Random thoughts of Jeffry Brock (and other 60's navy stuff.)

Sometimes, after reading through historical documents and researching for my next posts, my mind just sort of wanders off. Its perfectly natural, we all daydream at times, and research can be tasking.

While other people daydream of normal things sometimes I daydream on random historical periods. Usually, I keep these to myself, because there is rarely a time they come up.

Yet I know ive been laxking lately, and I feel like bringing up one of my favourote time periods in the middle of the night. I lobe the 60s, especially when it comes to defence.

The aftermath of the Arrow cancellation, Unification, the painful death of the Department of Defence Production to which I curse Glassco to this very day. Its a fun time period that's very often overlooked, sandwiched between the Korean era and the 1980s.

Yet its one of the eras with the most fun stories, especially as someone who's primary task it is to talk about procurement and force development. There is so much depth to this era that it's almost a shame how little we discuss it.

Tonight I'm thinking of thr navy, more specifically a few of the proposals that were thrown out in this time period, because believe me, they get WILD. Let me go through one of them.

In 1961 Rear-Admiral Jeffry ‘Brimstone’ Brock was tasked by then Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner with creating a report to "undertake a careful reexamination of Naval Objectives to determine whether existing activities and future plans were adequate.”

This report, the Ad Hoc Report on Naval Objectives, more commonly known as the Brock Report, presented a fifteen year plan to transform the RCN into a "Three-Ocean-Navy" able to effe tively operate in all three of Canada's oceans.

The Brock Report laid out the role of the Royal Canadian Navy as:

• Defending Canada's interests against attack from the sea

• Meeting our commitments to collective security arrangements

• Contributing to other external undertakings

• Supporting the Canadian Army

• Establishing and maintaining Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic

The Brock Report firmly committed the RCN to playing a major role in the Arctic, a region that had come to the forefront of the Diefenbaker administration.

The Brock Report called for the mass modernization of the RCN leading into the 1970s, as vessels such as the WWII era Tribal & Prestonian-class quickly neared retirement. The plan, for its time period, was quite ambitious in many regards, and quite foreseeing.

The Brock Report laid out a Modernization plan that included:

• Eight General Purpose Frigates

• Twelve Helicopter Frigates

• Twelve Conventional/Nuclear submarines

• Two Arctic Patrol Vessels

• Two tankers

• A fleet of complementary Auxillery vessels

The Brock Report lays out one of the eras most extensive attempts at transforming the RCN into a three-ocean, blue water force.

Keen observers might even take note of just how similar this report is to our current set of plans for the future of the Royal Canadian Navy. You might even say Brock nesrly predicted what our future fleet might look like.

Yes, some liberties must be applied, and numbers are not perfect but the vision is there, and very interesting to see when you spend a lot of your days examing what out future fleet might be.p

The Brock Report, of course, never came to fruition, as did many proposals of the unification era of the RCN. Budget cuts, the trials of Unification and shifting priorities made sure it stayed in the concept bin.

There were many, and I am sure I dont know all of them. Yet the ones you can readily find around do go to show the divide in philosophy many had, and the many directions people were attempting to pull for.

After Hellyer launched the 'Mobile Force' concept, and among the absolutemadnesss, the floodgates were open for everyone to push their own concepts. It was under Hellyer where a lot of these concepts start to come to the forefront.

Then Commodore Alexander Beaufort Fraser Fraser-Harris (who has my favorite name ever) who had long been a driving force behind naval aviation, threw out his own concept in 1964, proposing the navy acquire both a new CVL, and LPH to support this new Mobile Force.

Fraser-Harris described the concept as such:

These characteristics are submitted in the belief that such a ship is essential to the effective operation of helicopters in the A/S role, even though a number of these aircraft may be carried and operated from other ships. It is envisaged that the Helicopter carrier will not only provide considerably increased utilization of the helicopters now planned for operation from escorts, but will also greatly increase the number of helicopters available for both escort and attack functions. This ship can fulfil a useful limited war function, either by the carriage of helicopters or VTO [Vertical Take-off] aircraft for Army support, or as a transport for heavy vehicles and military equipment, and to act as a Headquarters ship.

Fraser-Harris, like many other upper brass, would retire a short time later as the chaos of unification kicked off the Revolt of The Admirals, ending his career relatively short at the age of 48.

He was a very interesting man with a very interesting life (Including being practically exiled at one point)

I have not read the original concept. There were a few mix matches, including acquiring a modernized Essex along with two Iwo Jima, or even acquiring two CVL, to be manned by both ASW helicopters and A4E Skyhawks.

This plan, like many others, went nowhere, although it does lead to some very fun conversations, and a great look back at what many see as such a turbulent time period.

Maybe I should write more historical stuff? Gives me an excuse to dedicate more time to research! Its just one of those things to nerd out on, we all need that once in a while. We can't always be focusing on the serious stuff now!