Let's Talk About The Heavy Direct Fire Modernization Project

Project Update

Tanks.

Who doesn't love tanks? I know I do. You probably do too. In fact, you probably have very specific beliefs when it comes to tanks that are bound to start several arguments and ruin at least two of your friendships. For example, the Centurion is the best tank of the early Cold War. I will not elaborate on this further, nor will I take arguments about this.

Anyways, we all love to talk about tanks—especially the Leo fleet. There has been a lot of ongoing debate about the role of tanks in the future battlespace. While much of this is driven by the environment we are seeing develop specifically in Ukraine, there is a lot to say about the future of Armour and its role in the Canadian Army that isn't just tied into the usual, tired statistics we see.

That ain't to say they aren't important, though I find the conversation oftentimes—especially among the public—does little to really get into the depth of this discussion without immediately devolving into a back-and-forth on drones.

The Canadian Army is undergoing one of its most substantial modernizations since the Second World War, topped by perhaps its most significant reform in decades. Both of which are coinciding with the Army looking at the future of Heavy Cavalry and a planned Leopard replacement.

Rarely, if ever, has there been a time for us to have a proper sit-down and have a conversation as to the future of tanks in Canada’s history. While this topic has been a regular occurrence several times over the decades, and the idea of ditching tanks entirely has come up several times before, it feels like this particular time presents a unique moment where such options might honestly not be as unreasonable as some presume.

Now, as a quick update: I know this wasn't what we planned this week. I apologize. I know many of you are eagerly awaiting the next submarine article, and for that, I sadly still need a few more days. It has been by far my most significant challenge as a writer to date.

After scrapping it again last weekend for a fourth time, I finally have gotten on a good track and feel fairly confident after taking a few days' break to clear my mind. I think this time I am actually liking what I'm writing, and can be happy with it. It's gonna be long though—very long—so sadly there just wasn't enough time to get it done this weekend.

It is coming though, make no mistake. It is gonna happen, after which I am hopeful we can get out a string of submarine-related articles to round out our comprehensive look. Until then, consider this an apology gift!

Usually, I don't do full rundowns of projects like this for something in such early stages. However, I still feel there is a lot to go over and discuss when it comes to this topic, and of course, as things develop, we can always jump back into it.

So, without me rambling, let's jump right into things.

The current state of things

Before we jump into the plans, let's go over the current state of the Leopard fleet quickly. At present, there are 74 Leopard 2 tanks in service. This is broken down into 34 Leopard 2A4 tanks, which are now relegated for training purposes; 20 upgraded Leopard 2A4M tanks; and 20 Leopard 2A6M tanks.

Canada had previously donated 8 Leopards to Ukraine back in 2023. These numbers also do not include any support variants in service, like the Büffel. The 2A6M fleet is currently undergoing a $76 million conversion to the new 2A6M C2 CAN standard.

This conversion replaces most of the remaining analog systems in the 2A6M fleet as well as modernizing existing systems like the optics and fire control system to align with the 2A4M fleet, which, despite the number, is the most advanced and capable variant in the fleet.

It should be noted that most of the Leopards we have date to 1979—at least as far as I know. They are old, rapidly aging, and also all of the variants require different supply chains to maintain them. This adds another level of complexity when you have five different variants running around.

I also want to make a distinction that, despite what some say, the 2A4 fleet—while relegated to training—are still combat capable. They're just severely outdated and not really fit for the modern battlefield. I don't know why people act like they can't still be tanks, but they hypothetically could.

A squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks is currently stationed as part of OP Reassurance in Latvia. This represents the bulk of our modern tank fleet, though it is likely to be joined by further 2A6M C2 CANs in the future.

The current Leopard fleet is aging, inadequately sized for the attrition of a potential peer conflict, and long-suffering from a lack of funding being available to support their upkeep. This includes ongoing issues with access to spare parts. This isn't entirely on us. KNDS produces about five parts a year for the global supply chain, then turns around and shrugs when no one has parts available and we have to park them.

Yes. I am salty at KNDS. You should be too. Despite being on year four on the Russo-Ukrainian war, the company continues to be an ongoing detriment to the existing fleet purely based off their shoddy levels of production. This is something that can't be entirely blamed on the CAF or government, although underfunding the fleet until recently hasn't helped.

That includes signing an up to $2 billion contract with KNDS in September 2024 to establish a Canadian sustainment capability. This includes the establishment of a Regional Maintenance Centre in Nisku, Alberta. That contract included an initial period of 6 years and 7 months, and includes 4 option periods that could extend the contract until March 2036.

So despite best efforts, the current fleet is significantly lacking for where the Canadian Army wants to be. With less than 40 modern tanks available at any given time, the Canadian Army lacks the depth and modern equipment to sustain an armoured presence in Europe for any significant amount of time if conflict were to break out.

You got all that? Good! Hopefully, this rundown gives you a bit of a quick refresher to everything. Obviously, we could go into far more detail; however, I just want you to have the basic catchup on the state of things before jumping into the project itself.

The Canadian Army, as part of its broader modernization, has initiated the process of identifying what the future of the Leopard fleet will be. That is what we are discussing today.

Heavy Direct Fire Modernization

Now that you have a bit of a refresher on the state of everything, we can finally get into the future of Heavy Armour itself. If you follow the newsletter, you are likely already aware of the Heavy Direct Fire Modernization (HDFM).

HDFM is the new name for the previous Tank Life Extension (TLE) project. It is not a replacement for the project but a rescope of the project to better align with the Canadian Army as laid out in Inflection Point 2025 and the Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept.

The aim of HDFM is to reset and improve the Canadian Army's heavy armour fleet to meet the Forces' 2035 and beyond operational requirements and threats.

As of now, the project remains in the Identification phase, though the DND was nice enough to outline the broad goals of the project as they exist to me. HDFM aims to:

• address obsolescence issues and repair and overhaul requirements

• ensure appropriate fleet scale and composition

• define priorities and address essential improvements to Protection, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA), Man-Machine Interface, Firepower, Mobility, Command, Control, and Communications, and Sustainability.

On top of this, TNSR was also the first to report that the project had an initial price estimate of up to $10 billion dollars. We can further confirm that this is the working number at this time, though I would like to stress that this is very likely to change.

Projects in Identification are often subject to frequent and extreme changes as the project matures and defines its requirements. For HDFM, which is especially young, these changes are likely to be significant. If you have followed our coverage of the Continental Defence Corvette, you'll be familiar extensively with how quickly these things can change!

For HDFM, the project will have to contend with a growing Canadian Army that desires to extensively expand the size and scope of the army of 2040. As part of the Canadian Army's modernization plan, the future Manoeuvre Division will be adding a second tank regiment as part of 1 CMBG.

As of now, I can't confirm where this new Regiment will 100% be located, but it is in the plans. On top of that, TNSR can confirm that the ongoing timeline includes IOC for 2032/2033. This is about the extent that we can confirm about the project as it stands.

The original plan for the Tank Life Extension, as I knew it, was investigating a mix of modernizing existing hulls and acquiring used hulls abroad that would be upgraded to Leopard 2A8 standard. The number discussed was ~103. This modernization would bridge the gap between now and a future replacement in the mid-2030s.

That, of course, is dead. However, I feel it important to bring up what the original plans were looking at before we moved into a full replacement now. Short-term pain for long-term gain and such.

Similar happened with the proposed Self-Propelled Howitzer UOR. That would have acquired Self-Propelled Howitzers specifically to support MNB-L; however, the Army never moved forward on it and decided instead to focus efforts on Indirect Fires Modernization.

That feels very similar here. You skip out on the bridge to instead focus on the wider replacement. Evidently, I imagine with money and a proper mandate both coming in, that there is a renewed belief that full modernizations can be done in an effective enough timeline to not necessarily need a bridge program.

That, of course, is before we get into how UOR can negatively effect wider procurements, but that's not for today. I have gone off track enough already. We are here to talk about tanks.

As of now, it is extremely hard to really compare options from an analytical perspective. That's not only because almost every manufacturer plans to have new models available by the 2030s, but we also don't really have any requirements to go off of. Essentially, we know we want a proper tank and that's it.

Of course, as of right now, several potential options exist on the table. While the previous modernization obviously had a German focus, I wanna stress again that we should not see it as some sort of tease for preferred options.

Potential options on the table for the 2030s could include platforms like the Leopard 2 A-RC 3.0, ​KF51 Panther, ​M1E3 Abrams, or K2/K3. These are all options that, hypothetically, would be available on the market for the early-2030 period.

Leopard 2 A-RC 3.0, KF51 Panther, K3, and M1E3 respectively

While each offers their own unique capabilities—perhaps something we will go into with a proper comparison once the project has a better idea of what it exactly wants—as many of you know, I don't like to do comparisons until requirements start to get hammered down.

One thing to note, though, is that all the aforementioned platforms take similar notes of future trends. All four platforms mentioned are aiming for a "Golden Zone" of 55-60 tonnes. They try to achieve this not by reducing armour requirements, but by altering the geometry of the tank through things like unmanned turrets, crew capsules, and relying on Active Protection Systems (APS) as a standard to intercept threats like ATGM, leaving the passive armor to deal strictly with kinetic threats like APFSDS.

All four platforms are also investigating the use of 130mm and 140mm guns in lieu of the traditional 120mm gun. This is in effort to keep pace with Russian/Chinese armor developments, while providing reasonable room for futureproofing. Most platforms are taking an agnostic approach to this development, where the turret has both future options available to the customer's preference.

All four platforms are also taking a hard look at future options for integrated CUAS capabilities, as well as increased lethality options through things like integrated launchers for ATGM/Loitering Munitions. Such munitions not only provide a long-range strike capability, but also a dedicated ISR capability.

Hybrid-Electric Drives and alternative fuels are also a common inclusion in many of these proposals. While most focuses on this topic would focus on fuel economy and such, it isn't the only benefit. A hybrid system allows a tank to move into a firing position on electric power and run high-draw electronic warfare/APS systems without the main turbine idling.

Modern sensors (thermal/IR) are the primary threat for detection. This "silent watch/silent move" capability changes the ambush calculus, allowing MBTs to operate with the acoustic stealth of an infantry squad.

Lastly, all of these platforms have a renewed focus on Machine Learning and Manned-Unmanned Teaming. From Situational Awareness and Signature Management to Target Identification and 'Mothershipping,' there are about a million concepts that exist for what sort of AI and Autonomous capabilities are planned to be integrated onto future platforms.

Future tanks are expected to not just partake in the traditional roles of executing armored breakthroughs, providing direct fire support to infantry, and neutralizing enemy heavy armor.

Yes, tanks will still be providing traditional Heavy Cavalry roles but will also act as an anchor in the future distributed network. They are sensor nodes, C2 platforms to autonomous systems, and increasingly are being positioned as multi-role platforms.

Almost all platforms available to us are following these specific trends. They all execute differently, and they all prioritize different capabilities and design choices. However, all are following the same sort of philosophies.

There are also multinational initiatives that could present viable alternatives to individual platforms. Chief among those are things like MARTE. The MARTE initiative (specifically MARTE ARGE GbR) is a joint venture established by KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall Landsysteme. Technically, this is not a single vehicle but a study and design consortium involving 51 legal entities from 12 EU nations (and Norway!) aimed at defining the "Main Ground Combat System" (MGCS) precursor or parallel technology demonstrators.

The technical mandate of MARTE is to harmonize the requirements for a future European Main Battle Tank that integrates the disparate technologies of the member states, specifically combining German armor/propulsion expertise with Italian electronics and sensor packages (Leonardo).

Participation on MARTE and whatever comes of it is another possibility. That might be one of the existing German platforms, might not. We just don't know enough at this time. It is an area of cooperation that Canada could potentially explore, though, as part of a replacement.

And again, we won't be spending forever on each platform at this time. That is for when we have more information available; however, that doesn't mean we can't talk about trends and start discussing what the future tank of the Canadian Army fully looks like.

But should that be an actual tank?

But seriously we should discuss this

This is where we often end up in these debates. Of course, the role of the tank on the future battlefield has been the subject of much fanfare and debate since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

I feel like most of these discussions are rather tiresome. Yes. We know the threat drones pose to modern armour. We know of the developments in Ukraine and the increasing proliferation of capable AIs and Additive Manufacturing are making these sort of capabilities more accessible and capable than in years past.

This isn't me trying to be dismissive. The proliferation of cheap drones and ever-capable loitering munitions do pose an active threat to armour, as we have seen. This threat constitutes a new factor on the networked, dispersed battlespace that we will see going into the 2030s.

However, I am not, as others are, so quick to dismiss all forms of Armour as some sort of limited capability that isn't survivable on the modern battlefield. Certainly, we still see armour continue to play decisive roles in shaping operations and being of tactical value.

This won't kill the concept of the tank, and as we have seen, future examples are tailoring themselves to a contested environment that will require them to operate in dispersed groups under constant threat of detection and engagement.

That includes increased layers of protection, better sensor fusion, and access to collaborative platforms to act as additional nodes or carriers for various systems and munitions. That includes renewed focus on needing to onboard and process large amounts of data.

See, the threat here—at least for Canada—is whether this, among other factors, tips the scale away from a direct tank replacement. Context is everything, and before we jump on such a concept, we need to ask whether a full tank is the right platform for Canada's needs and capabilities.

This isn't me arguing either way, but it is me saying the debate should be broad and ask whether the financial commitment, the broader goals of Army Modernization, and the benefit it provides are all enough to justify spending upwards of $10 billion dollars on new tanks?

For Canada, there are some stark realities that need to be addressed. Firstly, we have to acknowledge that tanks are primarily the domain of the European battlefield. That is where they are of most value to us. There is zero role for a tank in the defence of Canada. There is also little role for a full tank in the Indo-Pacific, but we'll get to that. The domain of importance is in Europe. That is where these tanks would have their most value.

Now, in the context of NATO, we should also be asking whether the best contribution we could make here is in Heavy Armour. $10 Billion is a lot of money, especially for a country who lacks the sealift capability to move armour from Canada to Europe in the event of conflict.

It also raises—despite the high many are on looking at the promised funding coming in—whether there is a pressing need to have this kind of Armour in our inventory as compared to investing in other platforms. Is the solution a traditional Main Battle Tank?

Or perhaps is it best for Canada to put a renewed look at the class of Medium Tanks that have popped into the market. Platforms like the CV90120 come to mind here.

Smaller, lighter, more scalable when combined with the potential for a common chassis with MEDCAV. Something that, while still limited in how many we could move at a given time, still presents a more deployable platform than a traditional MBT that may better fit with our capabilities.

We need to understand our role and what we want to bring to the table. Are we going to be in the thick of it? With MBTs and IFVs running around Eastern Europe?

Or should we look for something not necessarily light, but lighter, more rapid, and a complement to other partners on the continent. The same issues again with Sealift still exist with a Tank, unless we keep a large amount of the fleet prepositioned in Latvia, and maybe we do.

Maybe we do return to that Cold War disposition of prepositioning stocks of equipment in Europe incase of conflict. That's also a possibility that is very much on the table right now, and might be the optimal one.

However, I am not ready to close the door on anything. In this case, I want all options explored, and all potential combinations of them, before I am ready to accept that any option is the absolute best.

Restricting ourselves at this time does nothing but limit options and push the conversation out the door. We are again undergoing one of the most radical shifts in the Canadian Army that we've seen in decades. That deserves the same radical shifts in thinking and doctrine.

This isn't a criticism of anyone either. I know many people working on these issues across the board. Many recognize this, and are a hell of a lot smarter than me. It's actually refreshing to see people want to experiment and be out there about this stuff. I love it.

There are few projects I feel open the door to such interesting and deep discussions than the debate on the future of Canada’s Heavy Armour. Yes. We have this debate stretching back decades. Yes, we have always gone back to what we know.

This time, though, I think there are enough capable platforms, and enough reason, to actually make an alternative viable for us, and for that, I think it's worth discussing.