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Derrin Urban's avatar

A shout out to Noah for an outstanding job as usual and also for Noah and TNSR being called out as a source by the Youtube channel Dominion Defence Review. Makes me smile everytime they do it.

Colin's avatar

As it is very unlikely we would have enough maritime helicopters to equip the CDC's, I see the need for Lightweight torpedo launchers on the ship, even if the ship has a aerial drone that can carry the Lightweight torpedo.

The Sherpa might make a very good adjunct to the Twin Otter, particularly for the North, where it can easily move more bulky cargo with less requirement to break down cargo and could carry large ATV's/snow machines and even small Bobcats for light engineering work.

For the love of god, can we just start buying X number of Senators per year and start equipping the Reserves with some decent armour that won't roll over and catch fire on a regular basis.

As for pilot training, it is to weep for anyone who knows the history of our air training program in WWII. Maybe a program that pays for more people to get basic pilot licences that will give a pool for the military and civil world to draw upon them. There are hundreds of Air Cadet eager to get their licences, maybe start by expanding the Cadet training program to get more them flying? Later maybe add Robinson Helicopters as a option as well. Build up a couple of Air Reserve squadrons with Twin Otters and Bell 429's to act as a pool of candidates to draw upon for further training.

N. Q.'s avatar

What does the Reserve writ large need Senators for? Youre operating backwards, we need capabilities first to inform our kit, not kit to inform capabilities. I think Senator should and will win LUV but what does the reserve need to do under light armour? Is 4×4 good enough for mobility in wartime? In domops? Is it useful for LCav, sigs, MPs or light eng? I think so but that probably needs to be informed by the ADDP and the warfighting concept coming out soon. We’ve had so many political procurements that failed to deliver because the institutional capabilities disnt align with whats delivered.

Elizaisacat's avatar

I would argue that protected mobility, specifically proof against small arms and shell fragments from X caliber at Y distance, and, particularly, a sufficient level of passive protection to let occupants survive a FPV drone hit, is now a baseline requirement for all military vehicles.

Just as 4-wheel drive and modest ground clearance are baseline attributes for all military vehicles the world over, the UAS-catalyzed revolution in military affairs that has been ushered in by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made it necessary for vehicles of all types to have the ability to move through space under sufficient protection as to allow its occupants to survive the minimum level of lethal kinetic force that must be assumed to be present in any environment where a military operates, almost regardless of distance from the line of contact.

While the likelihood of the CAF needing protected mobility at home is minimal to non-existent, providing the CAF with protected mobility enables its complete range of vehicles to be used where they are potentially needed.

In an eastern front tripwire scenario where the CAF suddenly found itself in a shooting war, the rear area motor pool in Latvia should be expected to be quickly degraded through mid-range strike and battlefield shaping. In such a situation, the domestic motor pool would need to be ready to make good the losses in order to maintain battlefield logistics and high-tempo rear-area security against infiltration tactics. If it were still made up primarily of civilian-pattern vehicles without any protection, it would be a tremendous risk to replace losses in Latvia with such vehicles, if not outright unacceptable.

The only thing worse than an under-protected vehicle is no vehicle, so I fear unprotected vehicles would still be pressed into service. The scenario of the CAF running Milverados for CASEVAC and drone operation resupply, as so many Ukrainian units are forced to do with donated and fundraised pickups due to a shortage of protected mobility, should give us pause.

Colin's avatar

Because it’s time to make the Reserves as a more capable fighting force. The Senator will improve their abilty to respond and to train for the modern fight. It will also give some depth to the vehicle fleet in the CAF, which frankly at the current level might last a few months in a peer to peer conflict.

I have no faith the CAF will create or coherent plan or even if they manage to do so, will they be able to meet it or allowed to by changing government priorities?

The Senator will be better for the Reserves as there is no logistical support most of the Reserve units to support LAV’s in Reserve units. Most of the servicing can be done by local dealerships. I would start with 100 a year being issued and treat the domestic truck contracts like the NSS and get rid of domestically made vehicles older than 10 years and replace them on either a 2 for 1 or a 1 to 1 basis. Our vehicle fleet has been shrinking since the 1970’s and time to reverse that.

N. Q.'s avatar

I dont disagree - my main concern is I hope the horse isnt being put before the cart and I want any ARes procurements to be fully aligned with CAF requirements. Its the MO, we only get one shot at this per generation lol.

Mark's avatar

The Defence if Canada Division /2 Div needs to actually be able to train for modern combat & in extremis, fight to defend Canada. Those 2 things drive an armoured vehicle requirement. Even more so, considering the Combine Arms Reserve Battalion concept - CAMO calls for 10 CARBs (eventually) that will he full time (Cl B/C) units, at high readiness for DOMOPS/Arctic Ops & overseas deployments. Overseas deployments will require their own deployable combat-capable assets. They could retrain on something like LAVs... But this would generate a much larger training burden & decrease the deployability & usefulness of CARBs.

Further, if we want A Res members to be combat capabke & deployable to augment the Reg F (either as individual augmentees, or formed elements), they need to train with modern equipment & modern concepts. It doesn't have to be the exact same as the RegF to he effective - an APC with a basic weapon system & optics can still teach an infantry section what they need to know about mechanised warfare (something sorely lacking from the current A Res infantry... Any understanding of operations in a box larger than 2×2km...).

Armoured vehicles also are.much better recruitment tools. Put TAPV alongside G-Wagon, & the TAPV garners orders of magnitude more interest from civilians interested in joining (add in more modern kit across the board as well).

Some variants, like a Roshel Senator Ambulance & MP vehicle could also see use sife by side in the A Res

& the Reg F units. While RegF does have the ACSV Amb, it is too hig for certain applications... As is the LVM Ambulance. An Armoured Roshel ambulance would actually be a good fit here. Likewise, MPs need a deployable, protected, combat capable platform... Something like a Senator would be an excellent fit here,.for both the RegF and A Res.

Finally - having a 2nd stream of AFVs provides flexibility in an emergency. If we ever have to mobilize, 2 Div can mobilize & be combat capable from day 1... & The rest of the A Res can more rapidly train up the next wave(s) if they have combat capable AFVs. It also provides a 2nd production stream to more rapidly bulk up numbers of vehicles/replace losses.

N. Q.'s avatar

I dont disagree - my main concern is putting the cart before the horse and I want any ARes procurements to be fully alignwd with CAF requirements. Its the MO, we only get one shot at this per generation lol.

Mark's avatar

I'm hopeful that concentrating all A Res into 2 Div, & giving them actual operational roles (& the CARBs, generating higher readiness reservists) will actually lead to doctrine being developed to use A Res.... As opposed to what I've seen in my career to date, which is that A Res is an afterthought of an afterthought & only seems to be thought of as bodies to fill deployed positions that the RegF don't want...

& Then I've seen too many RegF treat A Res as low capability/low competency/low value... But I will say that low investment in A Res equipment generates less valuable training ... & Leads to a vicious cycle of neglect.

Derrin Urban's avatar

My son is graduating university and wanted to go be a pilot for helicopters or the large transport aircraft. He has no interest in flying fighters. Talked to recruiters, they are not accepting applications for pilots but would take him as ground crew. Of course when they open the pilot applications, he would probably not be considered. Training is our bottle neck.

Elizaisacat's avatar

A likely LUV-dependent announcement from Roshel and Stellantis today: Roshel has an MOU to purchase the Stellantis Brampton plant.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/unifor-stellantis-9.7340910

I could also see the Roshel-Daimler MOU potentially playing into this announcement for the Brampton plant. Daimler makes the Zetros military transport trucks that Canada is purchasing. That procurement predated the DIA and current policy and, thus, localization of manufacturing was not part of it. Perhaps Roshel will angle for a follow-on order for Zetros being built by Roshel through its partnership with Daimler in the Brampton plant?

Mark's avatar

I will chime in on HDFM, MCAV & Light CAV...

I for one do hope MCAV moving up to STANG IV & a heavy caliber direct fire gun signals the death of HDFM as a separate platform. We cannot transport & sustain a useful number of MBTs, & a 40-45t medium tank (woth a 120mm gun) can do 95% of the tasks of an MBT... In more.places, in greater numbers, while being logistically easier to sustain in a very dispersed battlefield. That being said... Moving MCAV up the size/weight scale also causes an issue that the MCAV will not he able to keep up with/ahead of the wheeled Brigade it supports (for tasks like an advance to contact, or escorting a long distance road move... Or just manoeuvring from the rear to screen a flank or screen ahead of the brigade/division in a dispersed battlefield. I really think we will need a wheeled variant of MCAV (with the autocanon turret off of the tracked version).

As for Light CAV - TAPV (& to an extent, G-Wagon/LUV) is our Light CAV until that fleet dies. Hopefully sooner than later. A 8x8 LAV from ACV-W is not a suitable platform for Light CAV - it must be a platform with good strategic mobility & excellent operational mobility, with an armament to do flank or rear area security tasks in a peer conflict (& more aggressive against lesser threat environments). Light CAV is an "economy of force" option - i.e. you want to cover a space with some combat capabke forces... But will accept some risk to have them dispersed & lightly equipped, in exchange for them being very easy to sustain in operation. This drives a lighter platform than a LAV. Also, as it will be an A Res platform, domestic sustainability with limited CAF resources is key. TAPV as it stands is too big for the role, & not sustainable for A Res. A dedicated Light CAV variant of Roshel Senup would be a much better fit IMHO.

Stephen F's avatar

Regarding Q31, what GBAD system is going to be selected? Come on, I know that you know 😉.

Wayne's avatar

buy the 2 other P-8s, put them into rotation

should be 6 AORs but 4 will do. 4 + GLAAM even better Logistics always takes a back seat until needed

Harry Neutel's avatar

Q23, you nailed it! You did a great job of explaining it without condescending us. Thanks for a thoughtful answer.