Yes, We’re Getting New Helicopters (But Not What You Think)

Noah Note

Canada’s rotary fleet can best be described as a long, very long sigh. It is not necessarily that the whole fleet is bad, but the ones that take the spotlight are exceptionally bad at what they do.

Like much of the CAF’s many fleets, the rotary fleet is currently undergoing one of its most significant shifts in decades. Under the next Tactical Aviation Capability Set, or nTACS, Canada will replace its current rotary fleet with:

• A new tactical helicopter to replace the CH-146 Griffon

• A new Attack/Reconnaissance helicopter capability that had been lost with the retirement of the CH-136 Kiowa

• Whatever else they feel like.

Is that a bit of a generalist statement? Perhaps, but it is true. While there is broad support for a Griffon replacement and a dedicated attack helicopter, nTACS has a fairly broad mandate to search out what options might be available, and what combinations might be of value to Canada to pursue.

A Griffon replacement might not be 1:1 with another medium platform like the Airbus H175M or the Leonardo AW149. It could be that we see a mix of a true medium helicopter and a lighter platform like the H145M. We might skip medium entirely and instead focus on a light/heavy mix of a light helicopter and Chinook. Maybe throw in a few MV-75 Valors for long-range transport and Arctic operations.

Maybe we do as Bell pushes us to do and just go all-in on the MV-75. Maybe we decide a tiltrotor isn't on the cards and we skip it entirely. I know I got some people hyped the other week talking about the MV-75 as if it is a done deal.

Nothing with nTACS is a done deal in my books until the RFI for it is dropped. I am told that is coming extremely soon, soon enough that people are being teased about it. Once that RFI is dropped, we should have a better idea of what is desired. Maybe, if they don’t just make it a broad document that basically keeps every idea open for now.

Which, by the way, is entirely possible. They could easily do that and leave me to continue hearing about all the potential combinations desired. I honestly like to hear all the combos. I think they are really fun, and everyone has a different idea of what they would like to see. No two ideas are the same.

Of course, that is understandable. nTACS is coming at a unique intersection where new platforms are plentiful, but debates are fierce on what exactly tactical aviation looks like, and what sort of things have to be prioritized.

Oftentimes, we see this debate in the future of Attack/Reconnaissance helicopters specifically, something that nTACS is very much gearing up to procure. The War in Ukraine has called a lot of assumptions and capabilities into question, often ahead of what I would call the reasonable point.

Whether that be attack helicopters, artillery, or tanks, if you would believe some commentators, all of these capabilities would soon be relics of a distant past, replaced by whatever drone or autonomous system that people cared for in a certain day.

Of course, I am not so keen to write off such capabilities, despite my noted bullish nature around autonomous systems. I still believe that many of these platforms have a role to play and are still valuable in the future we expect to face.

While some, like South Korea, Japan, and even the United States with FARA, have pivoted away from these platforms and towards unmanned systems, even canceling existing orders as part of this shift, we should always take care not to take individual examples and singular conflicts as evidence for widescale shifts.

I still believe they will have a role as armed escorts to other rotary platforms. They will still have a reconnaissance capability. They will still have a CUAS capability, as we have seen the Israelis use them. They will still be valuable in COINOPS and lesser-peer conflicts.

While there will be a doctrinal shift and a need to take a proper re-look at capabilities that will necessitate more long-range strike options, like SPIKE-NLOS, and a collaborative approach with Air Launched Effectors, or ALE, also known as fancy little drones, I still think the humble attack helicopter has its places to be and can still be an effective part of the battlefield.

But I don’t want to focus on this topic too much as we will not be talking about nTACS today! See, while nTACS is the primary rotary aircraft project in the works, it isn't the only one we need to discuss, and in fact, it might not be the one we hear from first.

Along with nTACS, there is one thing that I feel we need to discuss in detail. Skies Magazine somewhat broke this in their December/January issue, and I feel it is best to make a post about it.

Yes, 427 SOAS is getting new helicopters, eighteen to be exact. While this is discussed as part of some sort of Phase I for nTACS, I consider them separate. As far as I know, the nTACS team proper is not on this file for the most part.

This has long been a desire of CANSOFCOM, who have had a troubled relationship with the CH-146 Griffon helicopters. The history there is marked by unreliability, a mismatch of capabilities, and demands that have long forced uncomfortable compromises.

The Griffon

For a very quick recap for those who don't know: It’s the early 1990s. The Cold War is ending, the peace dividend that would define us for the next thirty years is about to kick into full swing, and the CAF is looking for a new helicopter.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the CAF maintained six separate rotary fleets slated for retirement soon, including the CH-136 Kiowa, the CH-135 Twin Huey, the CH-118 Iroquois, the CH-113 Labrador, the CH-124 Sea King, and lastly the CH-147 Chinook.

Canada’s Cold War rotary fleet

The stories of the CH-135 and CH-124 are for a different time. We won't be focusing on them today. The small CH-147 Chinook fleet, deemed too expensive to operate at that time, was retired in 1991 without a replacement, at least until 2008 when the six CH-147Ds were acquired for Joint Task Force Afghanistan. We have been operating them since.

That leaves us with the CH-136 Kiowa, CH-135 Twin Huey, and CH-118 Iroquois fleets. The decision was made to replace these three fleets with a single helicopter that would cover the utility, light reconnaissance, and transport roles. This would fall under the Canadian Forces Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter, or CFUTTH, Project.

Like many choices in the 1990s, the primary driver behind this decision was less about reasonable consolidation and more about the cost. To summarize a bit, the idea was that at a time of falling budgets and rapid downscaling, the CAF could not afford the costs of maintaining two or three separate fleets to properly replace all the capabilities provided.

That isn't to say that the then Air Command had not tried to get funding for a proper replacement; however, none were successful. This is actually a very interesting period if you're a fan of political and procurement drama as I am. However, I don't intend for this to be a long piece about the history of the Griffon, so sadly we won't be deep diving into this here. That will come when we discuss nTACS proper.

The 1998 Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons is a wonderful and fascinating breakdown of several projects from this time that really goes in-depth about the decision-making process behind this choice. I highly recommend that, as it does go fairly deep into some of the discrepancies and issues surrounding the choice to procure the Griffon.

If I can steal one quote from them to paint the picture of what was happening at this time:

"We found no evidence that the Department consulted more than one company to explore the alternative of leasing aircraft. Ultimately, the aircraft were purchased from that company.

Prior to the award of the contract, the manufacturer was asked to determine whether used helicopters were available, and it reported that it was highly unlikely sufficient aircraft could be found.

Other new aircraft were excluded on the basis of higher initial capital costs, even though their larger size meant that fewer would have been required. Life cycle costs for other aircraft — which might have been lower — were not considered. In short, the options analyses were too limited and relied in part on the potential vendor."

Lack of proper analysis, discounting of factors such as the loss of capability, and political pressure are rampant throughout any assessment of the CFUTTH project. Hell, the Statement of Requirements, or SOR, for the project wouldn't be completed until a year after, in 1993. It is something that, if you look into enough projects in the 90s, you find fairly commonplace. The focus was on acquiring what we could with the limited funds available, oftentimes compounded by added political pressure attempting to manipulate the choices made.

In April of 1992, it was announced that Bell Helicopter Textron Canada would be awarded a tenderless, sole-source contract for 100 Bell-412CF helicopters, themselves based on the civilian Bell-412EP out of Mirabel, Quebec.

The choice to go to Bell, while I don't often like to call things political, was primarily driven by a desire to support Canadian Industry, primarily Bell's Mirabel facility and the aerospace industry tied to it, as well as to win some political favour in Quebec at a time of rising nationalist sentiment.

Of course, then-Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse had already gained a bit of a reputation for awarding such contracts. He was also the Minister behind both the EH101 contract to replace the Sea King and Labrador fleets, which as I said before we will talk about another time, and Minister at the time of the MRCV/LAV3 saga.

A nationalist in his own right, he also had noted favourability towards awarding contracts to Quebec companies, especially when it came to defence procurement. So, when presented with the opportunity to provide some lifeline to Mirabel and support Canada’s aerospace industry as a whole? It isn't hard to see where political aspirations took hold of the project.

Of course, I am not here to criticize the dead, not too much at least. So I shall leave that saga here for now. The Treasury Board approved the contract on 8 September 1992, and the next day signed a contract valued at $1.293 billion for 100 Griffons, flight simulators, and other equipment, documentation, and services.

From the very start, the Griffon suffered several deficiencies. The aircraft could not carry the loads specified in the original operational requirements, despite the SOR coming after the initial procurement. The civilian heritage of the Griffon meant the need for expensive modifications to make it survivable in combat zones. This would become a noted issue during Operation Athena.

While theoretically configured with seating for up to 13 people, consisting of 3 crew and 10 passengers, the added weight of equipment, sensors, and armour plating often meant that in real-world conditions, the Griffon could rarely carry more than 6 to 8 combat-equipped soldiers.

When first delivered, the Griffon also lacked the necessary communication and self-protection equipment needed to participate effectively in combat operations, and had limited integrated surveillance equipment needed to replace the Kiowa, a role that the larger, more expensive Griffon would never be able to match.

And the cost savings? Not so much. The Auditor General reported that the Griffon was actually more expensive to operate than the fleets it replaced, while offering less capability in key areas like range and payload.

If you would all like, I will continue; however, I believe you get the point. These issues would be on-and-off problems at various points in the Griffon's life. Too big for recce, too small for transport, as some would say. Again, we could easily make a dedicated post out of this, however, I don't want to do that. This is meant to be a Noah Note after all!

The plan

The idea is to demonstrate to you the limitations of the Griffon platform and why there have been repeated calls within places like CANSOFCOM for another, dedicated platform to supplement them. The Griffon is barely up to the demands of the wider CAF, let alone the intense demands of a Tier 1 Special Forces unit like JTF2.

Their demands for a long-range, rugged, multirole helicopter able to operate in a number of challenging, contested environments is not met by the CH-146, and for a long time they have either gotten by with what was available or relied on allied rotary assets to make the difference.

You can read this piece by the Ottawa Citizen if you want some first-hand complaints. It gives a good idea of the prevalent mentalities that exist at CANSOFCOM. Luckily for them, it seems that someone is finally listening.

I won't play the tease here. As we said before, CANSOFCOM is looking to acquire 18 new helicopters to supplement the Griffon fleet. While nTACS plans to deliver sometime in the next five years, the critical gap that exists is enough that the Federal Government is moving ahead with the acquisition.

I first heard about this a few months ago in an offhand conversation about nTACS. While interesting, I never was able to get more info on it and assumed it had either fallen to the idea bin or was progressing slowly. Lo and behold, I am being proven wrong.

We could see an acquisition announced within the next few weeks, at least that's what the rumor mill says. Don't count that as verified. That is just the RUMINT going around. That is why I thought I would get this out now.

It's Blackhawks, by the way, or more specifically the MH-60M is likely. At least that is what I hear. Is that surprising? I don't think it should be. Yeah, CANSOFCOM wants Blackhawks, and the indication is that they will be getting them. My sources within CANSOFCOM are non-existent. I consider them my dark spot, a very big one.

However, the line of reasoning for this one is fairly straightforward. CANSOFCOM maintains a tight relationship with USSOCOM, Blackhawks are available and proven, and there is already experience working on them available.

As an immediate need, it makes sense to go with what is known. There are other options available, certainly, but none have the ease of introduction and integration like the MH-60M. It also makes sense to find commonality with the people we most often work together with, in this case USSOCOM.

Undoubtedly that will annoy a few people and will lead to some anger at yet another American purchase. By now, I have come to expect that anytime an American system is announced, it will be wrapped in controversy.

And while I have argued some, and always wish to see more diversification, I can't really argue this one. Sometimes the simplest reasons are the most clear in the decision-making process. It is available, we already have experience with the platform, it is used by our most common partner, and it can be quickly integrated and operational.

Simple, easy, and fixes the problem, even if just as a stop-gap until nTACS arrives. That is the big thing. While these will certainly operate alongside what nTACS delivers, these are primarily meant to bridge the gap that remains until they have sufficiently entered service.

The focus here is on speed and ease, to which the Blackhawk does that best at this time. I dont really want to award Sikorsky, and Lord knows they look like they'll be getting awarded a lot this year despite the Cyclone situation, however putting aside my own grievance and looking at this from an analytical perspective?

Yeah, I get it. I get why the choice is being made. Lockorsky doesn't deserve any more money from us, and them losing money on Cyclone is barely enough in my books, but this choice is straightforward and woefully needed, as we discussed above.

Keep in mind this is not "Newsletter" rumors. This is just what I have heard over the last week, so be cautious. I consider this RUMINT, a step below. It has not gone through my verification process yet.

Despite that, we might not have to wait long for an answer anyways. Again, if people are speaking factually, we could be hearing more on this extremely quickly, to which all will be put to rest anyways.

Until then, we can now sit back and eagerly await all the many Ottawa Citizen articles about this.