much into things. It was common to hear that in the 2023/2024 period; now, it is not so simple.

Certainly, I have heard both sides of the spectrum in my time in the defense space. I have seen Ukraine absolutists treat the conflict as an almost gospel of the future, a perfect look into what a future conflict in Europe will look like. I have also seen people who refuse to accept that we could find ourselves in a similar situation, that the Ukrainians are still in the ad-hoc, modernizing state of 2023/2024 and we would be able to quickly react and counter any sort of development in the uncrewed space.

We've known about this threat for a long time, even before Ukraine. The proliferation of uncrewed systems itself isn't new. Almost as soon as commercially available drones became commonplace in the early 2010s, non-state actors especially had attempted to utilize them as effectors.

People often forget that ISIS utilized commercial (primarily DJI) drones during the later stages of the conflict in Iraq (and extensively in the battle of Mosul) with jury-rigged release mechanisms to drop 40mm grenades and small explosives. That includes the targeting of Canadian personnel in Iraq at the time.

Similar systems were also utilized in Syria to a significant extent. Most famously, Syrian rebels extensively targeted both Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus Naval Base with dozens of modified, commercial uncrewed systems in the 2017-2019 period (although their success on the other hand was famously limited).

Azerbaijan utilized Israeli-made loitering munitions (like the Harop) extensively to devastate Armenian armored columns and air defense systems during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Anti-junta rebel forces in Myanmar have relied heavily on additively manufactured parts and modified commercial drones to drop munitions on regime outposts.

The case in point here is that the proliferation of small, cheap uncrewed systems combined with more sophisticated loitering munitions and one-way effectors has been a noted issue for a decade now. It did not suddenly come to pass with Ukraine, nor should one try to label the recent events in the Gulf as a wake-up call in my opinion.

CAF discussions of CUAS date back a decade. It is not a new concept, nor one that we should continue to act shocked by when the inevitable failures to adapt come into play. These are long-standing issues, ones that we can see a clear, quick turnaround of development almost as soon as publicly available drones became available.

And, of course, what defines CUAS can be extensive and bloated. It can be fairly hard to talk about CUAS at times because of the overlap it can have with several other projects and initiatives. Uncrewed systems come in all shapes and sizes, from small quadcopters up to Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance systems like our future CQ-9B Guardian.

As such, doing a dedicated "let's talk about all CUAS in the CAF" can be a bit difficult. Certainly, both the Uplift UOR and Enduring GBAD projects fall under the CUAS banner. They have specific concerns about countering things like loitering munitions, one-way effectors, and MALE systems. For Enduring, we are still waiting to see how dominant the CUAS requirement will be, as it is still in the identification stage at this time.

Certainly Phase II, which at this time aims to procure a dedicated, vehicle-mounted VSHORAD system until they change their mind, is very concerned about UAS. The Canadian Forces Electronic Warfare Support project is also concerned with CUAS, even if they maintain a broader electronic warfare mandate.

Land ISR Mod is looking at procuring a portable CUAS sensor. This sensor must be able to detect, locate, and track Class I UAS out to 10km. It must also be capable of detecting and tracking fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to a range of 40km. Up to forty such systems will be procured.

There is a multitude of efforts around the space, and at this time, it is fairly disorganized. It is for that reason that the CAF has launched the Joint CUAS Office (JCO) and Joint CUAS Working Group (WG). This will be our primary focus for today, and will be our baseline for gauging the current pace of CUAS development.

The current state of CUAS in the CAF.

The JCO's origins technically date back to 2019, when the Armed Forces Management Board (AFMB) designated CJOC as the Joint CUAS champion. It was under the CJOC that a lot of the early work on CUAS development took place.

That includes the early iterations of things like the CUAS sandbox, advancing interdepartmental relationships with Transport Canada (TC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), and developing working relationships with our NATO and FVEY partners.

They also helped lead the OP Reassurance CUAS UOR originally announced in 2023, currently the pinnacle of Canada's CUAS procurement. It occurs to me we never really talk about the UOR, likely because it was fairly limited in scope for Latvia.

I do think it is important to acknowledge progress, though, even if limited. A quick recap: the CUAS UOR aimed to acquire a number of non-kinetic CUAS systems to provide the boys in Latvia with some native capability to defend themselves against Class I and II UAS.

The UOR was divided into two phases: dismounted and mounted. The dismounted phase included three separate systems meant to provide a basic non-kinetic layer of defence against UAS. This included:

• TRD Systems ORION-H9 Handheld Anti-Drone Gun.

• CACI's BEAM (Backpackable Electronic Attack Module) 3.0 omni-directional system.

• Leonardo's Falcon Shield fixed-site system.

The mounted phase aimed to acquire a CUAS platform to provide mobile CUAS defence against Class I/II UAS. That was also awarded to CACI last year, and while not specified, it is likely that the system is based off the company's X-MADIS platform.

In 2024, the RCAF submitted a proposal for the establishment of a Joint CUAS Office within the Chief of Combat Systems Integration (CCSI) organization. It had become apparent (at least to those I asked) that CJOC was not moving fast enough in the current environment; add to that the rapid development of several independent CUAS initiatives across the board, and the recognition was that a dedicated entity needed to be established to better respond and coordinate CUAS efforts across the CAF. Of course, Our North, Strong & Free also sets out the mandate to explore acquiring new counter-drone capabilities. So there is precedent now to do more.

The role of CUAS Champion now falls under the CCSI. They have also been designated the Functional Authority (FA) and Centre of Excellence (CoE) for CUAS. At the same time, a Joint CUAS Working Group subordinate to the Joint Capabilities Steering Committee (JCSC) has also been established.

The end goal of the JCO is simple. The CAF needs to be capable of detecting, deterring, and defeating UAS threats in the defence of Canada and on missions abroad in cooperation with partners and allies.

It will create a structure to stimulate coherent joint CUAS capability development, integration, and interoperability while supporting advancement and sustainment of CAF CUAS capabilities, policies, and initiatives. It will also support integrating CUAS capabilities as part of Canada's wider IAMD initiative.

I don't think I need to get into the deep, nitty-gritty here. This gives you the base idea as to the function of the initiative. Originally, the plans were for a proposal to be presented in the fall of last year; however... it seems to be a slow process.

Now, I don't fully know everything going on in this file; however, I do hear enough, and I can make a fairly accurate update as we stand in March 2026. As of now, the proposal for a wider CUAS project remains in the identification stage. The JCO has been stood up, and it is active. However, things continue to progress slowly.

And while there is an acknowledgement here that risk will need to be accepted, and we need to be experimental and innovative in how we develop our CUAS capabilities, the fact is that the system still isn't in a place where it can operate to the degree that the JCO wants to.

In a world where we have accepted that UAS developments are being made in weeks, if not days, and that we are going to likely be in a game of constant catch-up, the fact is that even minor delays can have significant consequences on Canada's ability to keep pace with developments.

The current proposal, as I know it, includes expanded non-kinetic and limited kinetic capabilities. What exactly is being discussed? I don't know. Unlike its mirror opposite in MINERVA, the ongoing CUAS initiative remains quite quiet and almost hidden away.

I was surprised in trying to engage with people just how many who I would expect to know of the initiative either didn't know of its existence or felt just as in the dark as I did.

It's especially strange given again how focused many seem on CUAS and CUAS initiatives that one would almost be convinced that nothing really existed at all! It was definitely strange for me, and despite my best efforts, I was unable to get much on the current plans themselves.

There is also no existing timeline for this proposed CUAS project that I have ever seen. While we can generally give many of the above (Land ISR mod, Enduring, etc.) projects that have a CUAS component tied into them a vague timeline (Enduring is a bit funny), for the wider initiative? We just don't know.

And this is, of course, the common issue. Again, the system as it exists is not designed to rapidly identify, classify, and procure solutions for potential gaps and dynamic threats that might force us to operate on a schedule of weeks and months.

This is again especially accurate for UAS threats, where different classes (both in group and capabilities) require different layers of defensive systems to efficiently counter them; and look, I hate the group system. I think it is kinda bad for proper assessment; however, it does give us a general idea and a fairly simple classification of potential threats. So we will continue to use it as a system.

This isn't just a people issue, as some would say, nor just a simple procurement fix. It is multiple fundamental issues that are preventing us from responding effectively to this issue.

It is a failure of organization, yes, moving too slowly and being too overly cautious to properly respond on the timescales we need. It is a failure of the system, where the CAF can't readily acquire new systems because there is a lack of a system in place not just for things like funding, but also on the failure of authority and system on the individual level to independently acquire effective CUAS systems.

We saw a lot of that failure in GPUAS. We see a lot of concerns of MINERVA faltering for the same reasons. When your spending authorities are so ridiculously low, and the system of classifying projects actively works against individuals taking initiative, you inherently restrict your ability to rapidly scale and foster developments at the unit level. You cut off one of the systems you could hypothetically have in place to support the rapid fielding and experimentation of systems in the short-term timelines you keep discussing.

On the industry side as well, while Canada has had a very successful run with the CUAS sandbox (and now the Urban CUAS Sandbox, which deserves some praise), it is inherently limited by its lack of pathways to a contract.

Programs, challenges, and sandboxes are a great way to see what's on the market and what's capable. If you don't translate that into capabilities, though, what did you really get out of it?

This is a wider issue with how we translate IDEaS and DRDC concepts into actual, working assets. It isn't just CUAS that suffers here; however, it still affects these efforts. There still exist no pathways for IDEaS winners to take the concepts they're funded to develop and potentially secure a contract at the end.

Companies, especially SMEs, can't wait for a system that could take years to run through a competitive competition. They certainly can't survive off of the limited support IDEaS provides. Ukraine shows how SMEs and startups can be leveraged to help develop a dynamic environment of developments. This is especially true in the UAS/CUAS space.

Primes cannot be the only players in these efforts. There needs to be a credible, supplementary layer of SMEs that can more rapidly respond and scale to meet the dynamic UAS threat. The truth is that a lot of the great companies working on these issues, and the ones that are trying to step up, are part of the SME and startup system.

The Industry is there

Over the last year, I have had the chance to meet and discuss this topic with a lot of companies across Canada. I wish I could highlight all of you here. I do. However, that would sadly take forever!

I do believe we have an extensive, well-forming industry developing for ourselves. I do think we have the talent and the innovator mindset in place to be a much more significant player in the CUAS space. We have the people here putting in the effort to get things done.

And I should highlight all of them extensively. We have so many of them that deserve the shoutouts. We have the bigger players, like North Vector with their CI-60 CUAS vehicle and CM-70 CUAS missile. We talk about North Vector a lot, and they are one of the few players here doing kinetic CUAS here in Canada.

They ain't the only player, though. There's Zighra in Ottawa who's doing CUAS now. They have HiddenSpectrum, which utilizes a unique aerodynamic signature detection method to identify micro and mini drones.

HiddenSpectrum is particularly cool because it can track drones without relying on radio frequency (RF) signals. It is optimized for complex urban operating environments, allowing for the detection of threat drones flying below rooftop levels or maneuvering out of direct line of sight between buildings.

DARIT Technologies out of Sherbrooke is now a mainstay winner of a lot of the CUAS sandboxes. They most recently presented their Rempart Intrusion Detection System (IDS) at the Urban Sandbox, which took home the $1,000,000 1st place prize. It leverages the company's proprietary Fusion-Core software suite to ingest and process data from a diverse array of distributed sensors, including optical cameras, acoustic sensors, radar, radio frequency (RF) detectors, and LiDAR.

The system is engineered to be lightweight, portable, and weather-resistant, allowing it to operate efficiently in complex urban environments with minimal operational workload.

OBJEXIS AI out of Oakville is also really cool with FIXAIT. Rather than relying on traditional radar or RF tracking, FIXAIT is designed to ingest any standard video stream and instantly convert it into a real-time C-UAS detection platform.

This software-driven architecture allows defense and security organizations to utilize existing camera networks or pair the engine with new electro-optical sensors to rapidly identify, classify, and track uncrewed aerial threats without emitting detectable signals.

I could go on and on highlighting people around. Believe me, there are many out there and even more from outside Canada who have expressed interest in setting up shop here. Two names that come to mind are Teleidoscope, which you can read Peep's article on, and Frankenburg Technologies, which I have heard has also proposed Canada as a potential location for its own Mark I CUAS missile.

It isn't as if the talent and industry aren't here already. To act like it isn't is to deny the people who are doing the heavy work to try and build up a Canadian CUAS ecosystem from near-scratch.

In my eyes, I don't see a perfect industry. I don't see an industry that is maybe prepared to fully jump into the dynamic environment that we've been talking about. However, I do see the foundation, the basis of which a proper strategy and system can take and build up into something credible and capable of acting on the global stage.

But this current system isn't one where they do that. How many, as an example, CUAS sandboxes does DARIT need to win before they are given the chance to prove themselves on the grander stage? When are they ready to move on to the next stage? When do we trust them to support our national security?

Companies like Zighra already have an extensive relationship with the CAF and CCG through their other products like DeepSense and GenesysInsights. They have already shown they can deliver working, valued products (I say this because I have heard it myself).

And I shouldn't be surprised. I shouldn't be screaming into the void expecting something of a unified effort, a national push, especially when we all recognize the vulnerabilities. Here's an article from yesterday about recent incursions over American facilities. Here's another for you. Here's the UK, France, Belgium, the Baltics, and Denmark, just for good measure.

CUAS is more than systems.

We would be foolish to assume the same isn't actively happening here. We would be foolish to assume that any part of our geography or location will keep us or critical assets safe from potential asymmetric attacks.

If you think something like Operation Spiderweb couldn't happen here, where cheap, crude uncrewed systems integrated with basic artificial identification and targeting couldn't, say, target a facility like Cold Lake? Or Halifax? Or Trenton? Hell, what about critical assets like the future Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar systems?

Then I'm sorry, but you're playing a very stupid game, a game that has proven to cost those who don't play it seriously dearly. What will you do then? What would you do if a key part of our continental radar network is taken out by a cheap drone launched out of the back of a semi?

"What would you do?" is an easy question to ask, and you can supplement it for anything: any platform, capability, facility, or critical piece of infrastructure. Then remember that we have almost no way to protect ourselves, not while the ongoing CUAS initiative continues to sit in identification, not while we continue to endlessly study and discuss what we need.

And if I sound a bit dramatic? That's entirely because the concept terrifies me. It scares me when I talk to people about it, to understand how vulnerable you are, to know how little you have to stop it. To remember that it only takes one or two lucky little fucks to cripple us in ways we couldn't imagine.

That's why I take this so seriously. That's why I push for aggression. That's why this whole debate frustrates me, because we know there is a path forward. We know the assets and capabilities we have. We know the industry we have. We know we could be doing something now, anything.

And that's another thing in all this. It isn't just about having the systems in place. It isn't just about the right equipment. It's about having the right mentalities in place who are willing to accept that reality, and are ready to tackle it in the aggressive manner that the situation demands of them.

It's about having the contingencies in place for if the worst comes to pass. It is about having the proper facilities, like hardened shelters, in place domestically to ensure that we have available as many layers of protection as possible for our future fleets, even if some might call it silly. It is about having the proper training infrastructure in place so people can develop the experience and skill sets they need to operate in a drone-dense environment. That is especially important to me as we start talking about the future Base Security trade.

A lot of these conversations I hope are already happening. I don't know if they are, but I am naturally a very hopeful person, so I have a bit of trust in the system to do me right, to put its heart behind at least one major initiative. If I had to choose any, this would be at the top of my list myself.

Time will tell. I don't wanna judge people too harshly, even if I know much of this comes off as aggressive criticism compared to my usual. The JCO is still young, still getting things going. Damn it all, though, if I didn't hope for a bit more, if I don't hope for something to try and take a sledgehammer to the system at a time when the Federals are already looking set to take it apart piece by piece and remake it in their own image.

Can't always have winners, though. Sometimes you just have to accept that the old system is still in place, and changing it will take a lot longer than many hope.