Let's Talk Briefly About The NorthWatch Initiative
Project Updated
My second project post in a week! Must be a record. Since my CDSEA article, I've been getting a lot of questions about certain projects that I brought up; more specifically, NorthWatch.
Now, to my defense, I had sworn we spoke about it a few times before and its information was publicly available. Imagine my surprise when I learned that, no, apparently the title has never been publicly utilized before; nor had the project ever really been detailed.
I wasn't planning to write about NorthWatch today, mainly because there isn't too much to speak about. However, even if it is not long, I still want to deliver; I feel that it's at least good to get it out of the way since so many of you are curious!
NorthWatch is an initiative, not a project in itself. It is the name for the combined pairing of the future Polar-Over-the-Horizon Radar System, not to be confused with the future JORN-based Arctic Over-The-Horizon Radar System, and the future Space-Based Airborne Moving Target Indicator constellation.
The RCAF is looking for these two systems to provide a continuous awareness layer for Canada's Arctic and North approaches in tandem with other assets like A-OTHR, AEWC, DESSP, and future upgrades to the Northern Warning System.
A-OTHR falls under the Northern Approaches Surveillance System (NASS) initiative and covers the northern and eastern approaches of the continent; meanwhile, P-OTHR covers the northernmost approaches, including the Archipelago and Arctic Ocean.
These two make up the primary ground-based radar systems of the future RCAF. They will be further supplemented by upgrades and expansions to the Northern Warning System (to be determined) and the Modular, Autonomous, Containerized (MAC) sensor systems deployed under the CROSSBOW initiative.
NorthWatch, though, remains one of the RCAF's most ambitious projects; least of all is the attempt to bring together an SB-AMTI constellation as a viable capability.
SB-AMTI is probably something you're familiar with if you follow American procurement, least of all the attempt to shoehorn it in as a Wedgetail replacement. What we are attempting to do is effectively a Canadian-controlled copy of that same idea.
Canada has a relatively new mandate of sovereign capability across all domains. It isn't necessarily official, but it is being operated in practice; what that means is we want to move away from the idea that, "Our allies have this capability, so we have that capability."
The CAF no longer wants to be reliant on allies to provide specific, niche capabilities. We want to have at least some nominal capacity to act independently of our allies when it comes to certain tasks, including when it comes to space-based capabilities.
That's why we're starting to see a lot of very specialized, very niche concepts like CDSEA and SB-AMTI come to the forefront and get traction. The mandate has shifted enough where we can have conversations on very specific capabilities that the CAF might want; furthermore, the federal government is willing to at least listen and provide space to make the argument.
That isn't to say the CAF never wanted these capabilities, nor planned for them. One can argue that some were more prepared than others; the Air Force has long been ready to jump when the mandate and mentality shifted, which is something they independently set out to do.
Anywho...
SB-AMTI is a polar-orbiting satellite constellation equipped with microwave sensors, such as space-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), designed specifically to detect and track moving airborne targets from space.
While P-OTHR acts as the tripwire of the two, providing broad identification and early warning of potential threats, SB-AMTI acts as the magnifying glass to identify, classify, and track threats like adversarial aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles.
P-OTHR tells us, "Something has happened and something is coming," but it isn't precise enough to provide reliable identification and tracking data. It also still suffers the limitations of being a ground-based system. There is always going to be a skip zone, as an example, even if you work hard to limit its concern (such as pairing it with A-OTHR).
They are still affected by environmental factors like space weather, such as solar storms, auroral interference, or even the ionospheric differences between day and night. They are also still susceptible to localized jamming and electronic countermeasures; moreover, they still struggle with low-flying targets and terrain masking.
That is where SB-AMTI takes over; it acts like a high-powered flashlight pointing straight down. Utilizing its built-in sensor, SB-AMTI could, in theory, resolve most of the limitations of P-OTHR. It avoids the atmospheric distortions, auroral interference, and other environmental concerns that P-OTHR has.
Furthermore, from its top-down perspective, issues like skip zones and terrain masking are virtually eliminated. A low-flying cruise missile or drone hugging a mountain valley can't hide from a sensor looking directly down on it.
Coupled also with a higher resistance to localized jamming, and a theoretical higher resiliency from distributing your sensing capability over an entire constellation, SB-AMTI should provide the RCAF with crystal-clear, real-time tracking data that OTHR simply cannot deliver.
That doesn't negate the constant, redundant nature of other assets like P-OTHR or, as the Americans are learning, the tactical battle management and localized command and control capabilities of an AEWC platform. All might have overlap, but each provides a different link in the chain; each adds to the all-domain picture, and each works in tandem to give the RCAF a 24/7, constant picture of our air domain.
That's the general hope, at least. In practice, it is far harder.
SB-AMTI is hard, very hard. You need the infrastructure to take in and process large amounts of data to properly identify threats. It isn't just about beaming raw data back down to ground stations; the sheer volume of background noise and clutter means you need to be looking at things like AI and advanced onboard edge processing to help filter out the clutter before it gets there.
You also need an appropriate satellite bus with significant SWaP-C margins to support the immense power generation and thermal cooling required by an SAR system, especially when dealing with high-speed, moving targets against the rotating backdrop of the Earth. Firing that signal down through the atmosphere and catching the return echo of that potential threat takes heavy, power-hungry hardware.
Finally, there is the constellation itself, which will need to be significant in order to provide both reliable coverage in the Arctic and redundancy from adversarial targeting. A handful of buses won't cut it; you need a robust, overlapping network available.
That ensures persistent tracking and guarantees that if an adversary employs anti-satellite weapons or targeted jamming, which our adversaries are very much expanding and improving their capabilities to do, we don't lose out on that network and capability.
Adversarial targeting in space is such a terrifying threat. Anti-satellite missiles, increasingly sophisticated jamming, laser systems, and even anti-satellite satellites are now becoming commonplace systems our enemies are both exploring and actively deploying; that's also why having a broader sovereign launch mandate is just as important to ensure we can keep up.
But here is a bit of the nitty-gritty issues at present: the current budget allocated for the NorthWatch vision is only about $4 billion combined, which has to stretch to cover support for both the satellites and P-OTHR. For an advanced, high-end constellation, that leaves much to be desired.
While Canada is also making moves to build the support network, including through projects like the AVEDLEK northern ground stations, dedicated Space Command and Control facilities, and space-based data processing centers, these projects aren't projected to reach full operational capability until the mid-2030s and even into the 2040s.
This leaves a bit of a conundrum, and one Canada has a big issue with across the board: we often lag behind on the foundational and infrastructure front to the point that they can become a crisis; see stuff like the F-35 and its struggles with infrastructure, the secret cloud, etc.
Pan-Domain Command and Control, arguably the glue that holds everything together and my most important project, is also delayed, still conceptual, and struggling to come to formation. It isn't the end of the world. There isn't nothing; however, the longer you wait on having the backend, the harder it is to bring the capability up front.
The United States is building a pathway for us to follow, with a recent $4.16 billion contract to SpaceX to begin developing the American SB-AMTI constellation awarded just a few days ago. That is the scale that they see as needed, and yes, it won't entirely align with our needs; however, it does give us a roadmap and concept to follow, even though pulling this off will be hard.
All space projects have some difficulty, and Canada has many. Ask one of the space boys, and they'll happily tell you all the cool stuff they're doing!
DESSP, ground and space-based optical capabilities, and a whole host of sovereign communication constellation projects are underway. There is a lot going on in the space domain; more than I believe many know. I know I have to one day go over all of them together, and map out what they all do and how they integrate together. It is really awesome to see, and that's without talking about commercial Canadian companies like MDA, 49North, Telesat, or Kepler and all the cool stuff they're doing.
However, it doesn't come easy. Projects like SB-AMTI try to show a path forward for us, one where Canada tries to be more than a standard we set for ourselves; one where Canada can act independently, even if only in our own backyard, without the EU, and without the Americans. It is a sovereign, Canadian solution to Continental Defence.
They show us the ways outside the box that planners are looking at the Defence of Canada. They also are trials, tests to see if we are capable of handling difficult tasks to ourselves. We have a lot on the plate; we have a lot that needs to be figured out.
A new DIA, a new DIS, a new Defence Policy in the works, and a whole lot of money we know will be coming in for the next five years at least; maybe the next decade as we look to 3.5% and beyond.
These kinds of projects are the trials we have to show that we can make this new system work, and that we can do things we thought impossible and out of reach. Projects like CPSP show us it could be done, maybe; but projects like SB-AMTI try to show that we can sustain that, and do it with some of the most niche, complex capabilities the CAF could dream of.
I'm confident, but lord knows they're a proving ground. Some will fail, obviously; no one hits 100%. However, I do hope that we figure it all out, and that all this works out, because just imagine how beautiful it will be.