Let's Talk with Noah (08/08/26): The Holy Munitions, The Navy & UxS, ARes APC, Turkish Drones, NSM, Blackhawk Mania

Q&A

Happy Saturday!

This Week almost broke our word count record with over 5000 words! I was almost tempted to pad it, but I decided not to. Breaking large Q&A into smaller supports having more detailed answers, I have learnt and I hope this week shows!

It's been a wild week, and I have had some fairly in depth talks about some exciting things that we can hopefully annkunce next weeks, a new project, new collab, and a new interview upcoming. We got a lot planned! You gotta wait though.

Anyways, this week is another week of new questions! Yay! I appreciate that somw of you are going out of your way to try and ask more unique questions after my little rumble about repeating answers on the same topics every week. Makes thing more dynamic and fun. This might surprise, but the Q&A is my main tool to keep fresh, and to diversify my learning. Uniqueness helps!

As always you can find the link to next weeks Q&A over here on Slido. I encourage you to ask as much as you like!

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Q1. Could you write an article on what you consider your "Holy 12" critical munitions and why they're important?

Yeah, it would have to be an article. It would probably be really weird though I will admit, because stuff like this is more my own thoughts and mumblings, which as you all know I can get into shit quite deep and get on a ramble easily. So I would have to try and control myself a bit.

Anyway, the Holy 12. I came up with that on the spot mind you, so no, there isn't really much meaning to the name, but I guess it fits? The Holy 12 are what I consider the 12 baseline munitions that Canada should have the capacity to produce domestically. They are what I would call the foundational basis of our munition supply.

It is not the ultimate authority. It is not the final list of munitions, and I need to clarify that. It is what I consider the absolute minimum that should at least be attempted to be produced here and what I also think is possible, that is important here.

Most of the list is fairly boring and already achievable or achieved here. There is the caveat though that merely having production isn't enough. That baseline needs to be scalable, modern, and evolving. Utilizing munitions a generation behind the current trend isn't supporting the Holy 12. It is a failure of the system.

That is why they are Holy. They are sacred, and as sacred to the list, you need to ensure that you are treating them appropriately. Anywho, the list for those who are curious:

• Small arms munitions (5.56/7.62/9mm/12.7)

• Medium-Calibre munitions (20–35mm)

• Indirect fires munitions (155mm, 60/81/120mm mortars)

• Naval munitions (57mm, 127mm)

• Unguided anti-armour/anti-structure (Carl G, M72)

• Infantry explosives (40mm, hand grenades)

• 70mm rockets

• ATGM

• Autonomous strike systems (LM/OWA/ALE)

• Interceptors, sub-10km

• Torpedoes (HW/LW)

• Low-Cost Precision Guided Munitions

• Expendable countermeasures

These are what I consider to be the natural baseline of munitions that keep us sustained in a drawn-out, peer conflict. These are the minimum, the foundation. It isn't a glamorous list. It isn't going to include many high-end capabilities.

Torpedoes just make it because we are starting half the process with Heavyweights, though honestly, Lightweights are equally important, and a submarine force, one of the largest potentially in NATO, without a sustained, domestically supported supply becomes glorified sensors.

Anti-Ship Missiles? Not included. Cruise Missiles? Not included. SHORAD and above systems? They don't hit that cutoff, and I know that the list will be controversial. Everyone will have different preferences. I do note that the list doesn't exclude these munitions from being hunted, but they ain't on my critical list for a variety of reasons, and they ain't the twelve I believe need to be monitored and prioritized.

Again, if we went deep into it? It would be a long post. I have frameworks in my head, not conceptualized. I have the spider web of personal analysis. There was a lot of personal debate, especially at the high end.

I believe this is the basis. These munitions as listed provide the most basic, comprehensive self-defence capability, with added things like Long-Range Strike still prioritized, a baseline Anti-Ship and ASW capability, a basic, layered Anti-Armour and Anti-Structure capability, and the capacity to enforce sovereignty in our waters.

It isn't glamorous. Some lose more than others; the navy really loses. You will always have to rely a bit on others. This doesn't exclude you from buying munitions, but it is the baseline of domestic capacity that I think we can realistically achieve here, produce here, and would provide the most comprehensive layers of basic self-defence capability.

Certainly worth a full post, definitely. The Q&A is not the right place to be throwing this out there and going in-depth. One day we'll get into it. There are categories that are specific and broad categories we can get into, because I do have concepts and baselines in mind for things like PGM and Countermeasures.

Q2. Will any of our future huskies be of the mrtt+ variant? I assume if we expand the fleet we would look at that variant?

The baseline fleet is locked in to the 200. None of the currently contracted will be Neo unless things are renegotiated. The current production line, though, is shifting beginning in 2028 to the MRTT+ line, so any future orders would be MRTT+ as that is the baseline now being offered.

So 200 as we have contracted, coming to the end of the 200 line, and 800 for any future as that is going to be the new baseline used.

Q3. Any chance Alert is expanded for its SIGINT mission?

Possible, but nothing specific is in the plans unless you like hearing people talking vague "We'll explore expanding existing assets" sort of stuff. There are vague plans to update our fixed SIGINT infrastructure, but those are kept close to the chest and are fairly early, water cooler talks.

There is far more discussion regarding expanding to new sites with new fixed and deployable systems. CROSSBOW, as an example, envisions a deployable system of rapidly deployable, autonomous, self-contained sensor systems built around standard TEU/FEU that could include SIGINT capabilities.

That is kind of the system a lot of the CAF is going for, moving away from large, fixed sites to a mix of fixed, expanded rapidly-deployable systems, and space-based assets. What large fixed infrastructure is being looked at in that category is primarily seen as a strategic necessity or the only existing option available, such as Strategic Radio Capability looking at new HF and VLF infrastructure.

Options are more limited, and so large, fixed sites remain the best option. The CAF though really, really doesn't seem to like that if alternatives exist, and depending on what capabilities you want? Other assets fill that better. Containers, CDSEA, Space-Based Capabilities. All form a part of the layered SENSE complex that the CAF is trying to build.

Fixed SIGINT in places like Alert is evidently not there as I have seen, not yet at least. Maybe down the line.

Q4. With Sikorsky pushing the updated Armed Blackhawk concept on the market, are they potentially aiming for it to compete for both Phase 2 and Phase 3 of nTACS?

I mean, sure. They could if they wanted. I don't know what their plan is for nTACS. Last I checked, they were still figuring stuff out, waiting for the RFI and such. A lot of folks are going to wait for the RFI to drop before they start to formulate proper pitches.

Lockorsky has a great in for Phase I. CANSOF wants Blackhawks for Phase I, and they're obviously, as we have discussed extensively, positioning Seahawk to replace Cyclone so they stop losing egregious amounts of money.

But the competition for Phase II and III is tough. Lockorsky is the one person here with no real domestic capacity; the RCAF wants a proper Attack Helicopter for Phase II, not a utility helicopter with pylons.

Even if they did, they have to compete with a very popular, very loved Airbus ecosystem that includes the very hyped HForce Weapons Handling System, which is seen right now by many as the gold standard for a modular, highly customizable WHS.

That same Airbus also has a more diverse lineup of offerings, which could be very important for reasons I can't say. They also have an existing, if limited, domestic capacity. Leonardo seems very open to domestic expansion, and is the one with a modern, full lineup for Phase II and III. Bell is Bell.

So Lockorsky is coming in here already at a disadvantage for Phases II and III, which put heavy emphasis on domestic production, IP sharing, and a proper attack helicopter. They can propose, but they're really starting from the bottom here versus others. They need to throw effort into it.

Q5. Is there an aspect of IFM/HDFM that includes 155/120mm (or whatever tank barrel size) production in Canada?

There are discussions. We have amazing companies like Patriot Forge who already have the capacity to do such things, and do for allies. We have a world-class coating producer in Paradigm Shift with their proprietary EPVD solution.

That one annoys me deeply, because EPVD is a fantastic solution to chrome plating in existing barrels. It provides better performance, increased lifespan for the barrel, is cost-effective, and significantly safer. It has met the European Union’s REACH and RoHS environmental standards, where most of their business is.

Sadly, for Canada, we have yet to utilize this capacity. For guys like Paradigm Shift, they're working primarily in the EU these days, while guys like Patriot Forge are doing more work down south.

Part of that is a lack of mandate from us. We put a lot of power in suppliers and primes to build out supply chains, and so they get to create what is their ecosystems. If people like Paradigm, who produce an amazing product, don't fall under that? The chance they see support from the Federal side of things is near non-existent.

Tier II and Tier III suppliers go through that every day, and it has its benefits. It does. Many times it works out well, but other times not so much. People and capabilities, Canadian-Developed and Canadian-Owned IP, are forced to look elsewhere for business, and eventually get put into the position where they need to choose if it is worth it to even stay.

To your question, it should 100% continue to be part of the equation and discussion. There should 100% always be a domestic capacity supported. Sovereign Barrel production is a critical node in the supply chain, and a gap that will hit a crunch in conflict if we don't ensure we have a credible supply available, and it needs to be treated as such.

Q6. Not a River VLS question, but do you see them adding a second RAM launcher to the boat? Considering it is supposed to fill an AA role and not a land strike role.

I think it's certainly possible if desired. Maybe not now, but in the future, I think we could see it added. Absolutely. Compared to other ideas, a second RAM is relatively benign in nature.

Q7. With the increased emphasis on the Arctic, is the RCAF looking to expand SAR assets north?

Yes, it's an active conversation. There is a recognition that growing activity in the Arctic, both commercial and recreational, presents a high likelihood of large-scale incidents occurring, and even on the minor end, an increased need for available SAR assets.

It's good to separate increased activity from adventurers heading up north from large-scale disaster responses like a cruise ship running aground in the Archipelago. Both require an increased outlook on how we handle Search and Rescue, and both require discussions on what assets are needed, but both are looking at different sides of the coin.

For the RCAF, the conversation is ongoing surrounding stuff like nTACS, Twin Otter Replacement, etc., all of which have SAR attached to the conversation. What kind of assets do we need? What modern options are available? We know we need more Cormorants beyond the 16, as an example. We want the Griffon off SAR and the line is hot.

We're looking at stuff like Tiltrotors and how they could operate in the Arctic. We are talking about larger assets in the Arctic, again like whether a Twin Otter is the appropriate platform in the modern context, or whether we might need bigger, Arctic-specific platforms to handle large-scale disaster relief and SAR.

All of those are active conversations happening right now. We're looking at Chinook upgrades and expansion, and how that could also tie in to a more active presence up north. A Chinook might not get a tiltrotor's speed, but the CH-47F Block II with tanks could get the range in pretty freaking well.

It's a big mixed bag of discussing. We have an airlift study ongoing too asking about it. Basically, everything I guess when it comes to Rotary, Airlift, and the support fleet right now has SAR and the Arctic attached now that I wrote it out lol.

The point is the conversations are happening. That's the big thing.

Q8. With respect to the proliferation of unmanned systems used for sea denial, what observations/conclusions do you think the RCN is drawing from current conflicts?

I think the conversations are a bit different than people expect them to be, because a lot of people will focus in on the Black Sea and Hormuz, two naturally constrained, littoral environments, and think of it as pushing some major, fundamental shift of conversation.

But the truth is that the littorals have always been a dangerous place for ships, especially closed-off, very constrained environments like the Black Sea. The proliferation of Uncrewed and Autonomous systems has added another layer of threat to that environment, and we now need to prepare for them, but the fundamental operating picture remains the same whether it's a drone or a cruise missile.

Similarly, in the open ocean, the proliferation of Autonomous systems remains limited in nature. The wide Pacific is not the kind of place where lone USVs and such are going to want to be. There are still natural restrictions on ranges, payloads, and the ability of systems to operate independently, which means having credible infrastructure for data processing, advanced AI systems, and having the existing SATCOM and connection infrastructure in place to support assets potentially thousands of Nautical Miles from home, in an expansive environment that favours surface combatants.

XLUUVs, really UUVs in general, are by far the scariest prospect right now IMO, but are still experimental in nature and limited at this time. Still, Autonomous systems able to lurk and prowl underwater for weeks at a time still need to find you, still need to have reliable ways to transmit data and maintain connection in a potentially degraded environment, and still have to contend with a surface combatant's own self-defence capability, which will include its own Autonomous systems. A River-class can carry an XLUUV or large USV independently along with several smaller Autonomous Systems.

So it isn't an existential crisis. It adds another threat, but it isn't a threat that is necessarily new in nature, at least how people envision it. MUSVs and LUSVs take all these problems and amplify them. They require more reliable connections, require an entire digital backbone that doesn't exist for most, and are still highly susceptible to things like Electronic and Cyber warfare.

For most who expect this to ring massive alarm bells, it hasn't in my discussions. There are specific threats that are scary. The Red Sea affair raised the need for cheaper, more prolific interceptors to ensure we can stay in the fight longer and aren't wasting critical munitions.

That's why the Navy is now exploring cheap, small interceptors for UAS and Drone-on-Drone systems, like how Asty has the MARSS NiDAR Drone system, so we have that specific UAS protection layer that doesn't require utilizing valuable munitions and VLS space.

Similarly, another scary prospect on the horizon is the Grey Zone use of UAS. UUVs for cutting cables, cheap UAS that can be built in-country and launched by adversaries at Critical Infrastructure, bases, etc. Cheap USVs that could be released by unsuspecting vessels that target vessels in port.

Not too dissimilar to the Black Sea, but done by adversarial actions in-country, targeting us at home, with platforms that are rudimentary and constructed in-country through dispersed workshops. That is the kind of Grey Zone Infrastructure our adversaries could set up here that could cause real problems.

And the solution to that is two-fold. First, there is the Advanced Naval Capabilities Unit who have now absorbed Harbour Defence and Force Protection as a core mandate. They are the Vanguard, the frontline defence for facilities and bases against these threats.

In the future, the ANCU will utilize dedicated CUAS systems, modernized Surveillance sensors, and their own Autonomous Systems to provide protection against UxS. They'll also have the renewed capacity for vessel-of-interest interception through investments in new equipment, new vessels, etc.

They will be joined by a wider, Canadian-Wide CUAS network built through initiatives like the CUAS National Array. That forms the second half, a wider, strategic CUAS network that can rapidly identify, classify and intercept, through both non-kinetic and kinetic systems, hostile UAS before the likes of the ANCU have to intervene.

That Grey Zone remains the primary concern for everyone. It is by far the scariest prospect on the horizon, and the one that, as you can see, is getting a lot of the attention right now, because we've seen through things like Operation Spiderweb how much damage a few cheap, simple UAS can cause.

The rest? We make note of it, we prepare, but they ain't as big a panic as some assume, and the solutions to them are known: cheaper interceptors, dedicated CUAS systems, and supporting our own proliferation of Autonomous Systems goes a long way in building resiliency and being prepared. The littoral will always be the littoral. It will always be a difficult environment to operate in, and UxS might make that shittier, but it isn't a new concept and isn't creating some new environment we didn't already know.

Q9. Any news on building new shipyards? We are already struggling with 3 yards with the current fleet. It's only going to get worse with the incoming fleets.

I mean we don't build new shipyards per se. If you mean will we expand the Large Vessel side of NSS to new yards? Maybe. The Navy is interested in opening that can and exploring multiple yards for CDC.

Once all three yards are operating at full capacity, I think people will be surprised how things shift and what starts to get done. Keep in mind all three yards are still in the midst of major expansions, and it is not indicative of the final state they'll be in.

Space isn't really the issue. That's the thing. You can ask the Navy as well. Space isn't the big constraint we'll be seeing, it's people and supply chain limitations that will define the 2030s. So long as everyone can modernize as planned and on schedule, the capacity will be there to do more, to fit our needs in the timelines described.

What that doesn't change is workforce limitations, especially if you're Seaspan. It doesn't change the Tier-II and Tier-III supply chains and critical components that we don't produce here, that we are reliant on others for. Those also present significant issues.

The biggest issues are the ones hardest to solve. Everyone wishes more yards could fix everything, but the truth is it wouldn't. The problems we have are multilayered and not easy to fix, and more capacity isn't a golden button.

Q10. I've heard talk of ARes light APCs to mechanize the infantry/enablers. If you've heard anything, what's being considered for this if it's being considered at all?

You probably heard it from us, because we've been talking about the ARes/COTS APC for about a year now. The idea exists, it's in the works. What exactly an ARes APC looks like depends a lot on what you believe the ARes needs to do, and what your opinion on proper protection is.

As Mark would say, if he was here with me, there is very much a divide on this sort of topic. What we need, in my opinion, is a cheap, multirole platform that offers decent protection against potential adversarial actions, is cheap enough to be acquired en masse, can be flexible in the tasks it can perform, and is simple to maintain at reserve units across the country. That means a large supply chain, it means a platform that could be worked on domestically, and one where transferable skills are prioritized.

That aligns to a platform like a Senator, which is by far the most common answer you will see, or a similar commercial-based chassis. Something that is flexible, can fit a dozen different roles, can be rapidly reconfigured, with a large, existing supply chain, a wide talent pool, and is domestically available.

That is the best option we have on the table, supplemented by platforms like DAME, and likely some future LAV thrown in. It provides a credible platform that could do just about everything we need. We don't need a LAV for the Defence of Canada. We also want something more than a simple truck. That fits the balance nicely.

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Q11. Do you see Canada moving towards long-range air defence in the long term? Heard medium-range is being looked at actively, which will be a good foot in the door.

Both Medium and Long-Range options are being explored as part of Canada’s ongoing Integrated Air and Missile Defence Study. Keep in mind, the definitions as they stand are fairly loose. While the Canadian Army is focused on acquiring both a VSHORAD and SHORAD capability through Enduring, the RCAF believes that a comprehensive, multi-layered IAMD ecosystem requires a mix of Medium-Range, Long-Range, and specific Anti-Ballistic Missile Effectors.

Whether we get that in the end is up to a lot of factors, but all of them are actively being explored and advocated for. That comes a bit later in the process. Right now, we're seeing a proper Critical Asset List being drafted, and that takes time to make.

Once we identify what we actually need to defend, and what kind of threats to prioritize, we can start having more detailed conversations on what kind of sensors and effectors we need to achieve that. Right now, that's a few steps ahead of where we are right now.

Q12. Has there been any word on the restarted Night Vision Modernization Program? This is something that feels like it should get sorted out pronto.

It's a bit of chaos right now. I'm working on it.

Q13. Do you think the CAF will hit 80,000 RegF troops in the near-ish future? Do you think any new bases will be stood up if our numbers grow to that size?

Near-ish? No. If that were to happen it would need endorsement from the feds and the funding to match. The longer-term 2040 vision could hit there if plans are endorsed, and exceed it, but that is still just under fifteen years away, and near-ish to me is before 2035, so it's off.

New Bases are active conversations. The Navy is exploring it, alongside new Naval Reserves. Same with the Army exploring Reserve expansion in line with a potential Augment Reserve. That could include expansions of existing facilities, and potentially new ones, to accommodate.

They're in the ideas list, but not fully in the plans, if that makes sense.

Q14. Do you see the 6500 AAR as a way for BBD to become more military export-focused? With a potential EW variant and L3 willing to adapt their suites to the Global?

I mean, AAR adds a lot, but the Global is already so popular and so extensively used that it becomes more of a cementing capability, if that makes sense. It takes an otherwise super popular platform and gives it another differentiator that it can use to compete against others.

Whether that alone drives significantly more sales? I don't think so. I do think it can squeeze out some extra though, but the Global in this category is already so popular that it was always a likely contender in the first place.

This could throw some over the edge and drag a few in, but it is a very specific capability. It's fantastic to have, I support us investing in it, but export-wise it's a bonus to an already growing standard.

Q15. While I would be happy for a collaboration with Firepoint on CDPSC. Does the Destinus Ruta Block 2 or 3 meet the requirements for CDPSC?

Block 2 could, but for Phase I of CDPSC, it would be cutting it REALLY close. It would need to have existing production and fielding en masse in the next three months or so, never impossible until we see how strict the RFP is, but likely not possible.

Phase II it could fit if the requirements stay similar, so long as they support the Canadization of the platform and IP sharing. That's fairly open to most people. Phase I is where shit is difficult.

Q16. With Canada's engagement in NATO's NGRC program, do you see it as a major contender for nTACS? Do you know more about Canada's role?

No. It is not. NGRC is looking at the 2035+ timeline, by which point nTACS will be well into delivery. It could fill future rotary requirements, but not nTACS specifically. It is the what comes after sort of things.

As for our role? We're a full member of the NGRC Program. We co-fund concept studies, help shape future platform requirements, and support the integration of domestic aerospace suppliers to future programs. There isn't a purchase commitment in NGRC, but we have a seat at the table in shaping what those future platforms will look like.

That's just as important, as it allows us a direct role in manufacturers' future platform development, which for us is especially important as our requirements differ from our Euro counterparts.

Q17. Has Rheinmetall showed any interest in CDC? In the background of their new GMF140 announcement, there seems to be a conveniently pocket-frigate sized vessel.

Not that I know. GMF140 is too big for what we want. It's a 140m, 6000t Frigate. While some are very interested in the mention of CMS330 and a North American procurement, my understanding is that Rhein is positioning this both for the German Navy as part of the ongoing F127 kerfuffle and for potential U.S. Navy requirements in the future.

They are not proposing this for us, nor is there really any interest at this time. It just happens to sort of, kind of line up to some clever things.

Q18. Has the navy indicated interest in Leonardo's Proteus or similar systems?

That would fall under the Joint Multi-Mission Uncrewed Aerial System (JMMU) Project, which has the express aim of acquiring a modern VTOL UAS for multidomain, heavy lift operations. Right now JMMU remains in Identification, but it would primarily be a platform for the JSS as I know it.

Now, we don't know where exactly on the scale JMMU will fall, so Proteus and similar systems could be contenders? But it depends on the requirements. It would be the best chance it has, as right now it's the only project that aligns well. Again, this could change, especially with DDIM around, but that's what to watch.

Q19. You mentioned hearing of LUV with NSM. While fantastic, wouldn't a versatile platform be a better direction? Like a manned ROGUE-FIRES esque system but on LUV?

ROGUE-Fires is a potential evolution if we wanted to explore a larger, autonomous vehicle that could provide Long-Range Fires, but the idea I have seen is more aligned to StrikeMaster. Cheap, quick to trial and integrate, and something that provides a quick solution for further Land-Based Anti-Ship needs.

While HIMARS provides a lot of that capability, there is an argument for cheaper, more expendable options. We don't typically see NSM, itself a fairly pricey munition, in that category, but we recognize also that NSM/JSM are going to probably become our mainstay, multi-domain strike family across land, air, and sea.

River-class, F35, CDC, 212CD. All of whom are likely to fall into that family. Adding a few NSM-equipped Senators, as an example, costs little in the grand scheme, provides another rapidly deployable, Canadian-Based Anti-Ship Capability that could supplement HIMARS with ranges past 250km, and fit a nice role as a coastal defence platform in places like Esquimalt, Halifax, St. John, etc.

Has a secondary land-based strike capability as well, which some also like the idea of. I ain't sold there, but it frees up HIMARS for the Army, and gives them something else for Coastal Defence that could likely fill the more immediate needs of places.

Whether that evolves to a ROGUE-Fires like platform? Maybe, never say never, but it isn't priority. Capability quick and capability easy. That's the game. Once LUV starts delivering, I think you'll see the Spirit of Buck fill a lot of people, which means be prepared to see the most insane mods of your life.

Q20. Is there concern about trusting Turkish suppliers enough to supply drones and integrate with FVEYs and NORAD intelligence systems in Canada?

Not a lot that I have seen. Companies like Baykar are seen as leading manufacturers, with multiple users across NATO, a strategic partnership with Leonardo with LBA Systems, and the recent acquisitions of Piaggio Aerospace.

That's only one, sure, and we aren't opening the floodgates. Baykar and TAI are the two we're overwhelmingly looking at, and both are seen as modern, trusted suppliers with NATO-interoperable systems.

The TB2 is well liked by many who have seen them, same as there is lots of interest in the TB3. I have never heard of a big problem, and certainly, neither have many others in NATO with great interest.

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As always you can find the link to next weeks Q&A over here on Slido. I encourage you to ask as much as you like!

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