Canada & the Support Ship

The last piece of the naval puzzle might be our hardest challenge yet

Another opinion piece to break the stream of analysis.

Apologies to those of you hoping for CMMC II. I promise I'm working on it, though it is taking me a lot longer than expected as I have scrapped and redone it twice now.

To make sure there is a steady stream of content, and because I have been on the topic, I thought what better time to jump on the topic of Multi-Role Suport Ships (MRSS) than now?

Truely, at a time when the Royal Caandian Navy sits on the tipping point of destiny, to either the largest expansion since the second world war or the most disappointing decade since the last decade, there is probably no better time for us to question if the navy is ready to take the plunge on a class of vessel it has remained lacking in compared to the rest of NATO.

Canada is one of the few major NATO countries without such a capability. Indeed, from the United Kingdom to France, Spain to Italy and the Neatherlands to soon to be Portgual, Canada stands among the largest NATO members who lacks the amphibious capability provided by these classes of ships.

But do we need it? Is it truely something worth our while? It's a question I've asked over the last several weeks, something I have had discussed and pondered.

Yet it remains a surprisingly controversial topic among many. When I pondered the concept on Twitter, I was surprised to be met with a fair amount of passionate and hostile responses to the idea.

Is it so hard to imagine the Royal Canadian Navy having such a capability? Could we have it even if we wanted? That'd what I hope to lay out here.

I hope this can spark some myriad of conversation, that people can walk away from this and engage in the topic, because I'd there even a time to discuss this, it is now as we ponder what the future navy might look like.

Firstly though….

HMNZS Canterbury, a Multi-Role Support Ship that inspired me to discuss the topic

What is a Multi-Role Support Ship?

The concept is fairly simple. A Multi-Role Support Ship is a vessel designed to carry out a variety of missions that typically require different types of specialized ships. Unlike traditional naval vessels, which may be optimized for a single task—such as combat, logistics, or amphibious operations—MRSS are built to be flexible and adaptable, capable of supporting a broad array of naval missions in a single platform.

Multi-Role Support Ships have become essential assets to a modern navy. Their ability to transition between these various roles without the need for extensive reconfiguration is imperative to a navies role to project force.

For example, they may serve as a floating base for amphibious operations in one scenario and switch to providing humanitarian aid in another.

MRSS come in various forms, each uniquely designed to meet the specific strategic needs of different navies. These vessels often differ in size, mission scope, and capability, but they all share a fundamental goal: to provide adaptable, multi-mission platforms that can operate across a broad spectrum of naval operations.

HMS Bulwark, an Albion-class landing platform dock

When we dive into the world of Multi-Role Support Ships, we find that there is no one-size-fits-all model. Each navy tailors its MRSS to meet its own strategic demands. There are quite literally dozens of classifications one could use to describe these kinds of vessels.

We won't list all of them, but will talk about some of the more common and discussed terms we see used to describe these vessels.

Let's start with the big one…

The Mistral-class is one of the most commonly discussed platforms when it comes the MRSS, famous for us not acquiring two when we had the chance back in 2015

We start first with Amphibious Assault Ships, also known as Landing Helicopter Docks, like the Mistral-class used by the French Navy or the Canberra-class of Australia. These are some of the largest and most versatile MRSS, often referred to as "helicopter carriers" due to their extensive flight decks capable of supporting rotary-wing operations.

Their key role is power projection—delivering troops, vehicles, and equipment to shore, especially in hostile environments. But these ships go beyond just landing craft; they also house command centers for leading amphibious operations and medical facilities, effectively transforming into floating command hubs and hospitals as needed.

Then we have the Landing Platform Docks (LPD), a more specialized form of MRSS, like the UK’s Albion-class or the Dutch Rotterdam-class. These ships are more specialized to amphibious support than amphibious assault ships but are essential for amphibious warfare and maritime logistics.

LPDs have large well decks for launching landing craft, and they often serve as the linchpin in amphibious operations, delivering troops, tanks, and other vehicles ashore. They may not have the extensive air capabilities of the larger amphibious assault ships, but they make up for it with their focus on logistics and troop transport. Their ability to support marine landings in contested environments is critical to any navy's amphibious strategy.

The Bay-class is an example of the Landing Platform Dock

A third category would be the Joint Support Ships (JSS), which emphasize logistics and replenishment at sea. Canada’s Protecteur-class, for example, fits this mold. While they don't have the amphibious assault capabilities of larger MRSS, these ships provide logistical backbone to a fleet by acting as Multi-Role replenishment ships.

They can refuel other ships, resupply them with ammunition, food, and spare parts, and even act as medical evacuation platforms. They blend the roles of several other support vessels, such as oilers, hospital ships and dry cargo ships together.

What makes JSS essential is their ability to keep a fleet operational for extended periods without needing to return to port. These ships are a key enabler of naval power projection and sustained operations far from home waters.

These are the three types you will need to know to continue from here, but many other classifications exist, and these categories are broad and expansive in nature.

While they might both be a similar class of ships, a Mistral and a Canberra are seperated by 10,000 tans and exist in two seperate categories of capability.

In short, MRSS come in various forms, from the powerful amphibious assault ships to the more logistics-oriented Joint Support Ships, with hybrid and specialized designs filling gaps in between.

The exact configuration of an MRSS depends on the operational needs of the navy it serves, but the unifying theme is that these ships offer a versatile, multipurpose platform that can perform across a range of missions, whether that’s landing troops on a hostile beach or delivering humanitarian aid after a natural disaster.

So where do these vessels fit in the Royal Canadian Navy? What kind of vessel could fit the doctrine and needs of a navy that already has a Joint Support Ship coming this year?

The Protecteur

First, before we continue, I want to make clear I am not compaigning for a vessel to supplement the Protecteur-class. That isn't what I envision this vessel shall be.

The Protecteur that we know is no doubt a lesser version of the original vision. It can be said that the original JSS was more along the lines of the LPD than the JSS we know today.

The Protecteur-class were envisioned as the backbone of Canada's naval replenishment capability, intended to replace the aging Protecteur-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) vessels, which were decommissioned in 2016.

The design is based on the German Navy’s Berlin-class replenishment ships but modified significantly to meet Canadian needs. For instance, the hangar has been redesigned to accommodate the larger CH-148 Cyclone helicopters, and HVAC systems were upgraded for operations in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions

The Protecteur-class will be the backbone of the RCNs supply capabilities, eith the first ship expected to be completed this year

However, the path to building these ships has not been smooth. Initially, the project faced delays, cost overruns, and technical challenges. The total estimated cost for the two ships is around $4.1 billion, far exceeding the original budget.

The Protecteur-class ships were initially expected to be delivered by 2020, but construction has faced repeated setbacks. One of the major delays involved reworking designs and negotiating between various shipbuilding entities.

The Canadian government eventually settled on a modified Berlin-class design, but even after the design selection, actual construction was postponed due to capacity constraints at Seaspan’s Vancouver shipyard, pushing delivery dates further into the future​.

These delays have forced the Royal Canadian Navy to continue leasing the MV Asterix, an interim solution that has extended significantly beyond its original timeframe, costing millions in rental fees.

Cut back fron four to two ships, facing delays and much controversy for the removal of some major features, such as the JSS loss of sealift capabilities, it's been a long road for the Protecteur-class.

Of course this isn't to speak entirely ill on the vessels. Their transportation capabilities are substantial, with the capacity to store over 6,800 tonnes of marine diesel, 1,000 tonnes of aviation fuel, and enough provisions to support a naval task group for more than 30 days.

The JSS is also equipped with a NATO Level III hospital that boasts a full medical suite, including X-ray facilities, intensive care units, a surgical bay, and dental services. This makes them critical assets in providing medical support during missions, especially in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations

Alongside this, the ships offer high-end quality-of-life amenities for sailors, such as shipboard Wi-Fi, fitness facilities, and individual privacy in living quarters.

They are a major step up from the original Protecteurs, and Asterix while we're at it. I don't think anyone will argue about the versatility of these vessels, and the benefit they will provide to the navy.

They truely are Multi-Role. They will do their job well, and include new capabilities that the navy has never had before.

Yet there are still just two to support the whole RCN, two ships that will be constrained with the plethora of tasks that will be demanded of them.

One can see the issues that might arise from this lack of support vessels compared to the desired future fleet. Fifteen Rivers, twelve Submarines and a potential fleet of Corvettes, spread out over a three ocean navy, is a monumental task for Protecteur and Preserver.

There is a reason why the original project aimed to acquire four vessels, and since that cut why there has been much concern raised if the current number is enough.

There is, of course Asterix. The Davies converted ship leased to supplement the transition between Protecteur II and Protecteur III for a ten year period in 2018.

MV Asterix, currently under lease from the Federal Fleet Service

There has always been an option for the RCN to purchase Asterix outright, for a substantial fee. While the current number is only rumored, pegged at at least over 850 million, the original estimate was not to much better at 725 million with applicable taxes.

Thr navy has been clear for the entire time that they had no intention of purchasing Asterix, amd maintain that stance. Once her lease is up, it is likely that she will leave the service of the RCN.

This is currently where we stand. A future navy that will be pressed off the backs of two ships destined to keep her afloat. This is before we even discuss the concept of availability, refit, etc that we shall face in the future. All valid issues to worry about.

Identifying the needs

It is therefore a valid question on what the Royal Canadian Navy can do to potentially mitigate this future issue. While the service maintains that the two JSS will be more than enough, it is clear comparing our future navy's plans to other NATO members, such as France and Italy, that our current fleet would likely be seen as inadequate to others.

But is the solution a new class of JSS? Or perhaps the construction of a third or even fourth? Is the cost of Asterix truely worth it or would such funds be better spent elsewhere?

This isn't a uniquely Canadian issue mind you. There has been ongoing talk among many NATO nations, if not most, about thr current size amd capabilities of their support fleets.

The U.S. MSC has recently discussed sidelining a large amount of support vessels, including two Lewis and Clark dry replenishment ships, one fleet oiler, and a dozen Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports, among others, due to crewing issues.

The Royal Fleet Auxillery similarly has had issues with crewing, including a currently ongoing strike over pay and conditions.

France plans to have four support ships post 2030 to support her navy, Italy the same, with both planning to acquire four Vulcano-class supply ships, though the fourth ship for France has yet to be ordered.

Germany has three Berlin-class in service, for which thr Protecteur are based, with plans to introduce two new oilers alongside them in the Type 707.

The Type 707 Oiler will be the newest addition to the Deutsche Marine, and will supplement the three Berlin-class in service.

The Germans are probably the one group satisfied with their logistics fleet, as they should.

It is impressive for a navy like Germanys, and a good mix of Multi-Role Support Ships supplemented with dedicated oilers.

In fact, this is the combo proudly supported by Admiral Norman, whom we can all collectively say we should have listened to when we had the chance.

This is of course the underlying question both short and long term. What do we require of our support fleet? What capabilities do we lack and how can we acquire them efficiently and effectively?

I believe it is clear that we can rule out two options right away:

1. Purchasing Atserix

2. Acquiring more Protecteur-class

Both options did exist at one point, but these days it feels more fantastical to suggest that they are realistic options to supplement our fleet.

The cost to acquire Asterix, likely over 800 million, is a steep price for a singular ship, one that is, at the end of the day, a modified commercial vessel.

Similarly, acquiring more Protecteurs seems out of the question, with no signs of such an option being discussed, and both ships about to enter service within the next few years, the time to place an additional order was several years ago.

Along those lines, as more projects come through the pipeline, space is quickly filling up at the three shipyards currently part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

This is without taking into account that CMMC will likely be a domestic build, with no indication as of yet that work will be potentially contracted to a smaller yard, despite rumors.

Nor does it take into account the Coast Guards vast backlog of vessels soon to start construction with their own fleet renewal.

So we are back to a blank state. We know that the current JSS are likely to be stressed supporting our future navy, but it's not the only issue present to our support fleet.

There is also the need to discuss the growing responsibility of the CAF in terms of international and domestic needs beyond naval support.

As part of this, I have been asking around to various people to identify where they see the gaps in our support fleet, and while Replenishment was by far the most common concern, the need to support operations such as the Brigade in Latvia, along with projecting force and support in the Arctic, we're common issues also brought up by many.

Various vehicles of the Canadian Army await transport to Latvia. Hundreds of vehicles have made the trip in recent months.

The Canadian Army is currently working on building its Brigade as part of its commitment to EFP Latvia, as first set out at NATO's 2022 Madrid Summit.

The goal is to transform the existing Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group into a fully operational brigade by 2026.

The Brigade is expected to reach full capability by 2025, with major exercises and infrastructure developments in Latvia, including live fire training in Selonia. NATO’s Multinational Division North, based in Latvia, will oversee the brigade’s operations as it transitions from the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade to Canada’s leadership.

2,200 Canadian troops persistently deployed in Latvia by 2026, with additional forces on standby in Canada. This ensures the Brigade's capability to deter and, if necessary, defend against any aggression, demonstrating NATO’s commitment to the security of the Baltic region.

The ability to support this Brigade, both in terms of moving manpower and material, is a major task currently being undertaken by leased Ro/Ro vessels.

The Protecteur class was suppose to have a minor sealift capability, but sadly this has mostly been scrapped in the final design, reduced to a bare capability that, honestly, Protecteur is unlikely to use in this sort of way.

Indeed, taking one of the two Protecteur-class away to perform such a task is a major ask, especially with other commitments more prevalent.

On a similar vein, the Protecteur are unlikely to be seen often in the ocean of most concern - the Arctic.

While it might sound silly to speak of Naval projection in the Arctic ocean, the growing tension in the region, combined with a reiterated Russian and Chinese presence, nessitates that Canada be prepared to not just be active in the Arctic ocean, but have the ability to project force in ways beyond platforms like the Dewolfe-class.

There is tens of billions at stake in the warming Arctic ocean. The fabled Northwest Passage, once the calling to many an explorer, is slowly opening up as the ice-free period grows longer and longer, opening up a new pathway that will revolutionize maritime trade.

To quote Thomas Herrmann, writing for The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies in 2019

When the NWP becomes accessible, it will decrease transit distance for most voyages by at least 7,000 km, compared to going through the Panama Canal or around the tip of South America.

This decrease in distance decreases transit time and dramatically decreases the costs of shipping. This lower cost is attractive to shipping companies, making the prospect of an ice-free Northwest Passage very promising.

In the future, it will likely include heavy ship traffic during its ice-free period in the future.

Canada stands to gain much through this opening Arctic, and while we stand alone in our position of sovereignty over this path, it does not mean that we should discount the need to maintain not just a presence, but a capable force to police our waters.

It is a fact that Maritime shipping remains the most viable way to move supplies to the Arctic, particularly the regions of Nunavut and Nunavik, whom rely on the sealift—a crucial maritime operation conducted during the summer months when sea ice is at its minimum.

Compared to other methods such as air transport or overland ice roads, maritime shipping offers significant advantages in terms of capacity and cost.

While air transport is faster, it is expensive and limited by the weight and volume of cargo that can be moved in a single trip.

The sealift annually delivers over 600,000 cubic meters of cargo, ensuring the survival of more than 38,000 people in remote settlements​.

As the Arctic grows, and existing infurstructure, such as ice roads, become strained and unviable due to shifting climates, the role of the sealift will continue to grow in demand.

This is also why projects, such as the Grays Bay Road and Port, are so vital to ensuring Canada can maintain its presence in the Arctic. These projects go beyond the realm of convential infurstructure, bordering on projects of the utmost National security as the current infrastructure scattered across the North continues to grow more constrained.

This task though requires a vessel for different from Protecteur, where the need for Replenishment-at-Sea is less needed. Instead, just as with EFP Latvia, the ability of the RCN to quickly move assets, support Arctic development, and project itself is for more vital than the need to support Naval operations.

There will be a growing need to police these waters, and as adversaries push the boundaries of our sovereignty in the region, to maintain a way to support a consistent detterent in the face of growing encursions.

This leaves us then with two gaps in our supply capability, both complex and without an easy solution in the short term:

• Supplement the Protecteur-class in support of the Royal Canadian Navy, primarily in replenishment capability.

• Support the wider CAFs ability to support it's operations internationally and domestically

These are both very different tasks that, while in theory could be done with one class of vessel, both issues that deserve individual attention to ensure that a proper, effective solution is found.

Instead, we will focus on both the short and long term solutions that the RCN could realistically undertake to fill in these gaps. We will do this with one caveat. We will not be using a new JSS, or a single vessel for this.

No, I believe that for this experiment, individual solutions are needed for both gaps. I have never been truely sold on the 'One Size Fits All’ approach to defence procurement, as many know.

While there are certainly cases where a common platform/chassis, such as the new Zetros can provide a world-class, viable solution to a problem, there are some things best left to specialized platforms.

Procuring more JSS, or a new class all together, will likely be unviable economically in the short term. This would be a multi-billion dollar adjustment, one likely to take years to see results, and something that, worst of all, is likely to garner political eyes that might aim to make cuts to what can be precieved as a waste.

For reference, we shall consider the short-term as the period between now and 2035. That is a good decade where we can craft a short-term solution before we take a look at what future options might be available.

The Short Term: 2025-2035

We are lucky to have quite a few years to prepare here. Indeed, the first of both the River-class and KSS-III aren't expected until around 2035, and while we don't have a timeline for CMMC, it is likely to be in a similar timeframe.

We can, and should, have a potential solution setup before these vessels start to enter service, so to ensure that we are prepared for any issues and deficits that might arise once more and more start to enter service, and demand for the Protecteur-class grows.

There are admittedly limited options in the short-term. Building new vessels, especially militarized supply ships, will likely be a lengthy, expensive process, even if only replenishment oilers.

Let me make that clear. These vessels, as I envision, would be a class of replenishment oilers, likely two, to supplement the Protecteur-class and provide the RCN additional capability to provide Replenishment-at-Sea.

Sadly, the options for this catagory, at least in the short-term is quite limited. There is the option to do as Asterix and acquire civilian vessels for conversion. This option though is likely to be expensive, time consuming, and might not present much of a savings compared to merely purchasing Asterix.

Assuming the vessels, let's say two, could be purchased and converted to a minimal military standard, and much less extensive compared to Asterix, with a focus on fleet support, then it could present a potential viable.

Such vessels, wholely owned under say a Royal Canadian Navy Auxillery (RCNA) could be crewed by Naval Reserve, providing them another ship beyond the Kingston-class to work with.

Of course a big thing here would be cost. These vessels would not be up to a fully militarized standard, as to save on the cost of conversion, and while that might limit them, depending on the amount of work done, it would still provide a solution to until the 2040s.

If conversion is not available? Then the options are scarce. There are few vessels on the market available for us to acquire, especially ones built after the year 2000.

There is one exception though, amd that comes in the form of the Wave-class of the RFA. The Wave-class tankers are a class of fast fleet tankers currently sitting in extended readiness.

The Wave-class tankers are set to remain in extended readiness until 2028

These vessels, first commissioned in 2003, are more than capable of fulfilling the role asked of them as replenishment ships. While they are beyond the mere oilers I had proposed, beggers can't be choosers here, and we don't have much else.

Wave Ruler has been in extended readiness since 2020, with her sister Wave Knight joining her in 2022. These vessels are scheduled, for now to remain there until 2028, where a decision will be made on their future.

Assuming that both vessels are earmarked for decomissioning, it might be in Canada's best interest to explore the possibility of acquiring the two as a short-term solution to our issue.

While far from young, the Wave-class has remained maintained in case the need arises for them to be called back into service. They would provide the exact capability we currently have a gap in, while also being a dedicated military vessel.

Some might scoff at the idea of purchasing older ships to fill the need, lord knows it has had issues in the past, but if we wish a solution in the 2035 and before timeline, the Wave-class provides probably the only other readily available solution to a conversion.

Just like the converted, these vessels could fit well in a RCNA, while buying us time to come up with a more permenant solution, at least unto the 2040s and beyond.

The second half of this problem is, thankfully a bit simpler, and again turns us to the RFA. While there is little way to truely establish the capability expected in the short term, there are ways to supplement in the meantime.

There will no doubt be those who will point out the 2015 Mistral situation, in which France, after having cancelled the delivery of two Mistral class vessels to Russia over the laters invasion of Ukraine in 2014, was left stuck eith two Mistrals it had little use for, and a desire to get rid of them as fast as possible.

During this time, there was a great many articles and media interest in Canada putting itself in the bidding for the two vessels.

Ignoring this came just after the then Conservative government initiated massive cuts to defence, along with the fact that we never had any need, plan, or ability to use the vessels to their potential, people seemed to flock to the idea of Canada acquiring the two Mistrals, which I assume was part of some grand plan to restore us to naval greatness.

Then the Egyptians bought them and everyone moved on. They now do… stuff… somethings, but hey, they look cool, and that is usually good enough for the Egyptian military.

If you can't tell, I was never sold on the idea, but that is a discussion for a bit. The best course of action, in the short-term, is not to aim for acquiring a vessel to fulfill all the needs we desire out of our secondary gap. This includes the Arctic.

Instead, we will focus on one task in particular, that is giving the navy the ability to move personal and equipment in larger quantities and on rapid notice.

This is primarily in relation to supporting EFP Latvia, where large amounts of equipment and manpower will need to regularly be cycled through, though it isn't the only place such a capability could be needed.

To achieve this, the RCNA should acquire a small fleet of 2-4 Ro/Ro vessels. These vessels, just as our above replenishment vessel, would likely be a civilian vessel, potentially not even militarized, or, at the most, minimally militarized.

These vessels would range between 6000-8000 tons, 114.8 metres in length, with a capacity for at least 500. That puts it in line with vessels such as MV Confederation or the future MV Jean-Lapierre, currently under construction at Davies.

MV Jean-Lapierre is a potential basis for a future RCNA Ro/Ro vessel

There are three ways we could acquire such vessels, either through leasing them, purchasing some off the civilian market, or acquiring them through, say, tacking on to Transport Canada's current Ro/Ro order through Davies.

Leasing Ro/Ro vessels isn't without merit. The Point-class in service with the RFA are leased vessels that, when unused, are contracted out to civilian service.

Originally built for commercial service and later adapted for military use under the UK Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Sealift Service (SSS), the Point-class are designed to transport heavy equipment, vehicles, and other military cargo to distant theatres of operation.

Leasing Ro/Ro vessels, such as the Point-class, remains one of the potential options for filling our support gap

The Point-class have served valiantly for over twenty years, and give us a valuable framework to base a potential lease of our own on. It remains likely the quickest option to filling the gap.

These vessels though would likely be non-militarized, with a bare minimum put onto any potential modifications made. This raises concerns about the survivability of these vessels in the event of conflict.

These are not new questions. The same has been asked of Asterix as well, amd they are valid concerns. These vessels are not designed for a contested enviornment, and lack the defences and survival capabilities of militarized vessels.

Yet these wouldn't be fully expected to be operating in contested environments, at least not in any situation more risky than what is expected of any ship in an area of conflict.

If it is deemed needed, there is also the option to purchase and therefor militarize either an existing vessel, similar to Asterix, or build a new, simple class of vessels built with minimal militarization in mind.

We are already in the process of building new Ro/Ro vessels. Davies is currently building two, Holiday Island II and Jean-Lapierre, both scheduled for delivery in 2028.

While ironclad details on these vessels remains limited, given their size of 114 meters, we can assume they would have a similar capacity to MV Confederation, around 600 people and 200 vehicles.

Now obviously this will vary depending on the exact vehicles being transported, but the capability remains more adequate at this size to be an effective tool in supporting our operations abroad.

It also frees up more space with the Protecteur-class, and gives us a rudimentary way to move people and equipment without having to rely on allies or leasing vessels in one-offs.

Again, these would be a short term solution, one that needs to be cheap, effective and able to enter service without a lengthy period.

With an already full backlog of other vessels, constructing say two to four Ro/Ro vessels could run into issues in terms of timelines, especially in the usual Canadian tradition of creep and scope come into play.

Purchasing COTS vessels might be the best balance we have to filling this issue. They would be truely ours, be readily available, and the lack of militarization is hardly a matter when we are looking for a quick, simple solution.

I don't have exact data on hand in terms of what vessels might be available, obviously getting similar vessels would be best, which presents a challenge. We don't want three completely different vessels, that require much different maintenance and expectations from each other.

This would be the biggest issue, of course, with purchasing. It requires there to be ships to actually purchase! Of course, if the opportunity presents itself, it can be a worthwhile venture to jump when we have a chance, always exceedingly rare these days.

The common theme of the short-term is that Commercial, minimally modified vessels, are likely the best way we have to fill the gap, if only temporary.

If the opportunity arises though, purchasing vessels such as the Wave-class would be a similarly excellent way to fill the gap with true, military vessels.

Yet I'm skeptical of Canada's slow, risk-adversive procurement system to be able to capitalize on this opportunity. There are likely to be many countries willing to pay decent sums quickly to acquire the capabilities the Wave-class provides.

If Canada is to jump on such an opportunity, it would require us to have a system in place to identify and quickly approve the acquisition of equipment beyond the current UOR system.

Even that is relatively slow, though the fastest way we have to acquire equipment, and while we have the tools to do these rapid acquisitions, they come at the risk of political aversion and a tight-pursed Treasury Board whom has not historically been as giving as liked.

There are options in the short-term, even if they are quite fantastical. This of course is in the event the need arises, and in the case of the Wave-class, requires us to be ready to make split-second decisions and be ready to commit.

The Long-Term

Moving beyond the 2035 timeline, the potential options slowly begin to open up. A big issue now is the large backlog that we have, along with the fact that the RCN is already trying to convince the Treasury Board to give them a fuckload of money.

A hundred billion for twelve Submarines? A high-end Corvette likely to cost several billion? Keeping the River-class from being cut? All as an incoming conservative government promises to make major cuts across the board?

The RCN is already playing with a lot of money, and demanding a lot more for the foreseeable future. As long as these projects remain in the works, without contracts signed, it is inconceivable for the navy to continue to advocate for even more money, especially for capabilities that they would have to defend the need of, amongst every other project.

The chequebook is not a formality, and the Treasury Board, while headed by our Queen Anita, isn't known for being charitable.

It is why the short-term solutions would need to prioritize being cheap and simple, to avoid the future wrath or tight cheques of the federal government.

By 2035, we will hopefully have those projects signed and in the works, with the first CPSP and River-class rolling off production. It would be that time, when vessels are hitting the water and others, such as the Arpatuuq-class are in service that we can discuss another major project.

But what is the long-term need of the RCN here? What could we potentially see to full these gaps? Its hard to predict how things will be in ten years time, both in terms of Financials and personnel.

I still believe we need dedicated oilers, and of course, all the short term solutions apply in the long-term. Assuming we do not acquire the Wave-class, there is still the conversion option in play.

We could build a new fleet of oilers. This isn't out of the realm post-2035. I am a personal fan of the BMT ARGUS concept, which has gone on to be the base for the Tide-class and HNoMS Maud respectively.

They vessels were built by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in South Korea in an effort to drive down costs, although the Tide-class did go over budget, it still remained under 600 million for all four ships.

Each Tide-class vessel is approximately 200 meters long, displaces around 39,000 tons, and can carry up to 19,000 cubic meters of fuel. That is more than sufficient for what we would need out of these.

There is also the possibility of jumping on the John Lewis-class currently under construction. While I find them quite big for what we might need, jumping on an existing order helps reduce cost, speeds up acquisition, and provides us commonality with our largest strategic partner.

If we wished to aim smaller, ROKS Soyang, at just over 10,000 tons, is a potential option. Despite her small size, she is still capable of carrying ~10,000 tons of fuel, and has the range and speed to keep up with Protecteur. Along this line, her sister ship, yet to be named, was announced this year at a cost of US$331 million, half the cost of a single John Lewis-class.

Ther isn't anything wrong with having smaller, specialized supply ships to complement the far larger Protecteur-class. In fact, I think it might be what we are most likely to see.

Smaller, cheaper, more flexible vessels in larger numbers. There is a subset whom don't like this idea, specifically because of our crewing issue.

It's a fair concern. Smaller vessels often means more crew, even if the platform's are simpler and cheaper to acquire and maintain. It'd also an even more important reason to take a hard look at how we use our Naval Reserve, and a future RCNA.

We currently have a deficit of ~20%, as recently confirmed by Admiral Topshee, with even higher deficits of trained personnel such as Marine Technicians.

It takes years to train up these skilled workers, and with an already extensive fleet in the works, it might be hard to find the hundreds of extra people needed to crew these vessels.

The CAF hopes to close the gap, and achieve their authorized strength within the next five years. It's a big ask, and only half the picture, but it shows just how volatile recruitment and personnel can be.

It's hard to predict what those numbers and gaps will look like in five years, let alone ten or fifteen. As such, for now, we will acknowledge the issue, and try to find solutions to keep personnel count down, but we won't be limiting ourselves here.

That is especially important for the next part of this, the Canadian Multi-Role Support Ship.

The Canadian Multi Role Support Ship (C-MRSS)

You didn't think I spent the whole beginning of this talking about these ships for nothing did you?

This is undoubtedly gonna raise some stir. This is a surprisingly controversial topic in the CANMILSPHERE to talk about.

It seems everyone and their grandma has some sort of hill on which to stand on this topic, none more than me, whom has been annoying everyone I know on this topic for the last two weeks.

Of course, this isn't the first time we've had these talks, even before the 2015 Mistral crisis. The original JSS were much more in line with the idea of a LPD than the end result.

It's been an ongoing discussion since before I was born, and will be here likely long after I am gone, so long as no one pulls the trigger on the concept.

The Royal Canadian Navy, to me, absolutely needs this capability, not now, but most certainly in the future, especially as our needs grow, and the reliability on allies to support us becomes more and more faltered.

Most of our allies are already dealing with cuts and constraints of their own, with little room to offer massive support in this capability to us.

Between the warming Arctic, EFP Latvia, amd the unknown of future needs and commitments, having this capability domestically, for a country where our seaways are vital, and sealift capabilities are already constrained, is a matter of sovereignty, particularly in the Arctic.

We maintain the sole position of sovereignty along the NorthWest Passage. We can not expect, nor should we, that our allies will support us in these claims, given they are already reserved, if not outright deny us.

Sacrificing this capability means giving up our ability to project force and control over our vast territory in the contested North. We have the navy, the future fleet of icebreakers, a vast fleet even, with over thirty in service or ordered.

Yet without the ability to rapidly move forces, equipment, even basic supplies on a mass scale, and with an Arctic already falling behind in terms of land and air infurstructure, the role of the sealift will only continue to grow with time.

It might be that this is the optimal way of rapidly responding to incursions and situations, assuming that we continue to faulter on our Arctic infrastructure.

As such, a Multi-Role Support Ship, capable of projecting force into the Arctic, with support of our future fleets, supplying EFP Latvia, and providing a small expeditionary capability, feels like a no brainer.

Beyond just that, these vessels can further contribute to Canada’s humanitarian role, able to provide a degree of tasks such as HADR beyond vessels such as the Dewolfe-class without sacrificing one of the vital Protecteurs.

Imagine how vital such vessels could have been when disasters such as Fiona struck, or in the evacuation of places such as Lebanon, which we are Starting to see the last few days.

There is quite literally a multitude of roles these vessels could play, from transports to command vessels, HADR to sovereignty patrols.

But to make such a project work, we need to establish what kind of vessel we would need to fulfill our tasks, while providing room for flexibility.

This is where the arguments tend to begin, and where I will establish right away, we don't need a Mistral-class or similar vessel.

No

This might be controversial to some, and I am willing to take the heat. Indeed, maybe we will have the capability to support these large, 20,000 ton amphibious assault ships. I just don't see that happening.

We do not have an amphibious capability. We have an army whom has made it clear it does not want in on the concept. We are unlikely to be in the situations where we will be performing these operations on a massive scale.

What point is there to purchasing a helicopter carrier that carries more helicopters than we have available? For a fleet that will already be stretched by the vessels coming into service?

You can say we can purchase more, or change, or any number of ideas, yet why would we spend untold billions to build a capability, to support a platform that we might never need the full capabilities of?

By that point we are paying billions to justify the existence of a ship of this caliber, not to have a needed capability. We absolutely need a larger force of maritime helicopters, but not so we can fill out a Mistral, or Dokdo, or Canberra.

In fact, I stand that we don't need anything over 10,000 tons.

That might seem small, and it is by the standards of these vessels, but the capabilities of these smaller vessels remains effective, potent and to our needs.

The first ship I thought of was HMNZS Canterbury. In fact, it was her that inspired me to think of the idea.

Constructed by Tenix Shipbuilding in Australia and commissioned in 2007, Canterbury was designed to fulfill a broad range of duties essential for New Zealand’s strategic interests.

She displaces approximately 9,000 tonnes fully loaded, with a length of 131 meters and a beam of 23.4 meters. In terms of capacity, she can carry up to 250 embarked troops, along with 40 vehicles, including light armored vehicles and trucks. Additionally, her cargo deck can hold up to 33 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) containers.

The ship is outfitted with two LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized), each capable of carrying up to 50 tonnes of cargo, enabling amphibious operations in areas with limited infrastructure.

To me, a vessel of this capability, of this size, is the standard that we need, more than capable of transporting what we need, with flexible space and capability to be modified to various tasks as needed.

The ability to move 250 troops, and their equipment rapidly and efficiently will be a vital capability in supporting the continued Canadian presence in Latvia as well as providing us a semi-amphibious capability to rapidly deploy assets across the planet, particularly, again in the Arctic.

There are a multitude of designs though in this catagory worth investigating, including some Caandian designs floating around.

There are various vessels ~10,000 tons on the market to fill this gap

As I've said before, often times these vessels are designed with specific countries and needs in mind, as such, it can be hard to find a design that can fit perfectly into one's needs.

In going to focus on three today, all similar vessels, of similar size and capability, each with a unique focus:

• Vard 7 313

• Serco Triton 11

• Damen Enforcer 13226ED

All three of these vessels are of similar size, with the Triton being the largest at ~11,000 tons, a bit bigger than expected, but not to big as to be outrageous.

I mostly included it for the addition of a proper Well Deck, something we can debate the need of given we do not have a massive focus on the need for amphibious assault.

I have often used the 7 313 as the perfect vessel for us, with the ability to complement 300 troops, 1400 square meters of Ro/Ro space, and almost 800 more square meters of additional storage and flexible mission space.

It has a NATO Class II hospital, flight deck with space for two medium-sized helicopters, and a hanger that can fit up to four more.

It isn't perfect, but fits the role we need. I would like more than two 15m landing craft, but the ship does come with a Ship-to-Shore connector, and I hear the capability to support larger landing craft if needed.

A look at the 7 313 hospital and hanger respectively

They lack a RAS capability, as far as I know, but I have yet to hear back from VARD on this, not that I expect them to fill this role. The best part of all, they're Canadian designed, which is always a nice bonus.

The 313 prioritizes being a Multi-Role vessel above all, flexible and able to fill and rapidly configure to different roles as needed.

Compare this to the Enforcer, which sacrifices some space and capability to provide a much more comprehensive amphibious capability.

It has additional provisions cranes, which I love, as well as the ability to carry not just four 15m LCVP1604, but also two larger 35m LCU3607 vessels, a far more capable amphibious capability compared to the 313.

It also has a Class II hospital, but only the capability for four helicopter, compared to the 313s six helicopter maximum.

It also only has around half the total space and capability of the 313 in terms of storage, but given its primary amphibious focus this is understandable.

The point of these two comparisons is to raise that no matter which we choose, to focus on a Multi-Role vessel or a more amphibious one, that the options are there to explore both in this size and capability, especially with both vessels able to operate with under a hundred crew, a big win for the personnel people.

Even if we must go higher, or wish to have both, options like the Triton 11 exists, even if slightly bigger, that can perform those roles as demanded.

Of course, I am more for proven designs, and many more do exist. These are just three of the selected options that I have chosen to show off what is possible in this smaller range.

I myself lean more towards a 313 design, focusing on having as much space and Modularity as possible, even if sacrificing amphibians capability.

At a price point of ~400 million each with a small crew count, we can easily afford to have three in service, allowing at least one to be available at any given time.

These vessels could easily fill most of the gaps we have, including freeing up space and capability eith the Protecteur-class, allowing them to fill more of the roles they're specialized in.

Building the proper supply fleet

There are many ways we can solve the gaps in our supply fleet, from leasing vessels, to conversion, to taking the risk on a major project such as a MRSS.

These are gaps that exist, and will exist. Denying that they do, and pretending it can be fixed simply and easily if conflict arises only further pushes this issue to the sidelines.

Obviously, we are limited in the short-term. There are options, but they are few and require us to take massive amounts of risk and effort that our current system does not encourage.

Long-Term, there is potential, even if it is fantastical. Granted, there is lots right now that feels that way. Twelve Submarines? High-end Corvettes? Three years ago you would have been laughed if you suggested it.

To pretend that the current plans aren't anything less is silly. This is the navy of hopes and dreams, one built off crafting a navy many would have dismissed as impossible a few short years ago.

Being hopeful, demanding more is not a bad thing. It is why we discuss these topics in the first place. We can't address issues if we don't speak about them, and we can't push new capabilities if we merely dismiss the ideas at first glance.

We have a sense of doomerism in the CANMILSPHERE, and for good reasons. There is a long history of disappointment, false hope and broken promises, capitalized by a harsh, complicated system that takes everything and beats it down before it often has a chance.

But things are getting better, equipment wise, and the demand for more, the push for more is there at the highest levels, amd while we might not think much of these conversations at our level, the observer, every project began as an idea, and every idea came from a single question.

The more we promote, the more we try to raise these discussions, the more people will hear, and the louder the call and discussion will go. We are a small space, but it is growing, and it's voice is growing.

We will not fix the auxillery easily. It will take a lot of effort and sacrifices. I do not see anything coming in the short-term, but that does not mean that the future does not provide opportunities.

The world is changing, and the navy will be playing a far bigger role as time goes on, and the ocean becomes more and more challenging to us, as it becomes more and more a lifeline between us and our vast north.

Commitment takes effort. Commitment takes sacrifice. It requires us to no longer be easily bound to allies, to be reliant to them.

We aren't the only people in this crisis. We will have little places to turn to in the event we need these capabilites and can't find them on our own

It will require us to project force, to be able to sustain not just our navy, but our forces abroad and our people afar. If we want to keep our claims, we need to be able to show up.

We need to be prepared to be alone. We need to be ready to be standing on our own, with the capability to respond accordingly.

We're close to finishing the puzzle, we just need to find the missing piece.