Happy Saturday!
Another week, another Q&A. This week is fairly usual in terms of questions, but less project asks. I like weeks where I can sorta just talk, less having to go through my notes lol. There are some weeks where project-heavy is easier, but I dont like that all the time.
Lots of Zetros this week, which is admittedly rare. We also got some Sealift questions, whoch are also not very common! I can see what you guys are focused on this week lol.
I won't keep you all long today. Let's jump into things!
Q1. What’s your opinion on Roshel signing an MOU with Stellantis on buying the Brampton plant?
I don’t know what Roman has planned for that facility. It’s absolutely massive, though; so I suspect there is a lot beyond LUV they’re thinking. Roshel is a big business. Maybe it’s for Cash-in-Transit, which is also a major business for them; maybe they’re looking at Daimler or something else. They ain’t the only ones hunting Brampton—just the ones who risked going public and taking some of the heat for it.
Stellantis has been talking to a lot of folks. I can’t speak for them, but evidently, they would rather fight than keep the plant going at this time. If we can’t have an automotive future there, I just hope someone finds a way to utilize it and try to get people back to working.
I don’t know Roshel’s plan here; I have not asked out of respect. When they wanna talk, they’ll talk. I have enough faith in them, and others, to hear what they wanna do before I cast judgment. However, if Brampton IS done, and we can’t find an automotive future for it, I would rather it be doing something to contribute to our National Security—and still contributing to the local economy and workforce—than holding out for potential buyers that keep the same scale automotive there.
My first desire would be to see some true automotive, though, as I do believe a healthy automotive industry is both a significant economic driver and vital to our National Security. I also would like to see any potential buyer align with the current displaced workforce and ensure there are equivalent opportunities available.
I trust Roshel enough after my years of knowing them to give them the space and chance to show what they can offer. I think they could do great things there, as could others I know are hunting the plant. I have seen three different concepts, but I don’t know the details to judge them.
Q2. How likely is it they end up ordering the full 12 subs? More than 88 jets? All 15 River class?
12 subs is likely; more than 88 jets, I think, is fifty/fifty right now. Fifteen River class, I think, is also likely—but not guaranteed. If we get more jets, it will be primarily as an incentive for investment and commitments. 12 subs seems likely for similar reasons; the current bid outlined by TKMS assumed twelve subs, as did Hanwha.
I think there was more than enough incentive in there to convince the Federal government that 12 subs is a worthy spend for what we get back. The fifteen Rivers is harder to say, as the last won’t be delivered for another twenty years. A lot can happen in that time, and taking it in batches opens up more opportunities for cuts down the line.
It’s a big incentive to get the Feds to commit to larger batches. Evidently, there is also the argument for protecting our fledgling shipbuilding industry and all the effort we’ve put into it; that does provide some level of protection to fleet cuts, at least without replacement commitments.
A high-end CDC, as an example, with a maximalist mindset to hulls, could be enough to justify some River cuts from the Federal side. The more overlap there is, the more the political class will question the value—especially for a platform many already see as expensive, slow to service, and inherently “American.”
While the wrong mindset, it is unfortunately one that does exist. So, I always consider it a potential factor.
Q3. If Roshel wins LUV and buys the Stellantis Brampton plant, could follow-on Zetros orders potentially be built there by Roshel under the Daimler-Roshel MOU?
I mean, the Daimler-Roshel MOU is fairly broad, so I don’t count much out. The one caveat I present is that building Zetros isn’t really inside that scope. At most, the MOU covers final assembly through knockdown kits. That isn’t the same as building.
The intent was never for Roshel to produce base Daimler vehicles, though. It was to utilize their chassis for future platforms and developments, essentially opening up the catalog for future products. That’s what they obviously do now, and that is the scope given.
Assembling Zetros here—as in full production—isn’t in there and would need to be something discussed at a later point. It is also a significantly larger challenge. The Mercedes supply chain doesn’t exist domestically, and so you’re still importing almost the entire product from Germany, if that’s what you’re wondering.
I have said before I would love to see, if we stick with Zetros, future platforms at least assembled here under that MOU. I still think there is value to final assembly and carrying that capacity, even if not full assembly.
This wouldn’t be a Canadianization of the Zetros, though. It would quite literally be just final assembly, but there is opportunity there.
Q4. Here’s another amphibious ship Q Noah. Instead of amphib ships or a civilian style ro-ros, we go halfway and get something like the LSM, your thoughts?
I think they suffer from just not being quite there. For moving things to Europe, cheaper, more versatile Ro-Ro platforms are far more economical and efficient than something like an LSM. It isn’t that an LSM can’t; it’s just that a Ro-Ro is a better fit. We aren’t looking at contested, amphibious landings. We’re looking to move things from Port A to Port B.
A more militarized Ro-Ro can also operate without dedicated port infrastructure available through things like sea-to-shore connectors or by having access to something like a Mexeflote system. That isn’t as large a concern, though; the primary use of a Ro-Ro for us is merely moving things between commercial ports. That’s before we get into the fact that a Ro-Ro dwarfs an LSM like the McClung-class in terms of size and what it can do, which is preferable when we talk about moving massive amounts of equipment between Canada and Europe.
In the Arctic, the need for such a capability is also limited. The reason we look at AMB isn’t primarily to be an amphibious vessel. It can if needed, same as it could be utilized in a transport capacity; but it’s combining several different platforms together as a singular concept and building upon it as another Joint Support Ship.
An LSM moves things, but up there, that is only one task—and not the major one we envision AMB tackling. That’s before we talk about an LSM capable of reaching the areas we desire AMB to go, being able to land there, and supporting a fleet that doesn’t fully match our needs.
LSMs are cool, but they fill a niche we don’t have, which can be better fulfilled by other concepts and platforms. Landing folks on a beach somewhere is sadly not something we envision ourselves doing; and when we do, we envision it as a secondary role for other things.
Q5. Do you have any insight on the new RCAF Security Force Trade? I know they’ll be at the fighter wings mainly, but what is their role & what will they be kitted?
Well, we know training will begin next month in collaboration with our friends at the 343rd Training Squadron at Joint Base San Antonio and Camp Bullis.
I can actually quote on the role from the RCAF themselves. SecFor is being stood up to “deliver a dedicated force protection capability. The new occupation will help support the RCAF as it introduces advanced air and space systems that require higher levels of security.”
Future platforms like the CF-35, but not limited to it as some suggest, require a much higher level of security than the platforms we are used to. We’ve also seen, such as with recent grey-zone drone incursions and the vandalizing of several RCAF Voyager tankers last year, that there is a need for air bases to maintain a dedicated security force for the protection of critical assets.
Asymmetric actions, third-party sabotage... these are growing concerns among many people, and the best way to tackle that is having a permanent force, attached to the RCAF, that is specifically trained to handle these kinds of threats in an air base environment.
That’s beyond the fact that modern platforms contain much more sensitive technologies that we would rather be properly protected. The standards we’re seeing set for modern platforms when it comes to security don’t come from nowhere. They don’t exist to punish us. They’re there because the platforms warrant that level of protection, and we recognize the potential threat vectors are growing.
On kit? I can’t say I know exactly.
Q6. Well done on scoring an interview with VAdm Charlebois! Any chance of sitting down with the other environmental commanders (and CANSOFCOM)?
I would love to sit down with more folks, but again, I don’t hunt interviews. If the opportunity is presented, I’ll snatch it. I tell people all the time: ask, or even tell me I’m interviewing someone. I’ll do it; I just ain’t hunting it out. That goes for any of you in Industry who want me to interview you. Legit, just tell me I am, and I’ll do it, lol.
Don’t even gotta ask, really. I don’t like doing interviews a lot. It ain’t my thing; I ain’t great at them. I do them because I know you all like them, and who am I to turn down someone like the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy? Do you think I’m gonna tell him no?
So yes, if anyone wants it, y’all can just ask. I ain’t gonna be a jerk about it.
Q7. Any movement on ordering more Zetros?
Not at this time. We do have an Additional Logistics Vehicle (ALV) project on the books. We also have an MSVS MilCOTS Recapitalization (MSVS R1) and a further-out Logistics Vehicle Recapitalization (LVR) after these two. As of right now, all of these are in the ID stage.
They are still in the early stages of development, so we don’t have too much info on them. MSVS R1 has a very vague 2035 timeline, but I am more of the belief that it is a placeholder and is unlikely to be a serious date at this stage. We know the 1,500 Zetros aren’t enough.
The MSVS is past its end-of-life, and the SMP will hit its end-of-life in 2028. That doesn’t mean they can’t keep going; it’s almost always the case with us that things keep chugging along despite any notion of an end-of-life date.
However, I do note that the need is there no matter what on the MSVS. In an ideal world? We would probably commit to more Zetros and try to shrink our ungodly number of truck chassis running around. That, unfortunately, looks to be the direction we ain’t heading.
I swear to God if any of you—and you know who you are—try and get that Tatra, I will dropkick your ass at CANSEC. Don’t you dare.
Q8. Do you think Korea is pissed that we didn’t pick their subs? Will they ever sell us their other stuff after that?
They’re actively looking at other projects, including HDFM, MCAV, and GBAD, among others. The Koreans didn’t just nope out of here. They took a step back; they are very much upset, but they ain’t pulling out fully.
Hell, the Hanwha-AMPA Joint Venture was in the booklet at last week’s Investment Summit. Hanwha is still committed to that facility if they win some land contracts—maybe not to the same scale, mind you, but they’re still there.
CPSP hurts because Hanwha didn’t just see it from a Canadian lens. Like Australia, CPSP was an opening to break into the NATO market naval-wise, to show they could do it. Yes, CPSP was also valuable in itself, but there were layers of pain and suffering here.
That doesn’t mean they don’t see opportunities and won’t try for them. Far from it.
Q9. Are people still mad about the GlobalEye purchase?
Evidently, yes.
Q10. Do you see the LAV 6 Mk.II ever being adopted, or will it just stay as a concept? Would be nice to add some hard-kill capability.
I mean, something very similar is likely to come out of ACV-W. The primary focus areas of ACV-W are lethality, survivability, mobility, and C5ISR. It’s best to understand that these are broad requirements; again, ACV-W is an incremental, agile initiative. These categories are built as general focus areas that we work on and develop over time: things like hybrid drivetrains, mobile camouflage systems, active protection systems, etc.
ACV-W will, however, likely be equipped with a 30 mm main gun, supplemented by the addition of an ATGM or loitering munition system. It will also likely feature both soft- and hard-kill C-UAS capabilities, a bespoke battery system, and a renewed focus on digital and AI integration.
What exactly is set as a requirement, and what gets into the initial batch, is yet to be seen; but what’s desired aligns really, really well to what GDLS-C has presented in the LAV Mk.II as a concept.
Do we end up with that exact design? Not likely, but we will likely end up with something very similar.
Q11. Timeframe on when River #2 starts construction? Or when a 2nd batch is ordered? With long lead items being the bottleneck and a desire for faster delivery...
I unfortunately don’t think I can comment on that; I’m sorry.
Q12. With your recent rumour, the 1.3 B is most likely for the Mortar portion of the program. My guess... yours??
Well, it can’t be for the howitzers themselves unless numbers get cut. $1.3B ain’t going far, even as a base acquisition cost. That eliminates basically everyone, so it can’t, IMO. Makes no sense.
I do think it’s mortars, but I won’t say that in the newsletter because then someone will take it as fact, and we never want that. However, I do suspect it’s that if we’re talking about platforms. Mortars are the area we’re looking cheap on—for good reasons, mind you.
Q13. Do you think an expanded fleet of light helicopters for both AOPS and CCG vessels to be possible/probable? Do you think they could be useful on CDC?
I wouldn’t say probable, as in we see a big expansion. I think we’re gonna see a lot more of what we’re seeing now: the existing 429 fleet sort of bouncing between the RCN and CCG fleet. Whether that changes as collaboration deepens, I don’t think we can say.
I think it’s possible, and as we talked about last week, I do think it would be extremely beneficial for the AOPS and CDC to have those available. If AMB becomes a thing, I think the likelihood becomes higher as we look at what sort of platforms they need to be credible.
But right now? I think it stays largely the same fleet-wise—mixed in with future Large Autonomous Systems, like the Joint Multi-Mission Uncrewed Aerial System, that will take some of the burden on things like heavy lift.
Q14. Will there be talks of us finally getting NASAMS?
I mean, we’ll get something soon. Should hear about the winner for the Uplift UOR for a SHORAD battery soon. We should also get an RFI in the next little while for the Enduring GBAD projects. Whether that’s gonna be NASAMS, Skyhunter, IRIS-T, CAMM—who knows?
We’re moving on more GBAD, though, and it is one of the five priority projects on the docket right now.
Q15. What do you expect to be the big Army run announcements?
The Army Warfighting Concept will be released; I wouldn’t be surprised this week to see something announced, either. One of two things could be coming first—I can’t say which it will be. DAME is one of them; that’s been coming around now for a few weeks. September, maybe October-ish. We’ll see.
AWC, though, likely won’t be available publicly for a few more weeks for the rest of us; but we should see it this week internally.
Q16. Any new FASST-V program details or updates?
Unfortunately not on anything requirement-wise. The RFI is still expected this fall, so we should hopefully see it in a few weeks. FASST-V is not a complex vessel; it won’t be something overtly unique. It will be a slightly more capable, modern Orca-class in current concept.
It isn’t gonna be radically different. We need cheap, easy-to-maintain, flexible vessels that are able to be delivered quickly and be supported by the local NAVRES. That imposes some natural limits to the size and capabilities they can have.
Either way, we should get a look soon.
Q17. With the trade war, do you think the US will weaponize ITAR against us on everything?
No. Defence has mostly been left untouched in terms of retaliation, and our defence ecosystems are so interconnected that to retaliate on an industry level would inevitably damage both of our defence ecosystems more than it helps.
If defence was going to be touched, it won’t be, in my mind, in mass restrictions or refusing exports. We might see some pushback, say, on certain integrations, such as secure comms and datalinks on certain platforms. There could certainly be a fuss there.
But beyond the normal “it’s gonna look bad to other customers,” utilizing ITAR restrictions is also hurting American industry. It weaponizes a critical industry that we both need to expand at scale.
That happens when we collaborate with each other. That is supported by an integrated Defence Industrial Base, as we’ve been building since the 1950s. To target that only hurts us all for no reason, and I’m sure they know that.
Q18. Reserve infrastructure is wholly inadequate. Any info if a buildout is coming with all the new money?
Sure. A lot of these run through DCC and ain’t gonna be fully public. There are quite literally hundreds of active infrastructure projects—most under $5 million—that will never be advertised out there, save a few.
A lot fell under the Reserve Infrastructure Investment Program, and it is an ever-controversial topic between holding on to historical presence and identity, and the need for new, modern facilities able to support what we want to do.
There are a few off the top of my head that have been recent. North Park Armoury finished its Phase I about three years ago; that involved rebuilding the west wall and widening the entrances to accommodate modern vehicles.
It’s moving on to Phase II now, which was awarded last year. That will be done around 2029/2030 and involve a whole bunch of structural repairs, adding geothermal heating/cooling, solar panels, and a bunch of interior upgrades and modernizations. Guelph Armoury, I know, got similar work done a few years ago. Sherbrooke is undergoing a massive expansion and renewal.
The Colonel Gaëtan-Côté Armoury and William Armoury will be getting restoration work done; new facilities will be built as well. That’s coming in three phases, I believe. Edmonton Armoury is also getting a massive expansion—something like a thousand units. Ortona also got a revitalization.
There’s the new armoury in Lévis, Yellowknife is getting a new headquarters, and Esquimalt is adding a few hundred housing units. There is a lot going on; perhaps not enough, certainly not with the massive expansion we’re looking at. It’ll put a strain on a lot of historical facilities to try and accommodate.
There are many in favour of abandoning or downscaling the use of historical armouries for much more purpose-built, modern facilities. There is also a drastic need to re-expand, especially with the reserves, where their presence is and how they engage with communities.
Abandonment is radical, even in the conversation, but there is only so much you can do with a historical facility. The fact is that the places people live and engage have shifted in the last 100, 50, hell, 20 years in places like the GTA. It opens up the conversation a lot as to where the CAF needs to be and what modern facilities they need to support it, especially in a 400,000-strong, 5% Reserve.
The conversation and scale have shifted so much in the last year that, really, most plans are no longer sufficient and are outdated. That’s part of why a new policy is being worked on—one I hope tackles this.
As for other infrastructure? There is absolutely work being done—more than we can talk about at any given time; however, if you’re curious to go deeper, DCC does post a monthly roundup on contracts to view!
Q19. I heard Canada is evaluating Swedish CB90 fast boats. Is this part of a current project? Wonder how they would do in the arctic, flexability for the rangers?
That was a few weeks ago, honestly. There are some photos out there of them running around Halifax. Anywho, they were brought in for trialing future requirements we might have across CANSOF, ANCU, etc.
We have a bigger need out there for smaller craft that are more capable than something like a RHIB. I can’t say I know exactly what they might be thinking in terms of capability, but I do hear the trial went great and there was lots of interest in a craft like it for various roles.
Q20. If Canada were to acquire A400s, would that open the door to them being able to diversify their long-range strike capabilities by acquiring some Chunmoo systems?
We have HIMARS, and are now moving away from looking at rocket systems and towards other strike capabilities, like the Canadian Deep Precision Strike Capability Initiative or land-based NSM. Both are at stages of talks and movement.
LRPS(L) is considered done, and while there was some interest renewed by some earlier in the year, that has died down and we’ve moved on to other systems. I think Chunmoo is done.
Q21. Is there anything you can share on the shipyards offering more concept vessels to the RCN?
Unfortunately, not more than has been seen. I have told all the yards that they better send me new concepts first, and I trust they’ll do so! When they’re ready to talk, they will—likely after an RFI drops.
Q22. Is the lack of ro/ro vessels for rcn being discussed/looked at? Would be separate from amb?
It’s a common discussion. We know we have a collective Sealift gap. We know that we won’t have vessels available rapidly in conflict, and our allies will be hard-pressed to play support. I talked about it here in detail.
However, whether that is an RCN issue is yet to be seen. Does it have to be? I don’t think so. I would say it is a federal issue, and how they would execute depends. Would it be a Crown corporation that provides support Ro-Ro service? A service contract with a private provider? A P3 arrangement? Maybe even do what the Germans and Danes do and look multinational? Who knows.
I think someone could put together a proposal—a good one—and get some traction here if they had something available. We don’t need Sealift all the time, but when we need it, we want it available. That’s the big issue.
We don’t need Sealift a lot; but when you’re looking at year-long wait times, and the expectation that we will need to transport significant amounts of equipment and personnel abroad in conflict, it becomes a crux that we need to tackle.
The solution to that likely isn’t traditional in nature, and I wouldn’t say RCN.
Q23. Will we get the Patria NEMO for our mortar systems?
I mean, I wouldn’t exclude it, but it isn’t what we’re looking at. What I’m mostly seeing from folks is a cheaper, more scalable system designed to be replaceable in conflict, integrate easily into the ACSV, and be affordable. That means not a turreted mortar system, but more along the lines of a traditional hull-mounted system like the RUAG Cobra or Hanwha Skyfall.
We’re looking at 99 systems at maximum scope. That is a significant amount when talking about the scale and cost Patria NEMO would present. I don’t want to exclude it, but we want an ACSV-mounted system that can be produced at cheap, quick scale.
Unfortunately, that pushes us more towards a hull-mounted system over a turreted system.
Q24. It sounds like V-A Charlebois wants training vessels more than CDC. Will they downscale to the Vigilance 75 and use it as a trainer, troop taxi, or UUV/USV bus?
No, that’s too big for FASST-V. We want a training vessel similar in size and capability to the Orca-class, as we said above, and a proper, fighting corvette.
What you describe is more of a Kingston replacement, which we have very much decided we don’t want as a dedicated vessel in the future fleet. We’ve relegated that role to a mix of several future vessels (FASST-V, CDC, AOPS, CCG Vessels) and, if needed, the acquisition of commercial offshore support vessels to carry payloads.
Q25. Any insights into Beonyx’s self-reported sale of 10 ‘B1’ units to support CASEVAC and MEDEVAC operations for the CAF? Which units are testing them?
There were existing requirements out there for small UGV orders, including UGVs for CASEVAC. We tracked it over the summer through the newsletter.
That specific ask was for a tracked, COTS platform for the Canadian Forces Health Services to be delivered to CFSD Lancaster Park and CFSD Montreal, respectively.
For specific requirements, the ask was for a platform that met a maximum 1.25 m in width, 2.3 m in length, 0.75 m in height, and a weight of less than 600 kg. The platform needed a payload capacity of at least 450 kg and a pulling capacity of at least 3,000 kg.
I don’t know much about the B1 myself. I have reached out to learn more, but I hear great things about it.
Q26. Do you think the Boxer IFV will replace the LAVs?
When Jesus does a backflip on Parliament Hill, then maybe. Until then? Absolutely not.
Q27. For the implementation of SHORAD, would we see them implemented on a larger chassis like the LAV 700 instead of 6.0 due to weight and electrical power concerns?
Not very likely. The ACSV is already very large and a bit oversized in cases. Almost everyone recognizes that we’re hitting a point where ever-increasing sizes of platforms, especially for Canada, is not really viable long-term.
Similarly, the commonality between the existing LAV 6 and 700 is a lot less than people like to say. They ain’t really running the same underneath: different engine, different transmission, I believe, and suspension. If you’re thinking they’re common platforms, you’ll be disappointed.
I wouldn’t call it low commonality, but it’s something you have to factor in when introducing a new platform. You also have to consider if the platform is fulfilling both a role that isn’t already filled, and if it’s worthwhile enough that it outranks trying to make an existing platform take that responsibility.
We want fewer vehicles, fewer fleets to manage. Ideally, the whole army would run on about 7 or 8 outside commercial platforms and such. We want to avoid adding fleets if there isn’t a very clear value, and after ensuring nothing else can fill its requirements.
For GBAD—especially the VSHORAD role we look at the LAV to take on—we don’t need more than the ACSV. Something like Sgt. Stout would be fantastic for us, and it’s already on Stryker. I’ve actually seen the concept of Sgt. Stout on the LAV before in person! Looks a bit weird, but works.
I just don’t see the need for the LAV 700 here. Bespoke platform, for a problem an existing LAV can fit, and not many other roles for it to take.
Q29. So what are the big 4 that will be announced in Army Week and the next couple of months?
The big four I have talked about are the Army Warfighting Concept, Fleet Mix Study for the Navy, Budget 2027, and the upcoming Defence Policy. There are others in various stages, but I don’t have firm timelines for a bunch. AWC drops next week internally; others are more open. Defence Policy MIGHT drop this year, but I doubt it; likely spring next year.
There are a few others floating, but I don’t have dates to say when they might drop.
LOL! Q26, that was perfect. Sorry Boxer fans!
Q27 I feel like people keep thinking the LAV 700 “would have been” the LAV 6 replacement “eventually” but I really do believe it’s just a oversized and expensive washed out version of the LAV meant to sell as a export platform and not for national service.