Europe’s Northern Neighbourhood: A New Strategy for the Arctic replaces the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy. The new strategy sets a much more deliberate security focus than the previous one, with a renewed look at critical infrastructure, protection, and building northern resilience.
This is not a firm document, mind you. It has no budget, has no binding resolution inside of it and still has to go through the European Parliament, the Council and member states. We, as in me, will not be going through the whole strategy.
It’s rare that we go through foreign policies here, at least in some depth. Usually I choose to skip things, as Canada is often only briefly included. However, this is one where we are not only mentioned several times, but I do think that there is good reason to be a bit proactive and look at Canada’s potential standing, with the Arctic obviously being a major focus for everyone.
This won’t be an in-depth breakdown of the strategy itself, so I do recommend for those interested that you take a look at the strategy for yourself. It is a very interesting document, and very clearly had some deep thought put into it.
So, let’s not waste any time.
The Strategy
The strategy itself names three primary shifts since the 2021 policy for why there needs to be a renewal: the Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine and its continued military rebuild in the Arctic, and China’s growing ambitions in the European Arctic as it deepens its partnership with Moscow. China has also been investing deeper into the Northern Sea Route. To quote a bit:
“Multilateral cooperation remains indispensable, but it can no longer be the sole foundation of the European Union’s Arctic approach.”
The centrepiece of the document is a framework the EU calls the Northern Neighbourhood. The concept is fairly straightforward: bring member states and like-minded partners together at future summits and events to set shared priorities and jointly develop and finance future projects.
Of these partners, Norway, Iceland, the UK, Canada, the United States, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are named, with Japan and South Korea mentioned. The framework is meant to sit in tandem and collaboratively with existing structures like the Arctic Council.
The EU calls its partnership with Greenland “a cornerstone” of the strategy, and as the super special boy, Greenland funding is the only new money in the document: a €200 million package for 2026 and 2027 that had previously been announced in Nuuk last month. (Should note, this is just one part of a much wider financial package for Greenland that is working through the EU budget.)
Moving to the actual security side of things though, the strategy organizes Arctic defence around three concepts: vigilance, preparedness and responsiveness. The key note to make here is which commitments are firm and which are options. Not everything in the strategy is treated as firm.
The firm policies are primarily about sensing and tracking in the maritime domain. Under the strategy, the EU will propose a dedicated Arctic maritime domain awareness pilot in 2027 under a new Earth observation service for governments.
Alongside that, the EU will start Galileo’s government-only navigation service. It will also strengthen long-range ship-tracking data sharing, which it says will help authorities monitor shadow fleet vessels, and keep sanctioning shadow fleet ships coming in from the Northern Sea Route.
Furthermore, as a first step toward a wider Maritime Security Hub, the EU will support member states and interested EEA partners in setting up an Arctic Cable Hub to monitor, protect and help repair undersea cables in the North Atlantic and Arctic. The wider hub would pool national and EU data on things like cables, shadow fleet vessels, IUU fishing, pollution and search and rescue.
It would be led by member states, with possible close coordination with like-minded partners. That section, at this time, is kept open for partners like Canada to participate in the future, but doesn’t set it firmly in policy, as in subject to negotiations. The Cable Hub itself, for now, is just member states and EEA partners like Norway and Iceland.
The rest of the security side is a lot softer. The EU says its space surveillance network “could be reinforced” with sensors in the Arctic, and that polar-capable drones would be developed through programs it already has, like its drone and counter-drone action plan.
Exercises moving forces into and around the Arctic could be organized with partners and NATO, while any real improvement to military mobility hinges on an EU regulation that still hasn’t been adopted. On that note, the only financial mention regarding security and defence, for those curious, is the ten existing European Defence Fund projects worth about €260 million.
On the flip side, the document does spend quite a long while talking about icebreakers. Under the strategy, the EU will map icebreaking needs, vessels and European yards through a new Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance. It will also develop options for joint procurement, pooling and sharing between member states and like-minded partners, explore pooled funding within the Northern Neighbourhood, and examine access arrangements to member-state icebreakers, interestingly including ships with nuclear propulsion.
There is no fleet target, no timeline and no funding dedicated at this time, but the strategy clearly has the thought of icebreakers in mind. Of course, the mention of nuclear icebreakers is bound to get the attention of many, even though no one operates Nuclears outside Russia, and I know no one outside the Chinese pushing for them at this time, so this is a very weird inclusion. There is recognition of the fleet difference between the EU and Russia, as well as recognition that when excluding non-Arctic icebreakers, the number of available vessels drops to the single digits.
Of course, as we see with our own Polar Icebreaker project, conventional icebreakers are still highly capable vessels able to step up to existing Russian nuclear vessels, though I will admit, a Western nuclear icebreaker would undoubtedly be cool to see. I don’t see it on the horizon anytime soon, but it is interesting to see it mentioned here as an idea.
The economic side of the strategy further mentions several initiatives that have been discussed over the last few years. It backs a Pan-Arctic Cable linking Europe to Japan and South Korea via Greenland and Canada, something that has been in the works at various points by various actors over the last few years.
Far North Fiber, proposed by Finland’s Cinia, Alaska’s Far North Digital, its Canadian affiliate True North Global Networks, and ARTERIA (Japan), is a 14,000 km network linking Europe to Japan via the Northwest Passage, with planned landings in Ireland, Iceland, Greenland, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and Alaska. Alcatel Submarine Networks would build the hypothetical line.
Polar Connect is another proposed cable project backed by the EU. Under the current plan (which has shifted a lot over the years), the cable would link Europe, Asia and Canada over the Arctic, though Canada is only on the alternative route through the Northwest Passage. In July, NORDUnet (the Nordic research networks) and CANARIE signed an MoU regarding the project. The project is currently in the preparatory stage.
Both have been subject to changes and delays though, and neither is directly named here, though both represent potential candidates. Whether this concept is referring to either project or a new setup is yet to be seen. Both have received EU funding, and Polar Connect does have a natural connection.
It also backs additional IRIS² satellites to cover the Arctic, faster work on Rail Nordica, which would move existing Russian-era broad gauge rail in northern Finland to European gauge, lists raw materials projects in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Greenland, and offers Arctic states help countering disinformation, including during elections.
Overall, the document is what is expected. It is not a budget document, not a funding commitment. It is, at the end of the day, a policy document that sets the mandate and priorities for the EU heading into its next budget, and sets priority areas for future discussions. As of now, there are no set commitments that have to be undertaken, only desires and policy ideas.
Canada itself appears in four of the strategy’s five sections. It does not appear in the security section, which isn’t terribly surprising given what it is, but we can infer that Canada is meant to be included in the broader like-minded partners.
Canada’s main entry is a notable box tied into the 21st EU–Canada Summit. It calls Canada a long-standing partner and a natural ally in the Arctic, and says the two sides will work on an Alliance for the Future to build a common prosperity and economic security space.
The Arctic agenda it lists includes joint projects, climate, critical supply chains, space, secure connectivity, Arctic communities and evolving geopolitical and Arctic challenges.
Canada is also listed as co-lead of the OceanEye ocean-monitoring alliance, a Green Alliance partner and a raw materials partner under a 2021 agreement. It is a waypoint on the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable, and the text notes Canada’s own plans for secure broadband between Europe and Asia. There is also mention of Canada’s participation in Horizon Europe and the POLARIN research network.
Some Thoughts
Canada and the EU will host the next Canada-EU summit on the 29th and 30th of October, next week. There, we are expecting a lot of announcements and commitments to be made on both sides, including in the areas of defence.
Things rumoured on the list, such as a new digital trade deal, European Investment Bank financing for Canadian critical minerals, a joint purchase of 50 De Havilland water bombers by 2030, talks on Canada joining Erasmus, and Canadian participation in Galileo, are all on the cards.
There, I expect we will hear more on the ongoing plans and on Arctic security. Canada and the EU have been slowly working through the key areas set by last year’s strategic partnership. That includes things like Canada’s participation in SAFE, deeper collaboration in maritime security, and openness to collaboration in space.
SAFE is not mentioned here, not that I would expect it to be, but it is duly noted when on the topic of joint procurements, deeper collaboration on security, and furthering industrial collaboration. Of course, there are many areas here where Canada and Canadian industry can benefit from deeper collaboration with each other.
Icebreakers will obviously get a nod here. Canada is undergoing the largest icebreaker renewal in the West, bar none. We have been slowly building up our own icebreaker supply chain, both within the federal government and in industry, through design (Vard, Genoa), construction (Seaspan, Irving, Davie), and through private operators like Horizon Maritime and FedNav.
If I could list all the companies working on Canada’s icebreaker renewal, we would be here forever. Groupe ALMACO, Elomatic, Gastops, Thordon Bearings, Delta Hydraulic Power, Tri-Metal Fabricators, Stigterstaal Canada, Hawboldt Industries, EB Horsman, Rutter… All amazing companies trying to help build Canada’s icebreaker supply chain that have the capacity and the skills to help contribute if the call were sent out, at least in my humble opinion.
Of course, icebreakers are an area we as a country would love to see deeper collaboration on. It is a natural area Canadian industry could help contribute in, and an area where we are already leading in cross-Atlantic exchange through both the ongoing work on the future CCGS Arpatuuq being done at Helsinki, a natural intersection in the Canada-Europe icebreaker relationship, and the already existing ICE Pact.
The ICE Pact, while not perfect, mind you, is still one of the more successful partnerships Canada has engaged in over the last few years: a multinational industrial effort helping contribute not just to the two largest Western icebreaker renewals in history, but also driving significant investment in NATO’s wider icebreaker ecosystem, supporting consistent work at Helsinki and Rauma and acting as the instrument for another new icebreaker yard with Davie Defense’s future Gulf Copper yard.
It is also a major support to Canadian industry. Not only do Canadian companies get to support the American icebreaker renewal through the existing MPI design, but it also opens the door for established Canadian industry, already providing for Canadian needs, to access another potential market in the United States, whose own future fleet will be looking for suppliers.
The ICE Pact has also supported the deepening of relationships between Canada and our international partners in areas of joint research and development, training, and industrial development through groups like the ICE-SHIELD consortium, which at present includes Memorial, NRC, Aalto, VTT, Michigan and NSWC Carderock. The Fisheries and Marine Institute of Memorial University also just signed a new MOU with Finland’s Satakunta University of Applied Sciences to explore collaboration in several areas, including shipbuilding, training, and Arctic research.
The ICE Pact and its consequences are among the best examples we could use for how to approach multinational collaboration in the realm of icebreakers and Arctic research, a model that can be utilized as a baseline for future Canadian participation in European icebreaker initiatives.
Does this mean Canadian designs will be utilized? That vessels will be constructed here? Unlikely. Europe has its own icebreaker capacity, and the European and Canadian Arctic don’t always push for common designs given the different environments both present. That doesn’t mean no, just very, very, very unlikely in any medium-term future.
That doesn’t mean there isn’t collaboration elsewhere that could be undertaken to better strengthen that relationship. That includes, again, training and workforce development, Canadian suppliers contributing to wider European programs, and alignment on future platforms.
Outside icebreakers, collaboration on space and cables remains attractive to Canadian industry. Again, deeper Canadian participation in Galileo has already been discussed. Canada is also a member of the new NATO HALO (Hybrid Alliance Layered Operations in Space) program, along with Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Turkey, which aims to align existing national constellations into a wider, interconnected network for sharing intelligence, improving connectivity, and filling in gaps between partners. Canada is now also a member of NATO’s STARLIFT initiative.
On the industry side, the notable mention here is MDA, which this year announced a firm offer to acquire 70% of the French CLS. CLS provides the core application and communication services for the EU’s long-range ship tracking (LRIT) data centre, and maintains its systems. They also run France’s COSPAS-SARSAT mission control centre.
The company supports fisheries enforcement, dark vessel work, and ocean monitoring for government customers around the world, something MDA is well accustomed to itself through RADARSAT and soon CHORUS, where the company supports Canada and her allies through programs like the Dark Vessel Detection Program.
It is one of the more natural collaborations that could fit Canada into the EU’s Arctic strategy, though I make note that others such as NorthStar, Kepler, and Telesat also have relationships in Europe, so as not to put everything on MDA. Telesat has, funny enough, been proposing Lightspeed as a bridge for the future IRIS² constellation for a while now.
They also have an agreement with French company Orange regarding Lightspeed. Kepler has led work on HydRON, ESA’s laser data-relay network, since 2024, and NorthStar has an established European presence in Luxembourg. On 31 August, the ESA picked it to lead a consortium called FALCON that tracks uncontrolled reentries of old satellites and rocket stages.
Should also make note that Canada has a specific General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) with the ESA as of this year as well, something that very much opens the door to deeper information sharing and collaboration. Indeed, space is already a firmly established area of collaboration between Canada and Europe.
I imagine that space will get a decent nod at next week’s summit, though how far that goes is yet to be seen. We know Galileo is a discussion, but nothing else on that front. I have some hope though.
To make another quick note, cables are another fantastic area of collaboration. It is well known that I like cables, a lot. I wrote a big piece on cables last year for that reason. To give a quick rundown on the current state of Canada-Europe undersea cables…
On the East Coast, the primary transatlantic network remains the EXA links North, South and Express, all of which land in Halifax. On the other side, Express lands in Cork, Ireland and Brean, UK, while North and South have landings in Dublin, Ireland, and Coleraine and Southport, UK.
Express is the newest line, having come online in September of 2015. North and South are dot-com babies, with South going down into the United States instead of ending in Halifax.
They are owned by EXA Infrastructure. The company was established in 2021 when I Squared Capital acquired the network from GTT Communications.
There is another transatlantic line in Greenland Connect, which effectively serves as Greenland’s digital lifeline, physically linking the island to North America and Europe. Owned by the state-run telecom provider Tusass (formerly TELE Greenland), the line runs from Newfoundland to Nuuk and Qaqortoq, Greenland, and then onward to Landeyjar, Iceland.
This line went live in 2009 and serves as a redundancy route for transatlantic traffic, offering a northern alternative for data flowing between North America and Europe that bypasses the congested and vulnerable cable corridors further south in the Atlantic.
As we have seen through adversarial action in the Baltic Sea, undersea cables are highly vulnerable pieces of infrastructure. I won’t repeat my whole article here, but I also make note that undersea cables are increasingly supported by a limited, aging global service fleet that doesn’t always guarantee quick repair or availability in times of crisis.
That’s also why having an established monitoring ecosystem is so important, as well as proper redundancy. Prevention, in this case, is the best way to mitigate the potential loss of existing lines. Waiting for lines to be damaged is a losing battle for us, and one that we can’t be guaranteed to come out of on top.
Redundancy, such as the proposed Leif Erikson cable, can also help bolster resiliency by ensuring that there is additional capacity available if a line is severed. That line could also potentially get a nod at the upcoming summit, though I am not holding my breath. Ultimately, North Atlantic cables are always a multinational issue, and aligning and collaborating early on these kinds of developments is critical for leveraging our combined capacity to protect our critical undersea infrastructure.
At the end of the day, I like the EU Arctic Strategy for what it is. It isn’t, again, a dedicated, funded endeavour. It is a policy document that sets the priorities and concepts for future discussion. It puts the Arctic as a security issue deeper into policy than the previous 2021 paper.
For Canada, the areas of collaboration are there, and deeper than the policy itself. Other areas of collaboration, such as autonomous systems, joint patrols, deeper Coast Guard collaboration, collaboration with Germany through the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and collaboration on joint platforms like the P-8 and MQ-9, are all outside the scope of the policy, but still present potential areas of collaboration that help bolster the Arctic Strategy outside its general boundaries.
For Canada though, as always, that comes only if we make it. To its credit, the federal government over the last year has been working significantly to bolster this relationship, and has managed to break through in several key areas including space, defence, and a host of agreements and partnerships, including a proper EU strategic partnership and GSOIAs with partners like Germany, Spain, France, and the ESA.
We are putting in the effort, which is why I am relatively chill about things and not screaming from my little Noah soapbox right now, because unlike other areas, like my ever-infatuated Norway, I do believe we are moving at a great pace and doing about as much as we can expect with the time given, save begging and submitting to the EU as a near-client.
There is effort needed. There are other areas where we could deepen collaboration, but we are actively working in those areas, maybe not perfectly, but I would never demand perfect out of anyone. I think for now, the best thing we can focus on is next week’s summit. I think it is fair to let that pass and see what comes of it before we make judgements and talk about gaps. We still don’t know what will come of that at this time, and so in my mind it is best if we see where that goes first.
I don’t foresee anything bad, mind you, and I think this strategy does give us a lot as an outside partner to explore and collaborate on. I think it’s good to have this as a way to see what our European allies are looking to prioritize.
This goes for Canada too, but having updated, modern policies goes a long way in helping facilitate collaboration between allies. A lack of modern policy, like, say, a 20+ year old national security strategy, is an active detriment to conversations when allies can’t properly see our goals and priorities upfront, where they can work to find middle ground with established policy.
That’s why keeping policy across government modern and regularly updated, something we have struggled with, is so important. Waiting a decade between policy updates means a decade for that policy to become outdated and behind the times. The moment a policy drops, it has a shelf life. And yes, I will call people out on this greatly.
But I digress. It is clear we were consulted, and that there was heart put into things. I won’t be too harsh on things; again, I do think it’s a fine policy. It’s just a matter of execution.