Canadian Army releases Inflection Point 2025, the first document of restructuring.

Well, its finally here…

I say that as if this is some grand release, which at least to me it is. However those of you wanting the real juicy stuff are gon a have to wait a little while longer.

The Army silently dropped the first of its restructuring documents, Inflection Point 2025 the other day to little fanfare. This is the first of several documents that will be dropped as part of the broader restructuring.

Thats right, restructuring isnt coming to us all at once. Instead it will be slow-rolled to us over the next two or so weeks. If it weren't for a friend I might have missed this dropping on us this weekend!

Inflection Point, as I will be referring to it, is again the first of these documents to drop and looks into the current state of the Canadian Army, why restructuring is needed, and a basic idea of what the Army of 2040 is supposed to look like.

It is, at its core, the backgrounder to the wider restructuring efforts. It sets the stage and tone for what the following documents will give us, while giving a bit of a teaser for what is to come.

I won't be going through everything in the document. However we will explore it. You can read the whole thing yourself here.

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Breaking down Inflection Point 2025

Inflection point starts off with a simple statement: The Army we have is not the Army we need.

For those of us who have been regularly following and discussing this topic that sentence feels like a moment out of Animal Farm, this definitive, looming fact that hangs over everyone.

The scale will be massive and the timelines that we will get will be ambitious. There is an acknowledgement here that we have much to do, and a ticking clock to get things done.

There is no time to wait, no time to debate. The common term you might hear is that we have to be ready to partake in Major Combat Operations within the next five years.

For the last two years we have been hearing that from CAF, the Federal Government, among our allies. We have a set time period to be prepared for. I tend to not like the number timelines, choosing instead to focus on the 2030 period.

I feel that is easier for common people to understand and gives a but more leniency in discussion. The truth though is that a Major Conflict is likely to happen within the next three years.

That is for later though. We are here to focus on the document. The primary focus is on making sure the Canadian Army is prepared to participate in Major Combat Operations (MCO)

A Major Combat Operation is defined as “large-scale, high-intensity military operations involving joint and combined arms forces engaged in sustained combat against peer or near-peer adversaries, aimed at achieving decisive strategic or operational objectives.”

This is again the first document in a series of documents to be released regarding restructuring. The next will be the Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept, releasing sometime this week, and then the a Canadian Army Modernization Order (CAMO)

CAMO will define the lines of effort, objectives, effects, and high-level tasks required to achieve the strategy’s ends. After this Master Implementation Directives will deliver the specific tasks with associated resources, accountabilities, responsibilities, and authorities to execute the changes that will be applied across the Army over the coming years.

Inflection Point lays it out plainly: the world is shifting fast, dangerously, and for good. Strategic disruption and authoritarian powers are testing the rules-based Intnernational Order, and new technologies like AI, cyber, and space are reshaping the modern battlespace quicker than we can keep up.

Against this backdrop, the Army admits its combat capability is no longer adequate for Major Combat Operations.

The document does a good job of walking through the scale of formations available right now, something I give credit for. It goes a long way, especially to those who might not be aware of current structures, to show the current scale of things.

At the base sits the combat team—about 180 soldiers, a mix of mechanized infantry and tanks. These are useful for building combat proficiency, but far too small for High-Value Warfighting Roles (HVWR).

Next is the battle group (BG), ~1,000 personnel, task-tailored with combat, combat support, and combat service support (CSS). The Army can field BGs today, but they too fall short in mass, firepower, and pan-domain integration.

The brigade (Bde), ~5,000 soldiers across artillery, armour, infantry, engineers, signals, and sustainment, is the lowest level capable of synchronizing joint effects in pan-domain ops.

This is the echelon the Army must be able to fight at… yet it currently cannot field and sustain a fully independent brigade for long. True staying power comes only at the division (Div) level of ~15,000 soldiers, self-sustaining and able to fight combined arms over broad areas for extended periods.

The document stresses that Canada cannot depend on allies to plug our gaps forever. Capabilities like Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD), Self-Propelled Artillery, Long-Range Sensors, and Long-Range Precision Fires are decisive, but scarce and expensive even among NATO partners.

If the Army is serious about sovereignty, be that asserting presence in the Arctic, deterring aggression abroad, or meeting alliance obligations than it must develop these capabilities at scale.

Waiting until conflict breaks out is a losing strategy. We must be prepared for Modern Combat Operations, and that means being able to field at a Division level.

The document is blunt here, and continues to paint a fairly bleak picture. That is expected, given the obvious issues that continue to plague the army. As we continue through the document, we do eventually get to the point on where the Army currently is, and there are no punches pulled in its criticism.

The document doesn’t shy away from calling out the structural rot. It sharply criticizes the Army’s current setup being divided along regional lines, which is rightfully points out works fine for admin, but operationally it’s a mess—slow, redundant, and lacking agility when it comes to actually generating capabilities for real-world missions.

From there it digs into the PETS system (Personnel, Equipment, Training, and Sustainment) and the repeated issues with focusing on Counter-Terroism operations. This focus has left huge holes in heavy firepower, sustainment, and combined arms capability.

Infantry battalions are short on people, our Fires capabilities are lacking and outdated, the armoured regiment is down to one, tired squadron of tanks, and engineers are missing essential breaching gear.

All of these are things that we hear commonly spoken about. We just heard about these issues this week across the media in talks about the current state of MNB-L.

Lack of spare parts, a complex supply system that creates bloat and lacks fluidity to respond to issues, and personnel shortages across nearly half the trades. These aren't new things, and the document does a good job at going into a lot of them.

It goes further into Force multipliers like ATGMs, loitering munitions (LM), drones, and CUAS assets that barely exist in usable numbers, with no clear pathway to build of the success of recent UOR to provide these capabilities on a wider scale.

Instead procurements not only have to compete for precious time with these UOR, which despite being urgent still take multiple years to deliver capabilities, but also have to go the extra step to prove fairness in similar competitions.

Its an ineffective system with nothing built in to quickly acquire more assets for the wider Army, even if there is a very clear and easy place for them to fill.

I digress, but it is part of wider, systematic issues for why these assets take yeats to acquire and exist in such small amounts. It isnt as simple as to just blame a shift to COIN operations.

If it was that simple we would have been able to quickly acquire these capabilities several years ago when the red button was pressed.

Reserves (ARes) get their own sharp critique. Running on parallel systems from the Regular Force (RegF), the lack of proper Investment and struggles with Integration have left them ineffective. The attempt to make them useful at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels at once has left them effective at none.

Readiness fluctuates, equipment is minimal, and decades of underinvestment have hollowed them out. This creates constant tension and mismatched expectations between ARes and RegF.

Training is a weak spot too. The Army can’t scale and deploy fast because it lacks pre-positioned stocks, airlift, and reliable ways to mobilize reserves. Training pipelines crank out competent individuals but don’t prepare the force for modern multi-domain operations.

Structure gets a briefer mention. The mix of light, medium, and heavy forces has no clear division of labour, overlap in places, and glaring gaps.

Sustainment is built on fragile just-in-time models that wouldn't last, nor prove effective in prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Without a serious overhaul in structure, procurement, and logistics, the Army risks failing both at home and abroad.

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The Army of the Future

The document spends the first half going over the many issues and problems the Canadian Army currently faces. It outlines just about every issue you would hear on a regular basis from those currently serving.

From thr structural issues, lack of proper equipment, a lack of capacity…. Everywhere. There isnt much that isnt taken and ripped into, which for the record is a good thing.

Eventually you have to acknowledge your failures. Its something I think we as Canadians sometimes struggle with. Its hard for us to admit and then try to rectify issues of our own causing.

The document confirms what we already knew, if you follow me, about the future structure of the Canadian Army with both an Expeditionary and Domestic Division.

Those of you who have been here for a while will remember us discussing these two a few months ago, and again in the last newsletter. The concept hasn't changed much from when I first reported on the concept.

This is one of the few times it has been publicly confirmed though. The document, despite not intending to be the overall plan, does go into surprisingly great detail on what the Army of 2040 is supposed to look like.

Brigades have to sustain high-intensity combat, backed by a Defence Supply Chain that actually works and a Reserve (ARes) framework that can mobilize at scale. A lot of the system, at least from what I've seen, is built around creating this mobilization pipeline.

To keep the Expeditionary Division in the fight, sustainment needs a full overhaul. That means things like automation, predictive tools, autonomous delivery, and a complete rethink of how CSS is done.

The Reserves need to have self-sufficiency. Instead of chasing standards and goals that never materialize, training and sustainment will be tailored with new tactics, equipment, and trades built specifically for the ARes role.

On the tech front, the CA has to link its sensors, fuse intel, and strike faster. That means.networked sense-and-strike, AI-enabled targeting, and a C5ISRT (Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Targeting) fully interoperable with NATO, Joint Forces, and other Government agencies.

This is where projects like Joint Fire Modernization and Pan-Domain Command & Control come in, and also why I constantly bring them up as two of the most important projects currently in the works.

You don't survive in the modern battlespace without having the digital infrastructure in place to properly catalog, sort and organize information, as well as the tools to take that info and to turn it into executionable actions.

This also demands new assets like GBAD, layered CUAS, Integrated EW, and Cyber Defences baked into every Brigade, all while denying the same to the adversary.

The document also calls for a top-down approach to experimentation, lessons learned, and rapid adoption of battlefield observations. Doctrine has to be current, tied directly to strategy, and rolled out across the force quickly. Slow adaptation and lack of flexibility in the modern battlefield is defeat. Plain and Simple.

I won't go into everything the document says. It is quite extensive, I give credit, however we will be getting more documents that go into greater details.

Since those will inevitably contain more information and greater breakdowns, I will summarize a few of the key points and concepts outlined. Again I encourage you to read the document on your own to get the total picture.

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The Modernization Framework is broken down into three cores - Ends, Ways and Means. There is also a section on future investments out to 2040.

Here is a summary of what the Framework outlines:

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Ends

Enhanced Fighting Forces (Now):

• Harder to detect, target, and kill (both Physically and Electronically)

• More lethal with distributed sense-and-strike.

• Renewed focus on Dispersion tactics

• Active and Passive protection systems.

• Better close-combat power and globally deployable light forces.

• Arctic presence and domestic readiness built into the structure.

Lethality at Range (Emerging):

• Long-range precision fires (HIMARS)

• Multi-Domain Targeting

• Arctic-capable A2/AD

• Focus on disrupting and destroying before the enemy closes in.

Persistence at Scale (Enduring):

• Shift from Combat Team/BG comfort zones to fighting as a Brigade in a Division.

• Shift from episodic readiness to persistent, scalable force generation

• Strategic Depth, Reserves, and Logistics to absorb attrition and keep fighting

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Ways

Change in Focus:

• Faster decision cycles

• Expanded Electronic Warfare systems and Layered Sensor Networks

• Closing the lethality gap with tech, tactics, and more resilient soldiers.

Change in Organization:

• RegF regrouped into a single Div structure.

• Light forces centralized for Rapid Crisis Response.

• A second Div built around ARes + Rangers for DOMOPS, Mobilization, and Augmentation.

Change in Equipment:

• Recapitalize worn-out platforms

• Move towards a continuous sustainmemt and modernization model.

• leverage industry and expand sustainment capacity

Tech Integration:

• Data-driven, Networked, and AI/ML enabled Army.

• Renewed efforts to integrate Autonomous and uncrewed systems.

• Moving from single-domain “kill chains” to a dynamic multi-domain “kill web.”

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Means

People:

• Streamlined RegF + ARes pipelines

• Faster integration into field force

• Meaningful careers with demanding and relevant training, along with technology of their generation.

Capability:

• New UxVs and Autonomous systems

• Modernized Decision Support tools

• New Fires and Long-Range Strike Capabilities

Sustainment:

• New focus on Division-level Sustainment and Reconstitution

• Renewed focus on fighting in Contested Environments

• A revision of CSS tactics

Force Design:

Not one-size-fits-all. The CA will establish a focused divisional structure, fielding Light, Medium, and Heavy forces. This will provide renewed agility and scalability for future multi-domain and multi-region conflicts.

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Extra Investments (to 2040):

• UxVs across domains (Fires, EW, Comms, Cyber, Surveillance).

• Next-gen Tanks with Breaching/Bridging/Recovery integrated.

• Wider distribution of BLOS fires—LM Swarms, Long-Range ATGM, UxV Integration.

• LAV replacement + Next-Gen MEDCAV systems

• Engineer modernization with Optionally Crewed/Autonomous Bridging, Breaching, Gap Closure, AT Mine Modernization.

• Soldier systems overhaul with AR-Enabled Assets, new Small Arms, Protection, Night-Vision Systems, Sensors, Load Carriage.

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Putting things together

Inflection 2025 is extensive, quite so for what is essentially a backgrounder. Even if you were to inly read this you would have a good idea of the plans and future structure of the Canadian Army.

For those of you who have been following me for a while a lot of this might seem familiar to what we've been discussing this year. I will admit, there is a lot here that I am happy to see finally confirmed, a d more than I feel validated in sticking to in discussions on the future.

There are deep issues though, and the document does have a section dedicated to the risks that are currently present, from lack of funding for National Procurements, Aging equipment and inadequate stockpiles of spares and munitions, numerous Infrastructure issues.

All of these present a risk of the Army almost eating itself apart, both trying to play catch-up to sustain what we have while also trying to build out a fighting Division. Both of which are not intertwined, and focusing on one risks hurting the other.

If you go back to the beginning of all this, you'll remember the statement on needing things now. There are timelines, very ambitious goals, and now no longer any wiggle room for things to be delayed.

That no longer exists. We have used up all the free time we have, and there is no longer room for debates or second-guessing. We quite literally have a singular shot at this, and failure will lead to catastrophic results.

The document lays out whats needed, Accelerated equipment delivery with built in options for additional systems, adequate NP Resourcing, Fleet Rationalization, and ruthless divestment planning.

All of which are needed, dont get me wrong. See, I dont want to go into to many criticisms or concerns because this isnt meant to be detailed to the extreme, nor answer everything.

I dont hate the plan either. It brings us in line with the rest of our NATO allies, almost all of which are going through their own Modernizations in structure at the moment, or recently have.

I do have concerns. While I understand the desire to Centralize, I also have concerns that the various Regional divisions, combined with Canada's geography, will make the execution of a Non-Regional organizational structure difficult to execute, or in the worst case create new issues in terms of administration and sustainment while not really solving the core issues.

Speaking on that topic, CSS reforms are certainly needed, however there is significant risk in this new structure of messing that up, let alone the scale and difficulty of essentially tearing down the system and rebuilding it.

Again, I dont want to jump on things to hard here. We don't have nearly all the info to effectively judge the plans, cartainly I don't based off of now one document and the things I hear.

And it does come back to the age old “Tough choices must be made, and Risks must be taken”

I say that all the time. I almost preach it on a constant. So I dont want to now throw some sort of wrench in the gears of progress by suddenly becoming adversity to radical changes and reforms.

I do have concerns, everyone should. You always need to take note of potential issues and worries when undertaking fundemental changes like this.

Certainly I dont think im the most qualified to speak on the validity or intricacies of these kinds of reforms. Maybe I can find someone who does to do a podcast with? Anyone interested in rambling about it with me once everything's out? 🤣

I do think the current outline is detailed, well thought, and certainly the kind of radical shift that I tend to be vocal about wanting. It is very clear there was deep care and discussion that went into things, and the priorities focused on ate the same I had been hoping to see.

Again we still await more details. This also wont exist in a vacuum. While restructuring is good, it is but one of the many institutional reforms that are needed to make CAF start to work as a modern entity.

Yes, the document does acknowledge that. There are things out of its hands. Those, to me, present the biggest risk here. The risk of things outside ones immediate affect. That includes things like funding, procurement reform, etc.

Those things all present a huge risk of messing up the rollout of the new structure. Yet those are the risks that must be taken. We simply, again, cant afford to just sit around and hope the system works, or take the time to slow roll this over the next decade.

We have a ticking clock pushing us to midnight, and if we want to survive it we need to start taking action over publishing reports and making plans. I just hope those in authority have the same sense of danger and urgency.

I guess we'll find out November 4th.