Let's talk about Detterence

A random collection of thoughts because people keep asking me to talk about this

Deterrence

How often do you hear that word? How often recently have you read some article or heard someone speak on the concept? Certainly, everybody has, right? You can't go anywhere in the defence space without it popping up.

Deterrence is the magical word, the concept that everyone has latched onto when devising their rearmament and reviews, from France to the United Kingdom, Sweden to Australia.

Deterrence provides not just a layer of protection, discouraging adversaries from acting in scenarios they might otherwise feel comfortable in, but also acts as an influence, able to be projected outwards in influencing situations and other states.

Of course, that isn't to say that it hasn't always been important when discussing security. Deterrence is again a vital part of defending our sovereignty and our international relationships. I don't want anyone to think I'm trying to dismiss its revival.

Deterrence is also an integral part of NATO’s posture as a defensive alliance and has seen a renewed focus since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fact remains that NATO and her member states are woefully unprepared for a large-scale conflict.

That includes both in manpower available, material available, and in our preparedness for what many have rightfully seen as an inevitable conflict with Russia, a state that continues to outproduce us materially and one that, despite being bloodied in Ukraine, could quickly rebuild its capabilities within a five-year timespan.

To quote NATO’s Secretary-General Mark Rutte, speaking at NATO’s public forum on June 24th:

"Russia is reconstituting itself at a pace, at a speed which is really staggering and frightening. And so we have to stand ready. If we don't, we cannot defend ourselves in three to five years from now. Today, they know if they try anything, our reaction will be devastating, but we have to make sure that in three to five years they won't try."

I don’t want to be one of those people to say that NATO has lost its credible deterrence. I don't think it has. However, it has allowed it to degrade under the guise of the peace dividend that has existed since the end of the Cold War, and the shift to counter-insurgency operations, as if anyone would deny that.

NATO has a collective GDP 25 times that of the Russian Federation, yet the war in Ukraine has seen the Russian defence budget bloom to upwards of seven percent of GDP. That, when looked at with PPP taken into account, reaches upwards of $461.6 billion according to the IISS. That surpasses the combined defence budgets of the rest of Europe at $457 billion.

Yet despite those similar budgets, what does everyone get? For Russia, they get around three million artillery shells a year, and growing. That’s a lot, but how does that compare to NATO?

What NATO produces every year is around the same amount that Russia is currently producing every three months... A single state is producing four times the amount of artillery shells as the whole of NATO. That isn’t counting shipment from Russia’s allies like North Korea, also with production in the millions of shells per year.

Despite sanctions and an ongoing war that has seen Russian industrial capabilities targeted over the last three years, the country continues to rapidly upscale its production levels. Missile production in Votkinsk has expanded with thousands of new workers, according to HUR, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Service.

Russia has almost doubled missile production in the last year, able to produce upwards of 70 Iskander ballistic missiles and 15 Kinzhals every single month. This is the same for almost every missile in the Russian arsenal, from Kalibr to Zircons.

NATO is expanding, trying to expand, but it is a slow and tedious process, not helped by the fact that the needed munitions, in many cases, don't exist. The European defence industry lacks proper long-range strike capabilities beyond 500km. Those they do have, like MCDN, are limited in production and still years away from a ground-launched variant, with tests set for 2027/2028.

Tomahawks? Barely holding its 90-per-year minimum rate. PRSM? Looking to hit 400 per year. How about our ability to defend against ballistic missile threats?

PAC-III MSE are looking at 650 per annum by 2028. Aster is harder to find numbers for but is looking at several hundred per annum. Standard Missile production? SM-6 is currently locked in a back-and-forth funding game, while SM-3 production is running far below capacity, even if its max is still under a dozen per month.

And we're only talking about matching the capabilities of one state, Russia. We aren't discussing China or North Korea. We aren't talking about what is even made right now, but where we hope to be in a few years.

Again, I'm not saying that we aren't trying. I'm not saying that we aren't investing anything. Part of the reason we are now locked to five percent spending is because we desperately need the funds to ramp up capacity far quicker than we're planning and at scales far beyond what we have set.

Yet for three years, many states have sat and watched the Russo-Ukrainian war with tempered breaths. The urgency was never there, if not dismissed thanks to Russian performance giving some a pompous belief that the threat was contained.

While our adversaries have been scaling, preparing. While they have been perfecting and setting up now-insulated supply chains, we have been debating, and thinking, and formulating strategies and plans for what we could do.

The Canadian Detterence

This is where Canada currently sits. Waiting, thinking, plans exist, concepts exist. We are looking to speed things up in some places, such as quickly procuring HIMARS. Yet what is the Canadian deterrence? What does it look like?

Because individual states need to be able to credibly deter others on their own. Canada does not have the luxury of a European collective, nor should we be keen to outsource our deterrence to the United States.

Canada faces a unique position. We have long professed ourselves as an Atlantic state and allowed our thoughts and decision-making to be centered on an Atlanticist viewpoint. This has been the predominant mentality since, well, forever.

Yet the renewed focus on a warming and more active Arctic, coupled with rising tension in the Indo-Pacific, means that Canada can no longer afford to keep its eyes locked on one ocean, one threat.

We are a Pacific country as much as we are an Atlantic one. We are the gatekeepers of the Arctic. Our geography has often been ignored by those in power when discussing the challenges our security environment faces.

Second-largest country on Earth, population smaller than the likes of Iraq, Uganda, and Spain. We barely crack the top forty! That’s a fun fact for those of you who aren't caught up on Canadian statistics.

Do you know how much geography comes up in our defence policies? 1994 White Paper? A blip. The Canada First Defence Strategy under Harper? Nothing. Strong, Secure and Engaged? Blip.

To its credit, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF) at the least went deeper into these issues, acknowledged them, and gave more time to the issues of geography and our precarious position than the rest of the previous policies put together (this is not an achievement).

Most of our issues can stem from this simple issue. This distance and sparse population mean things are harder to support. There is a lack of manpower, infrastructure, especially up north, that creates gaps in our ability to sustain a presence and quickly respond to threats.

Building infrastructure is hard and time-consuming, stretching distances most of our NATO allies couldn't fathom. The Kivalliq Hydro-Fibre Link, for example, will stretch 1,200km, a distance similar to traveling from Amsterdam to Warsaw.

The Arctic Security Corridor, which will connect the future Grays Bay Port to Yellowknife, and in turn the rest of Canada, would see a new 900km road built. That is a distance just a bit greater than it would take to get from Paris to Munich, through a territory of just over 40,000 people.

That of course isn't counting the other challenges faced, such as the ever-melting permafrost, the lack of skilled workers, or the cost of getting materials up there. I've spoken many times on the issues of the Arctic.

The reason I bring these up is because deterrence, at the end of the day, needs to cover for one's weaknesses. Having a comprehensive deterrence means both acknowledging these issues and working out ways to get around them.

Canadian deterrence, at the end of the day, is equally a slave to our geography as it is our actual material capability. It has to work around these issues. It has to compensate our size and lack of people available. It has to deal with the vastness of our North, lacking in the needed infrastructure to support us properly.

We talked about it, if you remember, in our discussion about the AEWC project. AEWC are a vital capability, yet unlike our European allies, we have to maximize our ability to cover our area—an area where these aircraft can't just land to refuel. That is why having an air-to-air refueling capability is seen as so important.

We can see it in discussions about HIMARS. Canada is vast, and to properly respond means being able to rapidly move assets across these vast distances.

That means, for us, that the platform has to be C-130 accessible because it remains the backbone of our fleet. Why? Because the C-130 can land in the underdeveloped and non-existent runways up north. It can land just about anywhere.

Other aircraft, like the A400, could also do that, don't get me wrong, but the point remains: our goal at the end of the day involves shrinking Canada down, and making sure we can close those distances effectively. That is the backbone of our issues.

The CAF side of things understands this. It understands our vulnerabilities and limitations. Almost every conversation I have with people revolves around the concept of the Canadian deterrent.

Primarily the conversations always come back to: how can we cover everything? How can we have a persistent surveillance capability over our entire territory? The ability to sense, track, and catalogue is probably the biggest challenge we have. It is also where many of the current projects aim to address.

Let me give an example. Want to track things underneath the Arctic waters? Easier said than done. Corridors are tight, and many places can get under a hundred meters in depth, especially along the Northwest Passage. Channels are full of ice stretching down to the seafloor, creating tight, rigid canyons that can tear vessels apart.

It's why we have the Underwater Environmental Assessment project, to study the use of XLUUVs in the Arctic—smaller, autonomous vessels that can deploy off containers, spending weeks traveling under the ice, deploying sensors along the limited, usable corridors.

Far more efficient and safer than deploying a dedicated submarine into the mostly uncharted and volatile Archipelago. It also allows you to cover that vast area quicker and more persistently than with a manned submarine.

Alternatively, you could see other concepts, such as stations moored into the ice, acting as relays and sensor nodes, perhaps even as charging stations for unmanned systems. GeoSpectrum out of Dartmouth, famous for the TRAPS system, has a concept like that—one that is very interesting to see. To do that though, you need to also be able to relay that information back to the network.

That's why we have things like ESCP-P and Telesat Lightspeed, optimized for Arctic coverage. I always throw my support behind Lightspeed, despite the controversy. Building Canadian solutions to space is one area that I see as absolutely critical.

Especially in this regard. You need to be able to communicate up there if you want to have persistent surveillance. You certainly need this if you want to use, say, the MQ-9 fleet to its full potential.

It's another great example of building that sense and track capability. Our MQ-9 will come equipped with the Seaspray 7500e for maritime and littoral tracking. Their 24hr+ endurance and ability to be deployed from forward locations in the North will provide a needed complement to the P-8 fleet.

They can take over more mundane tasks and provide surveillance over a far longer time frame than other manned aircraft. That endurance includes the ability to undertake 24/7 coverage of the Northwest Passage, thanks to our 11-aircraft fleet.

It's an unsung, very critical capability that just isn't talked about, and I think that's the crux of what I'm trying to get at with the material side of things. The problem with these debates is that we oftentimes focus on the capabilities, when oftentimes we're already addressing those gaps.

I could go on for hours about the various projects and such that aim to address these. Why do the P-8 need LRASM? To provide them a long-range maritime strike capability independent of the RCN.

Why is HIMARS so focused on that capability? Because it provides another asset as part of the layered chain. In some cases, it might be quicker and more efficient to have them available for that role.

Especially with Increment IV, PRSM can cover a 1000km+ distance. That’s enough for a single HIMARS to cover the entire Labrador Sea from Newfoundland. That is a persistent capability that is hard to ignore.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine wants a land-attack capability. How does that affect our deterrence, many ask me? Because it gives us the ability to strike adversaries at a distance far beyond our shores, from a platform that is extremely difficult to detect.

Deterrence isn’t just about keeping things away, it's about changing our adversaries’ calculations of risk to make them not want to do things. It's not a calculation of harm that can be inflicted, but cost. That includes offensive capabilities, even if many aren't too keen on hearing those kinds of things.

We can't keep pace with people like China. Nor will they allow our gaps to exist without exploitation. That means, for Canada, we have to go above and beyond in our material capabilities. You don’t want to walk into anything with an equal advantage. You want to tip things as far in your favour as possible. You want that unfair advantage, so to say. For us, that means needing these kinds of layered kill chains and sensor networks available.

That’s where the CAF stands at least. OTHR, AEWC, multiple long-range strike capabilities—all play into creating that unfair advantage in spite of our natural weaknesses. The problem, in the future, won't come from the lack of these material capabilities.

That’s where a lot of the conversation goes though. It ignores the other factors of deterrence beyond the material, and truthfully, that is where we will struggle the most.

Beyond the Material Detterence

Deterrence itself is not based strictly on the capacity to inflict harm on an adversary. While it certainly remains the hammer in the toolbox, it is again a matter of cost and benefit—being able and willing to change that calculation. That means that the state's ability to deter needs to be examined through both a capability and mentality lens.

Capability comes not just from a state's material capabilities but also its political. The ability to influence other actors, to ostracize, and inflict economic harm through financial, trade, and movement are all ways that a state can present force as a deterrent.

This isn’t to ignore the material, but to highlight the rope that alternatives provide. A state pushed out of institutions, unable to participate in the globalized network of finance and trade, will struggle to keep posture when the local populace begins to feel the consequences of their choices.

States are a balance of factions and influence of the populace. Political capability is seen less negatively than military, is more involved in the everyday lives of citizens, and provides direct influence on the state’s ability to both conduct and function.

To that, a deterrence needs to have a mental aspect as well. A state needs to be both clear and consistent. It needs to be willing to exert the capabilities it has and needs to be consistent both in its messaging and choices.

A state who is not consistent cannot be viewed as credible. It loses the “trust” of its deterrence. This has been a longstanding issue for many Western nations, whose messaging and willingness have often faltered and waned.

Current discussions on deterrence focus very much on the continental defence role. They go hand in hand. Yet to take a look at Canadian deterrence also means acknowledging that it can't and won't be the same as great powers like the United States and Russia.

Does Canada even have a deterrent beyond its ability to protect its territory? Is it limited only to what we can provide in that continental defence role? We can ask if we've ever truly had that?

There are times when Canada has acted independently, such as in the Turbot War or efforts in Ukraine. Yet Canadian policy has almost always been tied to another actor, be that the United States, NATO, or the UN.

Canada itself hasn't released a proper, encompassing foreign policy in about twenty years—not since Paul Martin’s International Policy Statement all the way back in 2005. Nor is Canada an active participant in much peacekeeping, a hallmark of our foreign policy during the Cold War.

As a middle power, Canada cannot rely only on itself to deter. It requires being active and engaging with allies on the world stage. Yet if that’s the idea, and Canada truly holds a position of influence, our choices don't necessarily reflect that.

It’s one of the big missing pieces of discussion with previous 2% timelines. There was so much focus on what we already do, and what we get out of NATO, to some people that we ignored the influence factor.

Canada naturally has to maintain some favour with allies if it wants room at the table. The constant ignorance of two percent was a negative factor on our influence among NATO partners. If we were not going to show up for them, and were seen as a laggard, then why should they in turn care for our needs? Our voice?

It's a similar vein to foreign aid. Those advocating for mass defunding oftentimes forget the soft influence such funding can provide us. This is especially true as American influence retreats back and other influence, such as those from China and Russia, step up.

Because you can't just stick in the isolated arms of our NATO allies. You need to be an active influencer around you, and Canada—with her vast resources, decent financial position, and general positive opinion in many countries—stands at a unique position to step up when that influence wanes.

I oftentimes use recent trips to promote nuclear exchange in the Pacific, with countries like Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. This is an example of economic liberalism that not only provides an economic benefit to Canadian industry but also furthers our influence in the non-aligned camp.

That influence is what allows us to further our political and economic deterrent. It gives us a room at the table, a seat of influence in other states that can come together far greater than what we can do individually.

Canada's potential in the global energy economy is just one avenue of potential influence. There are always far more. Moving closer to Europe and further integrating our security relationship means opening a new door for us to have a voice in European decision-making.

But to get there, we need to first understand exactly what we want to be, and to make the proper commitments. Is Canada the new bridge between Europe and Asia in the waning days of the American hegemony?

There are many political leaders who have been pushing this idea the last several months. It is a valiant recognition of our status as an Atlantic and Pacific nation. Can we afford to continue our Atlanticist viewpoint in a world where our threats are coming at us from all sides?

I don't imagine myself as qualified enough to say fully what Canadian foreign policy needs to be. The current government has promised a new foreign policy to be released sometime in the future. They've promised new security agreements with the EU and Nordic partners in relation to the Arctic. We already have started the road with the EU.

Yet we need to acknowledge that we have allowed our position to wane ourselves. We have been content where we are, a partner in a far grander scheme, happy to be at the table. Is that the extent to which we can be?

I don't think so. I never think so. I do believe we can do more, but as evident, while we are trying to some degree militarily, we still lack the agency, the mentalities to use it. Do the powers that be have the resolve to use CAF independent of allies, or at least in a leading role as we saw in Libya? I am not confident that exists.

Because it’s wonderful to have these capabilities, but if you are not prepared to use them, what are you? Similarly, while this government has been proactive at trying to forge a new relationship with Europe, it has come at the cost of others.

Where we go from here

Before the recent election, Canada was doing quite well to get out beyond our traditional environment. Multiple trade trips to Asia, including major visits from people like CDS Carignan, a new Africa strategy.

Yet since then? Near silence. Very quiet. It’s as if it suddenly stopped. Is this a sign towards a natural return to our Atlantic roots? I think it's too early to tell, but the feeling of change is not in the air there. Certainly, if it is, I would need to see it.

We can do so much more. Certainly, we will have the tools in our belt, if all comes to pass. Submarines, fifteen Aegis-equipped destroyers, the world's most modern icebreaking fleet. All wonderful assets to have, but useless as a deterrent if we don’t have the proper plans or determination to use them to our advantage.

Stretch that over, well, everything really. Lack of export capacity for resources? Another avenue where we are restricting our potential influence. Cutting foreign aid under some guise of saving change? An absolute destruction of our soft influence.

All of it falls back to a simple issue. We recognize our problems. We have the military solutions. Yet the powers that be constantly fail to live to the moment, constantly push aside and sacrifice the influence needed to build a collective economic and political deterrent.

CAF can buy what they want. It is the federal government that controls things like securing munitions production, funding investments, and building relationships.

It is they who build infrastructure, who set the policies that spur its development. It is they who, for example, allow rail lines to fall into disrepair and abandonment by private operators, strangling our rail network.

It is the federal government that sets out foreign policy and gives directive to the armed forces. It is they who determine what role they want to see Canada play, and how we build beyond the material. It is their mentalities that set forth whether we use it or not.

For all that we've talked about here, all that we've set out—the question of deterrence is not a military one. They have their plans, know how we can build a force to defend the continent and our sovereignty. It is a political question, one rooted in successive governments who have allowed our influence to wane, and in turn, have allowed our credibility to falter as a partner state.

It is this risk-averse nature we have, this complacency being a junior partner instead of being an influencer, that has eroded our ability to shape the collective deterrence of our rules-based international order.

Canada can easily be a nation with influence equal to that of allies like France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Will it look the same as them? Absolutely not, just as they don't look the same to the Americans.

Canada can be a bridge, an economic influencer. We can do much more than we do now, in ways that our allies can't do. It requires us though to take an independent approach to our policy, to exert ourselves and identify what tools we have.

We will never be truly independent in our deterrent, at least outside our borders. That isn’t something we should focus on doing. However, we can be a major player in our ‘society’ of fellow liberalist states. One that can influence decision-making and choices in the collective.

That requires the mentality to be active, to use what we have. It requires us to stick to what we say, and have a dedicated policy in place that reflects that. It requires an industrial strategy for building up the defence industrial base. It requires export strategies to get our critical minerals, energy, and industry out there into the world, where we can turn it into influence.

It requires us to build not just the credible deterrence at home militarily but be willing to use it, both at home and abroad in cooperation with allies. That includes being more active and involved in efforts such as exercises, joint patrols, and targeting asymmetric threats like dark vessels and IUU fishing.

And we are making that effort, don’t get me wrong. There are works being done and I commend them, but they're coming too little, too late. We've allowed our adversaries years and years of almost unrestricted access to counterbalance us globally, to build industry and seep into non-aligned states, be that Africa, South America or the Pacific.

All of this starts with a new foreign policy. One that sets the direction and mandate to follow. One I hope recognizes all of these, and works to build up Canada as a proper middle power. That is the paintbrush needed for creating the non-military deterrent needed to complement the hammer that is military force.

Of course, I could write a whole book on this. Many better than me have. However, this is a topic I've been pondering for a while, and I wanted to get some of my thoughts out there. Certainly, there is more to talk about—the threats out there, the academics of deterrence. I leave that stuff for more professionals. However, I would love to do something on asymmetric threats. Would that interest people? I think it could go a long way into tying into this.

I've been reading a lot of these concepts lately, trying to educate myself a bit more on the fundamental side of things, beyond just capabilities and projects. That means getting to dive into wonderful things like theories of International Relations. Fun stuff to do outside academics. You lot in it have my sympathy.

I want to revisit this topic again though, both once I'm more educated and when the new foreign policy drops, depending on how long that takes. I've asked around, but have received no word yet from anyone. Oh well! It'll end up in the newsletter when I do.