Let's talk about the Minerva Initiative

Analysis

It feels like almost every week there’s another big reform or Initiative that passes by my desk. We’re officially in the era of big dreams and big ideas! With defence spending taking the rare forefront of government priority, it feels just about everyone is looking to take advantage before the pendulum shifts back the other way.

Minerva itself isn’t anything overtly radical. If you compare it to similar initiatives in many of our allies, it would seem fairly par for the course, if not a bit conservative in its desires. It honestly has a very similar feel to the American Replicator initiative, which aims to acquire thousands of autonomous systems over the next two years. It also had a broad mandate with a focus on Class I UAS, though has now shifted to CUAS systems.

It also isn’t as radical, in my mind, as other concepts like the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion initiative, which aims to acquire dozens of small and large USV/UUV as the backbone of an Atlantic surveillance network. That is an example of a heavily radical programme looking to leverage many experimental and unique technologies.

All across NATO, we are seeing similar initiatives to rapidly scale the amount of Class I UAS available. Minerva’s primary focus lies here, with the official mandate being “the Canadian Army’s blueprint for a practical, soldier-focused approach to integrating drones and autonomous systems into our operations.”

I have had the opportunity to receive the documents sent out to Industry the other week regarding Minerva, and talk around to several people on both sides of the aisle about this initiative. Industry met with the team on December 2nd for the initial kickoff. We’ll get into feelings in a second. First off, what exactly is being discussed? What is the team saying? Lucky for you, I have slides.

Looking into Minerva

Minerva starts off similar to many documents that the Canadian Army has released in the last year. If you have read thinking like Inflection Point or Capstone, a lot of the dialog here will appear familiar, and for good reason. Minerva should be seen as an extension of the ongoing restructuring of the Canadian Army.

The Canadian Army (CA) is currently built for ‘contribution’ rather than fighting and surviving in major combat operations. The Army has a critical gap in its “Division-Level Warfighting” capability. The current force structure, reliant on unit-level contributions and built around sustaining the Battlegroup, is insufficient for the modern battlespace.

That is why the Canadian Army is currently undertaking its biggest restructuring in decades and shifting from supporting the ad-hoc battlegroup to sustaining a proper fighting division in line with many of our allies.

The preliminary look at the “close fight” (0-40km) primarily suggests that without access to a healthy, diverse supply of autonomous systems, the CA can expect to take major casualties without any guarantee of success. The goal here is simple: reduce the risk to human life by inserting autonomous systems into the most dangerous tasks.

The initiative centers on the “General Purpose Uncrewed System” (GPUS). The brief categorizes these into three categories: Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS), Uncrewed Ground Systems (UGS)/Littoral Systems (ULS), and the often-overlooked Enabling/Sustaining Technology (EST).

The focus is on systems that are small, low weight, and low complexity. The kind of systems that can be managed at the unit level without a massive logistics tail. These are tools, not roles, after all. That’s what they say, after all.

Minerva does go beyond UAS, being a proper UxS Initiative that will also be looking at Uncrewed Ground Vehicles and even Uncrewed Surface Vessels for the Army. Similar to Replicator, Minerva is expected to run over the next 24 months with the end goals of:

1. Maintaining Ongoing Domestic Access

2. Increasing Quantities and Types

3. Integrated with CA Concepts of Operations

4. Maximize Operational Benefits

5. Simple Autonomous Systems at the Tactical Edge

The project provides several slides that detail the timelines and measurable goals of the initiative. The Campaign plan outlines the broad timeline and goals between now and FY/28. We have already passed by the Preparation phase. That is effectively already in the rear-view mirror. We are now well thrown into the Initiation phase.

This is the phase where we are now seeing this beginning stage Industry engagement. The timeline also makes reference to Drone Surge, an ongoing contest being held by IDEaS investigating concepts for scalable UAS systems and their development. We wrote about it when it launched. That’s already closed, so if this is your first time hearing about it, I got some bad news. That will run through most of FY/26.

The most critical, and perhaps most dangerous, phase is the Evaluation period slated for FY 26/27. During this single year, the Army intends to conduct trials, run interim procurements, and most importantly, revise its Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Attempting to rewrite doctrine while simultaneously testing the hardware that dictates that doctrine is always a risky act. It’s something that one has to be cautious about undertaking. Messing up the procurement part of the Initiative can lead to systems that negatively affect the final outcome of the TTP.

Similarly, being too rigid in this aspect can hinder innovation, stifle potential solutions, and can risk dragging out Minerva past its 24-month timeframe. It’s a balancing act, walking the tightrope ever so carefully to ensure you don’t fall.

We have seen similar miscalculations jeopardize the original GPUAS initiative, which has a similar mandate for quickly acquiring UAS by taking the U.S. Blue List and using it as a baseline for commanders to acquire at their own discretion. While simple in theory, GPUAS suffered from several notable setbacks related to policy, execution, and delegating the proper mandates.

It did get us the Teal II though, and I feel the Teal II is very cute, so it wasn’t an absolute waste. However, it does present something I hope the Minerva team has gone back on and studies what went wrong. We have had one UAS initiative fail. We do not need another, and the rapid pace that Minerva mandates inherently increases that risk. We need to be cautious.

The campaign culminates in the Execution phase in FY 27/28, where we see the fielding of ‘Tactically Effective’ UAS, UGS, and Enabled Systems at scale. It is a sprint to relevance, skipping the “crawl, walk, run” mentality for a “run, sprint, hurdle” approach. If all goes to plan, we should see Minerva delivering visible results within the next two years, across a wide range of systems.

Yet what exactly do these systems look like?

The Priorities

The results from the Concept Development Working Group (CDWG) held in November offer what could be our first comprehensive glimpse into the Army’s shifting mindset of what systems they really want. The color-coded list is a nice touch, broken down into increasing, decreasing, and new priorities.

It shows, at least to me, that a lot of the top priorities that have been discussed for years now continue to hold, with ISR and Logistics—the two tasks we commonly see discussed when the topic of UAS/UGV comes up—continuing to dominate the discussion.

However, for simplicity’s sake, let’s break this down quickly.

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Objective 1 – Tactically Effective Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS)

​1.1 Recce and Surveillance (No Change): Remains the foundational requirement for UAS. The desire for expanded ISR capabilities remains strong.

​1.2 Target Acquisition (No Change): Also another commonly discussed topic. This category will be especially important as Indirect Fire Modernization starts ramping up. Currently, the army primarily relies on high-end systems like the CU-172 Blackjack for that role; however, target acquisition does go beyond artillery, especially when discussing things like MEDEVAC and in combination with other assets like future ATGM and Loitering Munitions.

​1.3 Strike (Priority Increased): Speaking of that, Strike UAS have moved up significantly from its previous position. This aligns with the trend toward loitering munitions and “kamikaze” drones as primary effectors. However, I should note that the ‘Bomber’ style of drone is not included here.

​1.4 Communications Extension (Priority Increased): Another jump in importance. This is a concept we have actually been testing for a while now. This directly ties into the concept of dispersed operations, looking for ways to ditch burdensome, bulky systems like masts, expand and scale the wider communication network, and support operation in contested electromagnetic environments.

​1.5 Drop Capable (Priority Decreased): This role, which consolidated Cargo Transport, Bombing, and Mining, has been de-prioritized. My guess is that participants see this as a Master of None capability compared to dedicated platforms that could likely do these roles better. It’s also likely to reflect that the current desire leans to filling notable gaps instead of what might be seen as ‘Nice to Have’.

​1.6 Arctic Ops (New Requirement): A completely new addition. It highlights the realization that standard commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) batteries and airframes will fail in Canadian winter conditions. Minerva does have an Arctic mandate for exploring systems that can work in the harsh conditions. These kinds of cheap, scalable systems are especially important given that the primary operators would be the Canadian Rangers, who themselves have limited resources to support and maintain complex systems.

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Objective 2 – Tactically Effective Uncrewed Ground and Littoral Systems (UGS/ULS)

​2.1 Cargo Transport (Priority Increased): The “Mule” concept has moved up. Logistics is a major pain point and presents some of the largest risk to an individual on the battlefield. The Army, with a mandate for decreasing the risk to the individual, will always aim to automate the simplest of tasks first, such as running things from Point A to Point B. That’s just common sense.

​2.2 Breacher (Priority Increased): Also moved up in priority. There are vignettes in the slides that try to present different scenarios. I will not be showing them myself for safety reasons; however, the ability to breach minefields on both land and in waterways without risking engineers is a high-demand capability. See above as well.

​2.3 Recce and Surveillance (Priority Decreased): Ground-based recce has been pushed down, likely because UAS can perform this role more efficiently than a UGS/ULS and to greater flexibility. The areas where UGS dominate here are limited. ULS have obvious limits.

2.4 Communications Extension (New Requirement): Similar to the UAS requirement, the Army has identified a new need for UGS/ULS to act as mobile signal repeaters and communication nodes. Communications Extension, again especially in the frame of a dispersed environment, is an important need. Relying again on limited, bulky, easy to target systems in a peer conflict won’t cut it.

​2.5 Fire Support (Priority Decreased): The “Assault” or weaponized concept has been downgraded. The Army appears hesitant to prioritize autonomous direct fire ground systems over logistical ones. That makes sense. You focus on the easy to replace tasks and the support elements. That is where Autonomous systems really shine if we’re being honest. While things like Ripsaw are cool, they remain primarily boutique systems. The initial priority remains filling gaps and moving people out of the more dangerous roles.

​2.6 Specialist (New Requirement): A new, likely niche category for specific tasks (possibly CBRN or EW) that don’t fit the standard molds. I have not got an answer to what exactly this category is.

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Objective 3 – Enabled and Sustained Uncrewed Systems

​3.1 Universal Ground Control Station and Software (No Change): Remains the critical anchor for the entire initiative. One controller to rule them all is essential when discussing potentially dozens of different systems in operation.

​3.2 C2/Battle Management System Integration (Priority Increased): Software integration has overtaken hardware training. Integration of sensors and systems is a critical part of the digital battlespace in line with projects like Joint Fire Modernization, Land Command Support System Tactical Command and Control Information System Modernization, and Pan-Domain Command & Control. A node is useless if it can’t feed information into the system effectively.

​3.3 Common Training and Simulation (Priority Decreased): Pushed down the list. The focus seems to be on getting live systems into the field rather than building perfect simulators first. It’s still in the upper end, but integration of systems and making sure they can be easily used is the focus.

​3.4 Common Parts (New Requirement): A vital new logistical requirement. The Army wants interchangeable motors, props, and batteries to avoid a nightmare of proprietary supply chains. This will tie into things later. Hopefully, this also means support for building that supply chain domestically.

​3.5 IFF Integration (Priority Decreased): Identification Friend or Foe is still needed but has been deprioritized relative to ensuring supply and proper integration.

​3.6 Survivability Enhancement (No Change): Hardening systems against jamming and physical threats remains a steady requirement, but the constant evolution of countermeasures will always be a rat race. It seems the army has accepted that and is focusing on scale and ease of use.

​3.7 Vendor Tech Support and System Improvement (New Requirement): A followup to above is the need for proper support and evolution. Vendors need to be agile. They are partners, not merely suppliers of systems. Companies that can offer proper support and quick turnaround on countermeasures and improvements will benefit.

​3.8 Additive Manufacturing (Priority Decreased): The ability to 3D print parts in the field has dropped in priority, likely viewed as a nice to have rather than a critical operational necessity. While I greatly support the technology, I understand why this is low. Instead of chasing the technology, focusing on getting right what we can now.

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An initial amount of 1000 systems is desired, along with annual replacements. DND will work with DRDC (Defence Research and Development Canada), ISED (Innovation, Science and Economic Development), and the NRC (National Research Council) to advance this effort, as well as leveraging things like IDEaS and the future Borealis. They will also continue to leverage existing infrastructure, such as Suffield and the CUAS Sandbox, to support development.

The previously mentioned Drone Surge contest will be coupled with a new “True North Precision” challenge, which seeks a low-cost ISR drone specifically for Target Acquisition. The requirements aren’t really laid out. It must have an integrated laser range finder to cue indirect fire. This will, funny enough, be the Inauguration of ‘BOREALIS Innovation’ efforts.

Tied to this is the potential for up to $5M in procurement for this specific capability. That’s right, unlike the usual IDEaS stream, it looks like BOREALIS will have direct procurement tie-ins. Isn’t that a wonderful, innovative concept that no one ever thought of?

I’m petty, I admit it. However, I feel it is a valid criticism to keep bringing up. Another thing to bring up is that just like GPUAS, while the Army wants “low cost” they are explicitly demanding compliance with the USA National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) and the associated “Blue/Green lists”.

A “Canadian version of the Blue List” is expected shortly, though no timelines are given. I greatly support this effort merely for the independent ability to verify suppliers, especially Canadian ones. Anyone getting into this should know that NDAA would be applied either way. My only hope is that we focus on leveraging a Canadian supply chain as opposed to merely becoming an American importer.

You still need to decouple from China. That is non-negotiable. So if you’re DJI Canada who was lobbying last week, maybe just sit this one out I guess. The Army is not just broadcasting requirements here though. They are soliciting active feedback on the campaign plan itself.

They are asking if the “problem space” and “intent” are clear, which suggests they are still refining the doctrine and are open to industry telling them where their assumptions might be wrong. The call to action is for industry to prepare concept white papers, plan for collaborative trials, and crucially, provide cost estimates to help the Army build its budget.

And that of course goes into the thoughts and feelings themselves. While I can credit the Minerva team for seemingly being very comprehensive in their desires and being active, there is a sense of this being yet another time-taker, something for people to do.

The feelings

The vast response I have seen from industry is that Minerva is yet again an Initiative still trying to figure out what they want, making grand plans, but yet doesn’t seem to have an execution planned. There’s lots of talk, a lot of hyping, and many wonderful slides.

Yet there is very little initial confidence that the program will deliver on its ambition, and a lot of worry that it will suffer similarly to previous Initiatives because of that. If the idea was to instill a sense of direction and focus, it doesn’t seem like it was a success in the initial event.

And of course, I can understand that sentiment. I have many similar skepticisms looking at things. Of course, I did not attend the initial event myself, so I can not judge fully what was said or how it was handled from a personal perspective.

However, I have seen many such Initiatives come and go, and right now there is a lot of hype to get things done. That’s great, however, no one is immune from getting caught in things. There were criticisms to how the event was held and some of the things discussed; again, I didn’t attend so I can’t make an accurate assessment there.

My only assessment can come from the material I have on hand. That material paints the picture of a conservative drone acquisition program that wants to deliver quick, wants to deliver a bunch of capabilities but doesn’t quite seem to have the middle figured out. There’s a lot of ‘figuring out’ and ‘working on it’ that is still dominating this initial engagement.

All of these capabilities, the Initiative are looking to be delivered upon in just two years. That’s dozens of Autonomous systems, including all the TTP, frameworks, contests, etc., tied to them that are to be delivered and in service by the end of 2028.

And no one believes that Industry has that capability more than me. Canada maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive and deep Autonomous sectors on earth. Companies across the board like Draganfly, Volatus, Indro, Ara, UVAD, AVSS, Cellula, Rheinmetall Canada, Canadian UAVs, Aeromao, Clearpath, Kraken… So many companies working on these technologies call Canada their home.

The problem has never been in the innovators. This is just a small handful. The wider supply chain gets far deeper, and I know some of you might yell at me for missing you! The problem though is whether we are prepared and ready to execute on this industry and to tackle this head-on.

There is no bad guy. There is no prime problem. The supply chain is still in needs of expansion. Industry still needs to get things working and scalable, and the DND needs to have the proper plan. That also means having regulators like Transport Canada on board, engaged, and supporting.

I want this to succeed. I am going to give it my benefit because I want it to be a success that much. I want this to happen. So I want to support it in whatever way I can. However, I can’t ignore the feelings in Industry, how they’re feeling. They don’t see the ambition, the timelines. They don’t see the plan and that has to change, and fast.

I just pray no one messes this up. I pray for its success. However, the current feeling is not something that you want from this initial engagement. You don’t want the response to be a whimper and a sigh. This requires ambition, the same that we see elsewhere. What we are asking for isn’t hard. It isn’t radical. It is the bare minimum ask. If we can’t succeed here? What’s to say for other projects? What’s to say for evolutions like LUSV?

This needs to work because it’s the basic step to all of that domestically, to building that domestic capacity. If we don’t succeed together here? Then everyone risks drowning.