Let's Talk with Noah (01/13/26): The United States, MEDCAV, Munitions, Much on The Navy
Q&A
Happy Tuesday!
I did this a bit late this week, so I apologize. I stabbed myself in the foot yesterday. No biggie, got my Tetty shot. I'm good! Needless to say, I only got to twenty-five questions this week, so to those who missed out I apologize! Again I always encourage you to ask again next week. I try to prioritize repeat questions to the list.
As always you can ask your questions, and vote on others, over on our Slido page. It will be up until Monday! A lot of you sent stuff in DMs also but I prefer the stuff there as it can be voted on and also kept open to everyone. If you enjoy my content also consider supporting TNSR over on our Kofi!
Q1. What's your risk assessment of US infringements on Canada's sovereignty, and what should we do now to guard against those risks from materializing?
My risk assessment in this regard is what I would describe as fluid. Of course, I already talked about this topic on Sunday if you missed it—not fully, mind you, but it does capture my current thoughts well.
My position remains that the current threat of the United States against Canadian sovereignty remains minimum, though with the added caveat that this administration is fickle and subject to quick change.
From a purely analytical perspective, the American government has remained open to finding solutions with Canada, the security relationship hasn't significantly shifted, and outside the bashfulness of some, there hasn't been an overall targeting of Canadian interests that I would directly say threaten our sovereignty.
However, such things as we have seen the last two weeks can greatly change. We have seen this administration quickly shift focus on topics and quickly become aggressive when they see something challenge their interests and desires.
Because of that, the risk of sovereignty shifts from direct threats like annexation to indirect ones, such as wider shifts in our collective security, American activities in Canadian territory (such as the use of Canadian airports or transiting through Canadian waters), and continued economic pressure.
At the top of that list are the potential shifts in alliances/NATO and their ripple effects on Canada. While I am not of the belief that NATO is dying, the trust that the Europeans have in the Americans will nevertheless remain damaged for years to come. That puts us in a strange position between both camps.
Depending on how each side treats it, there can easily be conflicting demands made of us. That is especially true of the Americans, who would likely expect our support unconditionally in some sort of spat.
Similarly, demands for both continued Canadian presence in Europe and Continental Defence could come to a head in a schism, especially if both are tied into further economic negotiations. If the Americans decide we have a new minimum for Continental Security—or else they're out—it presents a potential risk factor that can strain otherwise limited resources and risk us making sacrifices elsewhere.
Further, when it comes to Greenland, we can expect that Canadian infrastructure and waters would be used by the Americans in the unlikely event that they decide it's better to move than to speak. That presents a major risk factor for Canada in being complacent.
Continued economic pressure also threatens our sovereignty by forcing us to bend to pressure. That's the idea, at least. The continued threat of economic retaliation will loom heavy so long as the current administration is in place. It presents the one ongoing threat.
The other two are unlikely but still notable concerns, both of which indirectly affect Canadian sovereignty in a way that pressures us into following one camp. Both of which are 'corrosive' to our autonomy as an independent power.
For Canada, it presents a very complex, difficult situation. It is easy to tell one side to bugger off and to take an aggressive stance on these issues. Sadly, such shows rarely work for anyone. Oftentimes, they only work to make the situation worse, save some people feeling tough and proud of themselves.
Of course, the solution in this case is accepting that you can't escape retaliation, and you will get hurt. The focus shifts from prevention to mitigation. That does mean diversifying trade relationships. That does mean building up a strong, independent Armed Forces with the tools to operate independently if needed. That includes in domains like Space, Cyber, and Command and Control.
You want to mitigate reliance so as to mitigate the effects of retaliation and pressure—to ensure that you have the capability to protect your immediate domain independently on something like NORAD, if needed.
I know that isn't the answer many will like. They want action plans, things of substance, but that really isn't what keeps us safe. Building the basic foundation and reinforcing it is what keeps us stable, keeps the house planted so we can build upon it.
That goes beyond defence. As I discussed with things like the Mackenzie River and human security: that is how we further reinforce our sovereignty against American pressure. That requires some protectionist policy, some tough choices on what to do. However, it benefits us in the long term more than preparing for any invasion would.
Q2. The CAF plan to increase the inventory of 155mm Artillery ammunition. Is there a plan to increase other ammunition levels for the numerous CAF weapon systems?
This kind of conversation is being had as part of a wider look into the Munition Supply Program. There is an active study ongoing as to how to modernize the program and what exactly should constitute critical munitions for stockpiling.
I for one greatly welcome this move, as I have long argued for it. I have not been privy to any engagement on the topic, but I trust it is going well. As of right now though, the focus is on our supply of 155mm shells, of which work is ongoing to slowly, painfully, identify where to make key investments.
IFM comes with a mandate to secure munitions IPs as well as for suppliers to engage with Canadian Industry on local production. That is a great step to make, and I hope other projects take similar approaches when it comes to munitions.
However, we are still behind the curve there, and we still have yet to truly invest in the infrastructure needed to get our munition supply up to the levels needed for a peer conflict despite years of discussion. Believe me, it is extremely painful for me to watch day after day.
Q3. Have you heard any information regarding the Main Operating Base West for the CC-330 Husky? Last year, we heard that it would be YEG, but crickets since.
As far as I know, negotiations are still ongoing for what it will look like and actually securing access. That was the status as of four months ago when I last looked into it. That's all I got. Sadly, this is one area where I don't have a lot of information. Negotiations like these are secret. They are outside my purview. So sadly, this is likely a case of having to wait and see what comes out.
Q4. If the government selects the KSS-III submarine, will we use the Korean cruise missile for the VLS or will we integrate Tomahawk for commonality with the RCD?
Well, for starters, the VLS is primarily designed to fire the Hyunmoo IV-IV Ballistic Missile. The Koreans are using the tube for everything else as far as I know, though I have been told that VLS is an option. They don't seem to do it themselves.
Either way, there is zero desire there. We want these as off-the-shelf as possible; that includes using Korean munitions.
The fact is that integrating Tomahawk into the VLS would be expensive, take years, and we don't even know if it would be possible from a technical side of things—IE, can the Tomahawk even connect with the existing launch system? That goes for any sort of munition integration.
We would likely be paying for its development, and while commonality is nice, with twelve submarines, the cost-benefit of adding new munitions slowly skews away from commonality as a definite desire, if you catch my drift. The sub fleet is large enough to justify investing in its own munition supply if we desire.
So the likelihood of Tomahawks on the KSS-III is a hair above zero, and that's being generous. If munitions already exist that are available and work? There's zero reason in my books to entertain [alternatives] for the sub fleet. Not if we're talking twelve at least.
Q5. How concerned or not are CAF leaders with buying American-controlled equipment and vehicles that are subject to ITAR and other US controls given current events?
There is almost zero concern on my side. There are some mentions, a desire to maintain some independence. Vice-Admiral Topshee talks about it often with CDC; however, it isn't necessarily an American thing. It's an overall desire for as much Canadian-controlled content and IP as possible.
We want to build up a credible Defence Industrial Base. We want to eventually become a true exporter. That requires Canadian content to be mature as well as access to Intellectual Property we can use. That is why IP is such a focal point of recent procurements.
However, none of this is Anti-American in nature. It just so happens Americans don't really give IP away easy, especially when they are our next-door neighbor and already have existing capacity at home. The desire there is minimal.
Overall, the mentality around is that we need to be more independent of our allies and their supply chains; however, there is no one arguing for cutting off American systems, nor favoring against them. If they're what fits best? That's the only thing that most care for. At least that's what I see talking around. It's mostly business as usual.
Q6. Will the RCAF look into a dedicated SEAD platform? Seems like SEAD was one of the contributing factors to how successful the Venezuela raid was?
Unlikely to be a dedicated aircraft, though I will argue that there is a glaring lack of support aircraft for tasks like ISR and Electronic Warfare. That's the kind of thing I would love to see us take the Global airframe and really experiment with as others have.
But no, that role is supposed to fall for us on the F-35, hopefully equipped with munitions like the AGM-88G. While not ordered, I know there have been talks on another munitions package that is supposed to include some juicy things for the F-35. I think Joint Strike Missile is all but confirmed, but would not be shocked to see AGM-88G in there.
So the answer is that we plan to use the F-35 in that role. No Growlers or such here for us. The Panther does the role just fine for what we need, though it could be benefited by having something like a Global-based Electronic platform in complement.
Q7. Has there been any updates or RFI yet on the artillery plan for the 81 & or 120mm systems?
Not since the last one, which if anyone is curious you can read here. The work now is on engaging with industry through one-on-one and Industry events while they finish drafting the RFP.
There is a need to get this done. The Army wants delivery ~2030/2031. That means we need to accelerate where we are now and start the ball rolling. We should hopefully be getting something there soon, hint hint.
Q8. Given the current global security environment, should Canada consider developing a limited nuclear capability?
No. Not unless you want to bring the hammer down before you ever get one, let alone the system to deliver it, and suddenly find out no one wants to touch you when you're under that lens—and not in the way you want.
Q9. Any word whether the CPSP might result in the procurement of submarine rescue ships and/or other submarine search and rescue assets?
There are no plans at current to acquire Submarine Rescue vessels. That role has predominantly fallen onto the AOPS and their ability to host the NATO Submarine Rescue System. You can actually get a look at it here.
I have argued repeatedly that such a vessel should be acquired, one that can handle both Submarine Rescue and Undersea tasks such as cable monitoring. I have even argued before that such a vessel could be acquired quite rapidly through the conversion of a civilian vessel like the RFA/RN have done with RFA Proteus and HMS Stirling Castle.
I think it is a needed capability, one that allows the AOPS to not be burdened with taking too many of the support roles that might be better serviced by a dedicated vessel. I have also argued that Canada should acquire its own dedicated rescue systems if we go the containerized route.
As of now, there are no plans. I should note that. However, I hope one day that changes.
Q10. We can’t staff the new amphibious concept unless we have sailors, air crew, and just as importantly, dedicated naval infantry…any discussion around this topic?
All the time. Personnel is such a dominating topic that there are many times I choose to exclude it because it has a way of dominating conversations. The Navy especially is very keenly focused on boosting recruitment numbers and trying to create a proper talent pipeline.
It's one thing I give the Vice-Admiral a lot of credit for, as well as most of the Navy's senior leadership. They take this seriously, to a fairly deep degree. Even if you look outside the Naval Experience Program and other big-name efforts, there are still discussions on new reserves, how to boost community engagement, discussing the current contract system, and how to be more active on social media.
I have heard it all in the last six months. There is this idea that the Navy is ignoring these issues as they rework the fleet mix, but I feel quite the opposite.
They understand that this is a major issue, they know it is a gambit and risk, but they are willing to take it and are actively engaged on not just how to fix issues now, but create the conditions so a decade or fifteen years down the line we have the recruitment system in place to support the introduction of new platforms like CDC or another JSS.
Perhaps it is because I'm more involved, but I see effort being done, things being discussed. I hear of the concerns and worries. They are there. It's just that there is an understanding we can't let it hinder the conversation, and need to take drastic steps to fix the long-term outlook.
On a side note, I feel "Amphibious Assault Ship" was bad phrasing on my part, as it invokes that amphibious capability as a core function. The Navy is using "Arctic Mobile Base" as an interim term, which fits the concept far more. These ain't AAS as you know it. They are support vessels with an amphibious capability, not too dissimilar to the Joint Support Ship of the mid-2000s.
Q11. Clearly Canada needs a stronger presence in the Arctic. If CDC is greenlit in 2026, when will we see operational corvettes? How can the project be expedited?
Keep in mind that CDC is not approved, is unfunded, and has zero timelines. Assuming that it was approved and funded this year? You wouldn't see vessels until the mid-2030s, likely past 2035 but before 2040 if all went well.
It is a far way off even at minimum. There would still need to be a whole procurement process to go through, as well as construction. The quickest way to expedite would be to pull a CPSP and try to streamline the procurement process by quickly identifying a core group of qualified suppliers and narrowing down the competition.
There are numerous ways to do that quickly, especially if you wanna throw in some National Security Exceptions, something we have been abusing a bit the last year. Shortening the qualifications process is probably the easiest way to expedite CDC, bar maybe foreign construction and loose use of civilian construction standards.
Q12. Will Nanisivik remain as what it is at this point. Or has there been any talk about expanding it, to be more in line with what it was originally portrayed as?
It will remain as it is. Fact is that Nanisivik just isn't worth putting much more into after so long, bar the Federals pushing through. Whatever value we can get, awesome, it's better than nothing. However, that doesn't mean that anyone is ready to keep funneling money and time into her.
We did our best, we learned the hard lesson. We take that and grow from it. Arctic construction is hell. No matter what we try to do. We did what we could, but we can't hold on to her forever.
Q13. Will the CSAR capability form a dedicated squadron or constitute a flight within 427?
I can't say I know 100% the organizational plan for CSAR. Sorry.
Q14. Is the new SP artillery likely to be tracked or wheeled? What do you think we are most likely to get and what do you like best for Canada?
Wheeled. We want wheeled. We wrote the RFI to exclude tracked as best we could. We have consolidated our tracked maintenance capabilities with the Leos, and wheeled fits better to what we can sustain.
The RFI was also written to explicitly favour the LAV 10x10 with the RCH module from GDLS-C. You can read the link above where I go into IFM. The RFI was almost written in line to the existing RCH-155 brochure. It is what we want. We want the latest system and we want to align with a number of our other European allies, where these systems are most likely to see action, who are also looking at RCH.
I am still waiting on RCH. It is a new system, one that has had some notable holdups in development. I am also not a big fan of the LAV 10x10 chassis, both because it feels like a system looking for issues and the fact it is still a work in development itself. I am not ready to trust it yet. If GDLS-C wants to prove me wrong, they are glad to do so.
I have always leaned K9 as a proven platform in widespread service among our allies itself. It cuts some of the fancier features, at least for now, but for IFM, I have always taken the stance that a scalable 80% is better than a niche, hard-to-replace 100%. It is a safe option. My only hope is Hanwha gets the turret in a Zetros or HX chassis eventually so there's some commonality with other vehicles in the fleet.
Q15. Can you re-explain the MEDCAV project? I keep seeing it talked about, but I can't find anything about it online or anywhere else?
MEDCAV doesn't actually exist. That's the twist. When we speak of MEDCAV we're talking about the Canadian Army's ongoing project to acquire a Medium Cavalry vehicle. MEDCAV as it exists is about one paper long. It is in the very early stages, though we have a good idea of what it wants right now: a Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle like the CV90 or Redback to complement the existing LAV fleet.
That is quite literally all we have an idea for. Medium Cavalry is weird. Almost everyone will have different concepts for what it looks like, and almost none of them agree with the other.
Keep in mind also that the project is still in the Identification stage, which means info and requirements will inevitably change as all projects do. We use MEDCAV as a placeholder name for the future vehicle to fill the Medium Cavalry gap that exists between the current LAV6 and Leopard fleet.
I wanna talk about it in more detail but that's hard right now when the project is still in its infancy. We don't have a lot to go off of but the rumors we hear, and even if accurate, they will change as the project matures and requirements are added.
Q16. Will the RCN begin retirement of the Halifax class before, during or after completion of RCD block 1?
I can't say. That is the Navy's to decide, and they (I don't think) have made that full decision as to when exactly retirement starts. I believe that it will come to a point where the first retires right before the first River-class comes into service.
The Navy wants out of the 'Old Ship' game and into the new one. The Halifax are great vessels and still capable. However, time waits for no one, and they are nearing the end of their life. They are increasingly becoming more burdensome and expensive to keep in service, and in turn, are slowly becoming more and more of a budget hog that could go to new capabilities.
So it feels natural that retirements might come quicker than many expect. Sacrifice short term to benefit in the long run. I think we see the first either 2029/2030. CDC being approved and funded would help a lot in speeding up that timeline.
Q17. With Naval Group continuing to lobby do you think they will try to bid on CDC either on their own or with a partnership w/ a Canadian yard?
I mean I'm sure they're interested, but the cards are stacked against them, especially with Canadian companies offering their own designs, which is what we want. Canadian Designed, Built and Equipped.
Plus I don't know if Naval offers anything that would fit the very specific requirements the Navy has for things like Range and Ice-Strengthening, assuming they get both of those.
Maybe—I have to check. I think they'll be interested but it really is against them. The cards are stacked for people like Vard and Davie who already have designs at the ready.
Q18. With the projected increases to size of the military, is it possible that we would order near the full complement of F35s PLUS 50+ gripens?
Unlikely. Mostly because the amount of pilots required would take so long that I would rather hold out for a Sixth-Generation aircraft. We already have a very bad shortage, and just to get the necessary pilots for the F-35 will take us until the early 2030s.
Pilots are a major investment. It takes almost a decade, about seven to eight years to fully train a fighter pilot and millions of dollars in ongoing investment. They are in a different breed when it comes to recruitment and having the personnel available.
That can of course be helped with new initiatives, expanded training opportunities, etc., but fifty extra Gripen? That's a lot....
Q19. Everyone talks about HIMARS as if it’s a done deal but I haven’t seen any contract announcements. Are/were we considering Korea’s Chunmoo and if not why not?
We looked at Chunmoo and determined it wasn't the fit for us. It not only wasn't C-130 compatible, which is important when that's the majority of your airlift fleet, but it also didn't have the right munitions we wanted.
You can read about it in my post here. The fact was that HIMARS was always the want. We always wanted HIMARS from the start. The majority of our allies use the M270/HIMARS family. We wanted something with PrSM's range and capabilities, especially when discussing future PrSM increments.
Chunmoo was designed with the Korean need in mind, which is far different from our priorities of rapid deployability and high range. They have a single-pod system in HPMRL that does better but still doesn't meet what we want.
Sadly requirements exist for a reason, and in this case? HIMARS was the one that fit.
Q20. Given the deteriorating geopolitical situation should Canada consider buying KSS III with conventional SLBMs? Feels like we are 10-15 years behind already...
Do you need a 1-ton SLBM? That's the question to ask. Why? What for? Is that worth basing your decision on? Do you need that kind of land-attack capability? I am not sold for us over a long-range cruise missile capability that could hypothetically perform both the Land-Attack and Anti-Ship function. The Hyunmoo IV-IV is a very niche capability specifically designed with North Korea in mind.
Perhaps we could tailor it better to our requirements, lower the warhead weight and focus on trying to maximize range. However, it is still a very niche capability. It isn't the reason I would pick the KSS-III if I'm justifying the choice.
If you're curious, I talked about both the KSS-III and 212CD munitions in more detail if you want a cool rundown!
Q21. Is there any discussion within the Army about the Reserves getting the same equipment as the Regs, and move away from this Two-Tier crap?
There is discussion on what the Defence of Canada Division looks like. That includes what vehicles and equipment they need to fulfill their tasks. That might not be a 1:1 scenario, and that's perfectly okay.
Some things might be required that the other division doesn't need. That's why we have these kinds of studies. Instead of trying to do 1:1 we're better looking at what the future Defence of Canada looks like, what structure we want them to have, and what equipment they need to fulfill that role.
I don't know how that study is going right now but it is active and work is being done. There is an acknowledged need that the Defence of Canada Division needs to be a fighting force with its own capabilities.
That's the first step to fixing the issue!
Q22. If we were to put in an order for an air defence system like NASAM, what’s the lead time looking like for that?
I can't speak to the full lead times of every system but most are currently at least a year at minimum. NASAMS was at almost two years but I believe they've been able to shave off some of that time, but obviously, this time greatly fluctuates as more orders come in and excess capacity disappears. That's why it's important to not wait.
Most are trying to get to a year, as far as I know, and some are aiming for less but I can't fully speak to all those efforts. Diehl is aiming to get IRIS-T production up to 10 fire units annually by the end of 2026. MBDA is trying to get the SAMP/T average below 18 months.
So it varies greatly but most want to get to a year/year-and-a-half at most in the short term.
Q23. What have we committed to with regard to the F-35? Have we actually paid $7 B for 16? Is there a cancellation or escape clause in whatever we have signed?
You actually don't need me to answer this! We actually have a very recent Auditor General report that you can read here (as well as my analysis) from June that lays out what we have paid in so far as of March of last year:
"As of 31 March 2025, National Defence had committed $935 million to the United States government to produce the first 4 jets and the delivery of long‑lead items necessary to enable the future production for another 8 aircraft, of which $197 million had already been paid. In addition, National Defence had spent a further $516 million on the project including $270 million for infrastructure design and site preparation."
These are the most recent numbers we have officially, and are likely still fairly accurate. We have committed to the first sixteen contractually. As for cancellation clauses and such? That is not available publicly. That is confidential information that we are not privy to.
If I know that info, then we have a serious security issue!
Q24. If RCN got everything needed, would amphib assault ships be discussed? Could the navy sustain even 1 if light inf takes more amphibious tasks in the future?
There is no desire for a true Amphibious vessel as you imagine. What the Navy wants is essentially a mobile base, which might have an amphibious capability but isn't the primary purpose. It would be much more akin to something like Karel Doorman than a Mistral, if that makes sense.
Could the Navy sustain one? They think so, though there would need to be conversations about things like Berthing space, crewing, etc. that need to be addressed. The integration of the Coast Guard under the DND banner opens up more opportunities to tackle the infrastructure problem, but space remains an issue and likely will for the foreseeable future.
Again it's best to not look at these as Amphibious Assault Ships. That isn't their primary purpose. They are Mobile bases, able to provide an Arctic-Capable platform that can support the navy in roles like Command and Control, Logistics support, presence, and Amphibious/HADR support.
At least that's the concept as I know it.
Q25. Is CAF considering tracked IFVs for the infantry and if so what might that look like organizationally? A manoeuvre division fleet or a single heavy mech Bn?
Yes, see MEDCAV above here. The plan for the Manoeuvre Division is to have a MEDCAV Battalion each as part of 2 CMBG and 5 GBMC while 1 CMBG gets Heavy Cavalry. That's the last I heard.
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I dont believe they are looking at tracked IFVs for the infantry. My understanding is that the MEDCAV project's scope is to equip the RCAC.
a tracked IFV is the opposite of concentrating tracked maintenance with the Leos