So, What The Hell Is An Arctic Mobile Base?

Opinion

Yes. This is from the Navy. Not me.

Usually, I wouldn't write about a project this early in its development.

My typical rule for any project, especially ones I know are early in definition, is to give it around a year before I write a full post about it. That is to ensure the project has time to develop and hopefully settle on some of its requirements.

Not all, but enough that we can be set in some things. For the Arctic Mobile Base, though, I am less inclined to do so. That is because we have actually known about the idea for quite some time, and the Navy has long been discussing the concept for the last few years. I talked about it last year actually.

You can likely thank Erin O'Toole, who first raised the idea of RCN Polar Icebreakers in his election platform, for helping to stir the idea. Since O'Toole, the idea has been Conservative policy, and it is something that the RCN had been asking exactly how they would fulfill if pressed. So make sure to give him a little peck on the cheek mext tike you see him and thank him for these new vessels.

Not the only reason, but certainly a major one. For those that don't know, the Arctic Mobile Base, as it is currently called, is officially on the books. Despite a few years of conceptualization, the project is still in its early stages.

I always feel the need to reiterate that to folks; it is very much still a concept. It is not funded, not approved, but despite that, we already have a fairly decent vision of what the RCN is sorta looking for as a platform.

It's for that reason that I feel comfortable actually talking, at least a little bit, about exactly what the Arctic Mobile Base is looking like. I feel confident that a lot of the basics will remain the same, and that core aspects of the project will remain the same.

Of course, anytime you get something so unique, it's bound to be that a lot of concepts and requirements will be thrown around. That is why it can be a bit surprising to ask around and find many people on the same page about what they would like.

So today, let's dive a bit into the concept and see what exactly an Arctic Mobile Base is.

The Arctic Mobile Base

When you hear a name like Arctic Mobile Base, I'm sure a lot of ideas go through your head. Indeed. What exactly is a base in this context? Who or what is it meant to support? What sort of gaps is it designed to fulfill?

To understand the AMB (as I will call it from here on out), you need to understand exactly what the Navy is facing up in the Arctic; more specifically, the difficulty in building and maintaining infrastructure. With the failure of Nanisivik, the RCN is faced with a difficult position.

The first thing you need to know here is fundamental limitations. Canada, unlike our other allies, lacks an available ice-free port to utilize in the Arctic year-round. The closest available major ports that Canada has access to with year-round access are Saint John on the East Coast and Prince Rupert on the West Coast.

Iqaluit, Tuktoyaktuk, and Churchill, the major ports available in the Canadian Arctic, all freeze in the winter. Even Nome in Alaska freezes. The only port facility available year-round would be in Nuuk, where, while work is underway on the Danish side to expand current facilities, it is still not enough to provide ample support for Canadian vessels operating in the Archipelago.

Keep in mind also that Nuuk does not provide availability on the Western side of the Archipelago, nor in the Archipelago itself. Oftentimes, some will try to make a justification for collaborating with the Danes on utilizing Nuuk for supporting Arctic operations; while Nuuk certainly provides another node in our collective Arctic security, it in itself is still not a Canadian facility and does not necessarily have the capacity to support the extent of operations that we desire to fulfill.

All of that also doesn't eliminate the need for sustainment of vessels within the Archipelago and the Western Arctic, something that no individual facility could support; least of all one that is not Canadian and where facilities would always be limited for Canadian vessels, something unsustainable when planning for a fleet of over forty icebreakers and ice-strengthened vessels between the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard.

Existing facilities like Iqaluit and Tuktoyaktuk do exist; however, their use for the Navy remains limited. For Iqaluit, which often comes into discussions for leveraging existing infrastructure, it is best to remember that it is a commercial facility in nature.

This is, of course, an issue that will come up for almost any existing or planned port in the Arctic. Iqaluit lacks the refueling infrastructure needed to support the RCN/CCG beyond the most basic. It lacks any sort of maintenance and repair facilities that could be leveraged; storage for things like munitions and resupply are also limited. In short, it lacks basically anything that makes it more than a small node in the support chain.

Iqaluit is especially difficult, even though it is better by the inclusion of dedicated port facilities, because of the tidal range around the port. The waters of Frobisher Bay can rise and fall between 8 to 12 meters every six hours. To put that into perspective, that is equivalent to a three-to-four-story building getting drowned and then draining completely dry twice a day.

Keep in mind also that, in the months that Iqaluit does not freeze, it is still a commercial port. It is still an active hub for the annual resupply and a growing destination for many, something that, despite the tepid reality of the North-West Passage, is expected to grow over the coming years.

Iqaluit can see well near two dozen dry/fuel vessels per year, not including the numerous trawlers, research vessels, cruise ships, and adventurers looking to explore an opening passage.

Capacity will always be limited to some degree trying to operate out of a commercial port, especially one that is a vital lifeline during the Sealift. While the Port of Iqaluit is looking at future expansion, any such increases will come in the long term and are unlikely to change significantly between now and the 2030s.

Iqaluit is a very important center of our national defence, and its role will grow through other avenues. However, as for leveraging the existing port? Its capabilities remain limited.

Tuktoyaktuk is worse given its notoriously shallow depth and lack of deep-water facilities; it is barely worth the conversation in my opinion. It is not built to substantially support the Royal Canadian Navy, although it is becoming more important for Arctic resupply for the CAF as the Mackenzie River continues to suffer from low water levels.

Dredging would be expensive and require constant upkeep from sediment buildup thanks to the Mackenzie. While theoretically possible, it remains difficult and expensive, and it still doesn't build up the necessary support infrastructure to make it usable even in the ice-free period.

Future facilities like Grays Bay or Qikiqtarjuaq could be built with a dual-use approach in mind, where some dedicated facilities are developed in collaboration with commercial operations. However, the same long-term issues remain as any other facility: the port will freeze, and space will be a competition with growing demand along the passage.

For Grays Bay, where significant export potential related to critical minerals is being looked at, capacity will be further crunched. That is before we discuss its future role in an Arctic that is suffering from a slow, ongoing collapse of existing infrastructure, the results of which will lead to facilities like Grays Bay taking a further role as a vital lifeline for resupply across the Arctic.

None of these solve the fundamental issues. None of these are dedicated facilities, and the cost for the benefit increasingly shows difficulty. These remain, primarily, commercial ports tailored to commercial activities. They still freeze for significant parts of the year, and the DND taking the lead on existing physical infrastructure will be both expensive and take significant amounts of time.

That is before, of course, we get into the other issue, and that is proper consultation. While Canada has committed to investing over $30 billion into building out Arctic infrastructure over the next decade, leaders and communities still feel like they are being left out of the discussion.

Premier John Main raised this issue after last month's announcement, but it raises another issue with many of these kinds of proposals in the media, and that is the lack of understanding of how many communities in the north work.

I spoke a bit about this when speaking on the Global 6500, and some of the questions regarding why air-to-air refueling is important for an Arctic aircraft. One cannot merely show up in an existing community up north and expect fuel, supplies, etc.

Every bit you take is often interlinked to the community you are in. The RCAF cannot merely land at any airport in the North and refuel without consequence. That same fuel is oftentimes the fuel the community relies upon year-round to support themselves.

The same would go for many port facilities. You do not exist in isolation. Your choices of what you do and what you take can have consequences for the communities you visit; assuming you don't have your own dedicated supply, it will itself need to be supported by your own supply chain, which will further play into capacity.

Many communities hear these arguments, see these conversations, and feel their needs are being put second to decisions and policymakers in Ottawa, most of whom have never engaged with or visited the communities they talk about.

Consultation is important, and many ask whether the claims of 'dual-use' benefits are actually beneficial to them. If a port has limited space for expansion, is it right to demand of a community that the CAF get priority of space and infrastructure over their own needs?

It might seem trivial. To some, it might seem a bit silly; but to those living in communities like Iqaluit, these are important questions, and these developments are looked at through the lens of what their communities have to give in order to see them through.

I won't speak much on Churchill. It is still a significant distance itself from the entrance to the North-West Passage, such that its role here is not applicable. It is not a facility to properly support the Navy in the Archipelago. You're still looking at a potential 1000nm+ journey depending on where you're looking to go.

Distance is a killer. It is quicker to get to Tokyo from Esquimalt than it is to get to the Arctic. It will always be a chain around our ankle. We have to accept that, and that includes recognizing that 'Arctic' facilities are not all created equal, and that different areas of the Arctic are better treated as separate places among themselves for the sake of these conversations. That includes Churchill.

In recent times, leveraging private and mining facilities has been raised. Indeed, the Navy has also debated this idea, as raised in the RCN 2023 Arctic & Northern Strategic Framework. For that, I highly recommend you check out my bestie Policy Hawk's piece specifically on this topic, as he goes into great detail that I won't for the sake of time, because this is gonna be long.

That brings us to the Arctic Mobile Base. The AMB is as much a product of failure as it is a call to action. We have tried other methods, the Navy says. We have tried to fight nature. We have created platforms like the AOPS capable of handling austere environments to ensure we would have something able to operate up there.

The AMB is the Navy accepting that it cannot change its position. It cannot change the ice. It cannot change the conditions. It cannot operate in a vacuum where it is free to operate without concern for others.

I wouldn't call it a desperation move. We could, at the end of the day, make do without it if needed. It is the standard we have had, and one that both the RCN and CCG have been preparing to operate in; however, there is a recognition for more.

There is a recognition that the situation won't get better. Traffic will continue to grow. Demand across many of the existing ports will continue to put pressure on facilities as the demand for Sealift, the increasing traffic of fishery vessels, cruise ships, and adventurers, and the increased traffic of tankers and cargo vessels continue to stress the limited facilities we do have.

The Navy holds no special authority there, unless there are drastic changes in how things work. It doesn't fix the problems above. It does not create even more infrastructure. It doesn't make expansion snap into existence.

With all that in mind, you start to get the picture of the AMB. They represent the rejection of the traditional approach. They are a solution born out of a realization that we need radical thinking to solve a seemingly unsolvable problem.

The Concept

That brings us to the vessels themselves, or at least the concept as I have been told. I guess one could say they are the true successors to the original Joint Support Ship concept; maybe even ALSC if you want to get deep into the philosophical.

They are an everything vessel. They will be Command and Control centers. They will have large, extensive medical facilities. They will be Replenishment Vessels, able to support the rest of the fleet at sea. They might have some submarine tender capabilities and forward repair capabilities built in. Those two are me speculating, though I'm sure someone is asking those questions.

They will be HADR platforms, able to operate independently of any existing infrastructure like ports. They will have an amphibious capability to support that, and if needed, support the Army in any endeavor they find themselves in. They will be able to reach any other vessel in the fleet, even the Polars if required.

That means that as of now, the Navy is looking at PC 2 for its potential rating, a monumental ask. It is likely to have similar range and endurance requirements to the existing Polar Icebreakers, so perhaps around a 25,000-30,000 Nautical Mile Range (as a general rough figure) and upwards of 270 days endurance.

That will allow for the AMB to maintain a persistent, on-station capability in the Archipelago for an extended period of time, similar to the future Arpatuuq and Imnaryuaq. Again, the AMBs are meant to be a semi-permanent capability in the Arctic, with the desire to have one up there or available to get up there at any given time and stay up there supporting both the fleet and local communities for an extended period of time.

As for what I know? Two are planned. Both will be based on the East Coast, where it is easiest to access the Arctic compared to going from Esquimalt, past the Bering Strait, and over Alaska. It is also the area of most activity for the Navy. So it makes sense, along with the typical desire to consolidate maintenance, crews, training, and additional infrastructure.

There is also potential that we see some alignment with the Coast Guard here when it comes to leveraging planned capacity, such as the future maintenance facilities being built out for the Polars in Sydney, Nova Scotia. Building out a proper, consolidated In-Service Support center here is a potential area of collaboration where stationing both AMBs on the East Coast could be justified.

For timelines, things get a bit tricky. Anytime a project is in definition, unfunded, and awaiting approval, you basically play a guessing game for when you could actually see things arriving.

If the Navy gets what they want? IOC would be in the 2030s, like the late 2030s, while FOC would be sometime in the 2040s. There is no timeline for an RFI at this time, nor would I expect there to be one. If the Navy gets their way? You would likely see the first AMB delivered in the 2036-2040 timeframe.

This is about the extent of the information we have. We can infer some things, such as the likelihood that this platform will have some form of well deck to support landing craft. It will likely be ~200m in length and upwards of 30,000+ tonnes. Slightly bigger in size than the Protecteur-class, but the addition of her PC 2 rating will make her fairly heavier, which is why I'm guesstimating in the 30,000+ range.

All of this is in line with what I have heard over the last few months since the concept was first rumored around last year. Since last year, much of the above has remained fairly consistent, save the PC 2 rating desire, which hasn't really been prevalent in discussions.

So to recap, we have a 30,000-tonne PC 2 Joint Support Ship capable of supporting things like Replenishment at Sea to other vessels, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, potentially things like forward repair, and support for amphibious operations.

They will likely have a range of 25,000nm and an endurance of up to 270 days. They will likely have a large medical facility, NATO Role IIE or III, as well as a well deck to support the operation of landing craft for areas without dedicated port facilities, while providing some future-proofed potential to the Canadian Army in the event they need access to such a capability.

That is the current concept, and I don't expect much of it to really change. That, of course, isn't to say that it can't, but the core capabilities and the needs for a long-range, long-endurance platform are unlikely to shift, save a massive change in the project's requirements, like CMMC to CDC level changes.

So instead we have what is essentially...

GLAAM

I knew starting this that I would need to address the elephant in the room. Yes. The current proposal does feel a lot like GLAAM. In fact, it gets about 90% of the way there right out of the box.

For a refresher, what is GLAAM? For those unaware, GLAAM is a proposal from Davie Shipyard for, essentially, a Multi-Functional Support Ship; essentially a beefed-up Joint Support Ship.

In fact, looking at GLAAM, you can see a lot of what was originally demanded from the Joint Support Ship in its first proposals with the Afloat Logistics Support Capability (ALSC).

Of course, ALSC would evolve into the JSS project, and over time drop the amphibious, Ro-Ro, and vast majority of HADR capabilities. That’s another conversation for another day, but a lot of GLAAM, at least to me, reminds me of that concept—and then some.

Visually and capability-wise, she is very similar to the HNLMS Karel Doorman. In fact, you could almost call them sisters. They share many design features and capabilities that take a step above the traditional Landing Platform Dock we see in other navies.

Compared to the Karel Doorman, GLAAM is slightly smaller at 180-190m long. While I have never asked for a proper tonnage, it's likely to be ~30,000 tons. So, very close to our own AMB estimates. This depends a lot on what Ice Class you would be discussing, as that will add quite substantially.

The ratings that Davie gives range from as low as Finnish-Swedish Ice Class 1C up to IACS PC III, dependent on customer demands. Most of the time you will see GLAAM advertised as PC IV, though. That is sort of the advertised baseline, with room to go up.

GLAAM features a well deck as well as a Ro-Ro Tweendeck. Davie advertises it as 'medium-sized', but I believe it's ~1500-2000 lane meters; similar, though likely a bit less than the Karel Doorman given her slightly smaller size and Polar Class reinforcement. The higher the Polar-class, the more internal volume you sacrifice. She also has space for a 12m RHIB.

GLAAM also has a solid/liquid replenishment at sea capability, a NATO Role III hospital that includes operating facilities, a dedicated storage area for HADR supplies, and a dedicated container storage section modeled after MV Asterix's rapidly deployable container bays, allowing GLAAM to rapidly load and unload 20ft standard containers.

GLAAM also has an AHC crane to support in forward ship repair and submarine support operations, as well as, I believe, a Class III Dynamic Positioning system. Again, while I have not heard of this desire as a requirement, I wouldn't be shocked to see forward repair discussed by the Navy as the project develops.

GLAAM's flight deck has the capacity to support up to five Chinook-sized helicopters. It has a dedicated hangar and workshop facilities accessible by elevator. This large flight deck also provides a lot of space and opportunity for unmanned systems, something Davie has been showing off more in material related to GLAAM.

GLAAM, as presented, is armed with a Bofors 57mm main gun, similarly found on the Halifax-class. Self-protection is provided by, as I counted, four RIM-116 SEARAM launchers; two mounted on the aft quarters just abaft the flight deck, and two mounted on either side of the ship's funnel.

Final armament and sensors would be decided by the client, so typically I don't really pay them much mind on concepts. The Navy will pick what they want, and one should assume that these exist mainly as concepts/placeholders for what could be.

On paper, the AMB would seemingly be tailor-fit for GLAAM. It's hard to deny they quite align with each other. That could be because GLAAM is really the only concept existing out there for a vessel like this, and with heavy promotion, it has remained in the conversation.

I have certainly talked about GLAAM a lot, and I have no doubt it has influenced the discussion on the AMB. I won't say it set the standard. That's a bit much; however, it certainly has aided in the conversation on what we could hypothetically do.

GLAAM fits almost all the requirements that the AMB will likely list out. It maintains the RAS, HADR, and amphibious capabilities that the AMB has set for itself. It features a forward repair capability, dedicated container space (a cute nice-to-have), and an above-average Role III hospital compared to similar vessels. The only issue, as above, is I don't know the range or endurance, so I can't speak there.

So that's it then? It's GLAAM we want? Close the book and wrap it up... Well, not so fast. There are a few things about the AMB that need to be discussed.

A couple things before we go

To start, I need to make a quick reminder that right now the project is in its earliest stages, but people have known about the desire for a while. While Davie has had GLAAM ready for several years, others have taken notice, and I don't think that they're going to sit by.

Seaspan has been investigating how to utilize their work and the hullform of the future CCGS Imnaryuaq to potentially design a vessel that can fulfill the AMB requirements. A few, like Vard and Serco, have experience as well designing vessels like this; Vard especially.

I don't know if Irving would want in here? Maybe? I can't speak for them. They might. However, large icebreakers are more the realm of Seaspan and Davie. They do have that AOPS experience, yes, but I don't know if this is one they'll really fight for.

So, off the bat, Davie takes a bit of an early lead in the conversation because they have a fairly well-fitting design; however, I do note that they won't be the only ones. As we have seen with Vigilance, while an early lead can help in keeping you on the minds of people, it doesn't necessarily come without drawbacks, nor does it mean that you'll maintain the narrative.

There is risk in being early, and risk in being too loud and out there at times. That, of course, is dependent on the people running the show, so to speak, and how they see things. It is good to note, though, that there are others out there, and being first is not a guarantee of maintaining momentum.

The second issue comes to the PC 2 rating. Now, I can't say if this is real PC 2 or PC 2 'equivalent'. These are two separate things that need to be discussed. When we talk about CDC, for example, you'll often hear these two used interchangeably; however, they are not the same thing.

Let me reiterate what I said about two weeks ago. Polar-class rating is not a measure of icebreaking capability. Rather, it is a measure of structural survivability; specifically, the hull's ability to withstand local ice loads and the machinery’s capacity to function in a polar environment.

Two PC 4 vessels can have very different icebreaking capabilities. Similarly, as an example, some PC 4 vessels actually perform better than some PC 3 vessels. That's why relying on PC ratings is a bit of a gross oversimplification.

Also, a Polar-class vessel is not automatically an icebreaker. There is actually a separate notation for icebreaking vessels. I should also note that many vessels do not fall under the Polar-class rating. Only vessels contracted for construction after July 1, 2007, fall under the Polar-class designation, and some countries, such as Russia, continue to use their own system.

When we talk about equivalency, we are often looking at icebreaking; more specifically, how thick of ice a vessel could traverse going forward. That is where we see things like CDC.

They might be able to, say, traverse through a similar amount of ice that a PC 6 vessel could. However, a platform like CDC, as an example, might not meet the proper winterization and resilience standards that the IACS sets out for the ship's machinery and vital systems.

Its steel might not meet the Strength & Thickness requirement, nor the requirements to remain ductile in the extreme temperatures of the Arctic. Is its propulsion system designed to ingest large chunks of ice without it snapping its propeller shaft or stripping its gears?

There is more that can be delved into. We could probably force Peter Rybski to do a whole series on this subject, but you get the idea. To receive a proper IACS Polar Class designation, you need to meet a very stringent and strict set of requirements, as well as undergo a rigorous process of testing and evaluation.

The AMB is designed to support Canada's fleets in any environment they might find themselves in. That means that, hypothetically, the AMB needs to be able to support platforms like the Polar and Program Icebreakers while ensuring that they could traverse around our Arctic without worry on if they're able to handle the specific ice conditions of parts of our Arctic.

Even though Canada’s future icebreaking fleet is designed to operate independently in the austere environment that is the Arctic, that does not mean that situations won't arise where they will need support. Similarly, there are many cases where the fleets can benefit from having a platform available to them that can both independently reach them and provide things like replenishment and resupply.

There is also a need for the AMB to respond to ever-growing concerns surrounding potential humanitarian disasters in the Arctic, again only to be bolstered as travel and trade become more prevalent in the coming years. The PC 2 logic here is that one does not know where a disaster might occur, and as such, the AMB needs to be able to traverse, at least, around the entirety of the Archipelago, including up to places such as Ellesmere Island and potentially into the deeper Arctic.

And so that is the justification for why the AMB needs to be PC 2, at least how I have heard it. However, with the current design as proposed, and even something like GLAAM, there are concerns here. Least of all that GLAAM has never been designed to be a PC 2 vessel. As far as I know, Davie did not go past PC 3.

It should also be noted that going up a level is not a simple, easy task. It requires significant structural and mechanical upgrades to reach that point. You can get a good look here at some of the comparisons between the various Polar Classes. To give some examples, the flexural failure factor (in very simple terms, a multiplier used to calculate the load the hull must handle when the ship rides up onto the ice and snaps it) more than doubles between a PC 3 and PC 2 vessel, while the crushing failure factor (a multiplier based on a ship's Polar Class, used to calculate the maximum ice-crushing force the hull must withstand) increases by over 60%.

A PC 2 vessel requires considerably thicker steel and heavier, more robust framing arrangements compared to a PC 3 vessel. It requires significantly more power and cooling to support the vessel, all of which eats into what is available for other things like sensors, armament, mission payloads, etc. That is especially important when considering the fact that we want this to also be a vessel capable of potentially supporting amphibious operations.

SWaP-C is important! As I always say, the higher the rating, the more you eat into that. You eat into the payload capacity, the internal space that a vessel like this tries to prioritize. You eat into the space of that well deck, into storage for things like fuel and dry stores.

You sacrifice capability to get that higher rating, and the truth? It is debatable whether it is worth it. Is that extra step to get to PC 2, to be able to operate in multi-year ice and up into the Arctic Basin, worth it for a vessel like the AMB? Are the niche tasks and potential concerns worth sacrificing elsewhere?

There is a reason the future fleet is dominated by PC 4 Icebreakers supported by the future PC 3 Programs. That is the optimal balance of rating and capability that fits our needs and the environments around the Arctic that we expect to be operating in.

A PC 3 AMB, for example, will still be able to operate in most of the areas of importance and across the Archipelago. It will still be capable of supporting 99% of the future fleets, many of whom will still be well supported by a hypothetical PC 3 vessel.

Even if your concern is on HADR, one has to ask about the chances of an AMB needing to operate and support an area where a PC 2 vessel is required. It is a very, very niche capability, and the potential needs for one are also very, very niche...

Keep in mind that the AMB is already being discussed as a platform that, again, could support operations abroad, such as supporting the Army or HADR in places like the Caribbean. A higher rating; well, I guess it really doesn't matter. A PC 3 vessel is already not optimal for that kind of stuff.

Remember, an icebreaking bow is not designed with open-ocean traversing in mind. It introduces significant hydrodynamic drag and consumes significant amounts of fuel compared to non-icebreaking vessels. Also, keep in mind that the extra thickness of those steel plates and internal structure adds width. Also not good.

These are heavy, power-hungry vessels. The vessel and its equipment are designed for traversing in the extreme colds of the Arctic, all of which work against them elsewhere. They are going to be slower compared to traditional counterparts; there will be concerns regarding stability and comfort. You could really go down the list of drawbacks.

Of course, they're not designed for open-ocean, so this isn't really a concern so long as you accept the penalty of utilizing them outside their natural environment. I should also note it obviously isn't impossible to utilize them outside the Arctic; there are just natural drawbacks to doing so that need to be mentioned.

Keep in mind that the higher the rating, the more significant these factors become. There's also a funny thing about Polar Classes where there is a significant diminishing return the higher you go. The gap of capability between a PC 6 and PC 5 is far more notable than between a PC 3 and PC 2, but the required investment and engineering continue to be significant across the board.

That is why PC 2 remains niche, and no one bothers with PC 1. It is rarely worth that investment for the capability you receive moving up a level. Then, of course, there are a bunch of minor things we could bring up, such as the well deck!

Traditional well decks are a vulnerability for a Polar vessel. Traditional stern gates need to be able to survive potential ice impact and extreme conditions without the risk of potential damage. The well deck itself also needs to be winterized to mitigate the risk of freezing or damaging the internal bulkheads, systems, or damaging equipment inside.

The well deck also plays into the vessel's ability to break through ice itself and needs to be accounted for. A big, flat stern gate is going to have an effect on the vessel's ice-clearing profile. My friend Derek and I talked a bit about it. He suggested, funny enough, to steal from Karel more, that the future AMB would likely utilize a 'steel beach' configuration over the traditional flooded well deck.

Basically, a large stern ramp that can be lowered just below the waterline so that landing craft can then "beach" themselves to load or unload cargo and vehicles. Because amphibious operations are a relatively minor concern on the list of the AMB, this sacrifice presents a potential alternative that mitigates some of the risks of operating in an Arctic environment that a traditional well deck might have to deal with.

The point here is that any AMB will be as much a platform of compromises as it will be a unique capability for Canada. There will always be trade-offs to make if we want the AMB to be a valuable, viable asset to the fleets.

I don't know if the PC 2 rating will stick, honestly. I know many of the potential bidders here won't be too keen on it. They will fight for PC 3, if not lower for some of them. I do think there would be pushback against a PC 2 vessel here from the industry side of things, who would much rather handle a PC 3 or 4 over a boutique PC 2 vessel.

At the end of the day, this will be a Canadian vessel, more than almost any other. It will be a uniquely Canadian product, built off the rejection of our traditional position and challenges. It will be a vessel that exists in spite of it all.

Radical? Absolutely. There is a lot of inherent risk in a vessel like the AMB that aims to solve many different challenges, in a vessel that will have never truly existed anywhere else. It is an all-in-one being built for one of the harshest and most unforgiving environments on Earth, one that runs counter to almost anywhere else.

It will be a massive challenge, and one that will test our ability to craft a 'Canadian platform'; it will test industry's ability to deliver on a complex, destined-to-be-orphaned design that existing counterparts can only go so far in providing a basis for.

It will be a class of vessel we have not had since Bonny. It will be a territory that we will be going off of with no modern basis or equivalent to look back on. I would dare say, beyond even the Rivers, beyond the submarines, it will likely be the biggest challenge to the National Shipbuilding Strategy we have seen or will likely ever see in many of our lifetimes.

That creates pressure, lots of it. It creates a massive challenge that will require a whole-of-country effort to succeed. We will luckily be going into the AMB with shipyards and designers at least experienced with working on ice-strengthened and Polar Class vessels. That helps, but it only goes so far, truthfully.

I, of course, want to see this succeed, because I have heard the reasoning. I have heard the frustration. I have heard of all the plans that have failed, the concepts that fell apart. The AMB is not a vanity project. It is not a navy trying to look for a jewel in its crown.

It is the Hail Mary solution to the problem of supporting ourselves and our fleets in a part of the world that does not want us there, and has shown us that it will not allow us to build against it so easily. We have tried the traditional. We have looked into what is there. We have looked at civil infrastructure, private mines. The Navy has determined none fit exactly what they need to be a credible, sustained force in the Arctic.

There is still lots that could happen. I always warn plans can change, and that the government could just as easily brush it off as expensive and unnecessary. It is not in any policy. It is not funded. At this point, the AMB is merely a concept and a name on the books of potential projects.

However, I myself do see the value. I understand the reasoning. I sympathize with the desire and the spirit of the AMB. For those reasons, I hope it succeeds. I hope we can one day look back at these conversations as the start of something great.

Hopefully, the next time I talk about it, we'll be talking about the RFI!