Golden Dome is ridiculous. It’s a total non-starter technologically and economically. There isn’t enough money allocated and the timelines are far too short. The US can’t get ground based interceptors working properly, let alone a space-based system. This is Reagan’s Star Wars redux, except without the focus or the money. Like everything Trump, it’s been concocted on the fly, a bright idea out of the Oval Office. Aside from this, it *cannot* work without some Canadian participation. So, the PM winks at Trump, says *of course it’s a brilliant idea*, and then says our improvements to NORAD represent our participation.
One Approach to Canada’s Ground-Based BMD and ISR Integration with U.S. Golden Dome
Canada can play a critical role in the U.S.-led Golden Dome missile defense initiative through a comprehensive, cost-effective strategy based on four fixed Aegis Ashore sites, multi-domain ISR assets, and a modernized NORAD-aligned C2 structure. Canada’s planned acquisitions—including F-35A stealth fighters, MQ-9B UAVs, P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, and a future airborne early warning (AEW) platform—dramatically increase Canada’s capability to detect, track, and engage advanced missile threats across the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic approaches.
The below proposes Canada stick with ground-based interceptors and does not stray into space-based weaponization (either kinetic or non-kinetic kill systems). Note, Canada would gain some anti-satellite capability (LEO only) with the purchasing SM-3 interceptors as part of an Aegis shore system.
Note: Rules of engagement defined via NORAD joint protocol. However, Canada retains sovereign C2 of its assets.
1. Strategic Context
Emerging adversaries are fielding:
• Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)
• MIRVs, FOBS, and low-observable cruise missiles
• Multi-vector and saturation attack tactics
The U.S. Golden Dome defense framework emphasizes:
• Space-based missile detection
• Layered intercept capability
• Allied ISR fusion and early cueing
Canada’s contribution focuses on interceptor coverage, multi-domain ISR, and integrated battle management—all with a sovereign footprint across Arctic and maritime approaches.
If we don't join it, they will do it anyways and we will be left with no BMD defence and no say in the American system. No brainer to join in my opinion.
Golden Dome is ridiculous. It’s a total non-starter technologically and economically. There isn’t enough money allocated and the timelines are far too short. The US can’t get ground based interceptors working properly, let alone a space-based system. This is Reagan’s Star Wars redux, except without the focus or the money. Like everything Trump, it’s been concocted on the fly, a bright idea out of the Oval Office. Aside from this, it *cannot* work without some Canadian participation. So, the PM winks at Trump, says *of course it’s a brilliant idea*, and then says our improvements to NORAD represent our participation.
One Approach to Canada’s Ground-Based BMD and ISR Integration with U.S. Golden Dome
Canada can play a critical role in the U.S.-led Golden Dome missile defense initiative through a comprehensive, cost-effective strategy based on four fixed Aegis Ashore sites, multi-domain ISR assets, and a modernized NORAD-aligned C2 structure. Canada’s planned acquisitions—including F-35A stealth fighters, MQ-9B UAVs, P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, and a future airborne early warning (AEW) platform—dramatically increase Canada’s capability to detect, track, and engage advanced missile threats across the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic approaches.
The below proposes Canada stick with ground-based interceptors and does not stray into space-based weaponization (either kinetic or non-kinetic kill systems). Note, Canada would gain some anti-satellite capability (LEO only) with the purchasing SM-3 interceptors as part of an Aegis shore system.
Note: Rules of engagement defined via NORAD joint protocol. However, Canada retains sovereign C2 of its assets.
1. Strategic Context
Emerging adversaries are fielding:
• Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)
• MIRVs, FOBS, and low-observable cruise missiles
• Multi-vector and saturation attack tactics
The U.S. Golden Dome defense framework emphasizes:
• Space-based missile detection
• Layered intercept capability
• Allied ISR fusion and early cueing
Canada’s contribution focuses on interceptor coverage, multi-domain ISR, and integrated battle management—all with a sovereign footprint across Arctic and maritime approaches.
2. Canadian Force Architecture
A. Ground-Based Interceptors
4 X Aegis Ashore Sites:
• Goose Bay, NL
• Cold Lake, AB
• Esquimalt, BC
• Bagotville, QC
Systems per site:
• SPY-7 radar
• SM-3 Block IIA (exo-atmospheric BMD)
• SM-6 Block IB (hypersonic/terminal-phase intercept)
B. Airborne ISR & Interceptors
F-35A Lightning II (88 planned)
• Role:
o Airborne sensor node with advanced AESA radar, IRST (DAS), and ESM
o Supports detection, tracking, and cueing of low-observable cruise and hypersonic threats
o Interceptor role for cruise missiles and airborne threats in the forward Arctic and maritime zones
o Stealth allows operation inside contested airspace for target acquisition
P-8A Poseidon (14)
• Maritime ISR and BMD cueing (EO/IR, SAR, ELINT, MAD)
• Supports early track and long-range maritime surveillance
Airborne Early Warning (Planned)
• Multi-domain AEW capability (e.g., GlobalEye or MQ-35-type)
• Persistent radar coverage over polar airspace and maritime arcs
• Supports vectoring of interceptors and real-time threat identification
MQ-9B UAVs (6–8)
• ISR cueing and Arctic patrol with long endurance
HAPS ISR (3–5) – New purchase
• Stratospheric ISR and communications bridging in Arctic regions
C. Space-Based ISR & Relay
• RCM-2 SAR/IR (3–5): Polar radar and thermal imaging
• LEO ELINT CubeSats (6–8): RF/launch detection
• Hosted IR Payload (GEO): Long-range early launch tracking
• Inclined SAR/IR Satellite (1): Arctic revisit optimization
• Relay CubeSats (4–6): Arctic and Pacific communications
Inuvik Ground Station: National ISR and C2 fusion node
3. New Capital Investment Rough Estimate (CAD Millions)
System Cost
Aegis Ashore (4 sites) $6,000M
SM-3 Block IIA (100) $3,000M
SM-6 Block IB (100) $800M
RCM-2 SAR/IR $450M
ELINT CubeSats $150M
Hosted IR Payload $150M
Inclined SAR/IR $300M
Relay CubeSats $150M
HAPS $150M
Inuvik Ground Station $100M
Integration & Training $700M
Total ~$12B
Includes full recapitalization of airborne and ground-based ISR/interceptor layers. Phased over 15 years
4. C2 and Interoperability
• Battle Management: Inuvik hub fuses space, air, and surface data
• Fire Control: Aegis Ashore and F-35/P-8/AEW share threat tracks and target nominations
• NORAD/NORTHCOM Integration: Full JREAP-C, Link 16/22, MADL (for F-35s)
• Resilience: Space-based ISR + stealth + HAPS ensures continuity under jamming or ASAT threats
• Sovereignty: Rules of engagement defined via NORAD joint protocol; Canada retains sovereign C2 control
5. Geographic Coverage
Domain Coverage Detail
Interceptors (SM-3/SM-6) ~85%+ All population centres, coasts, Arctic and GIUK gap
ISR (P-8, AEW, F-35, satellites) >95% Full coverage of air/missile corridors
Maritime buffer >750 km Persistent ISR and early warning via Poseidon, UAV, satellites
Arctic ISR High F-35s + satellites + HAPS + AEW combined
6. Strategic Benefits
• Integrated NORAD-Golden Dome alignment
• Full-spectrum ISR and intercept coverage
• Stealth ISR and interdiction with F-35A
• Persistent Arctic detection via AEW and satellites
• Avoids dependency on ship-based missile storage
• Protects North America and enhances NATO credibility
If we don't join it, they will do it anyways and we will be left with no BMD defence and no say in the American system. No brainer to join in my opinion.