The Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette
Part one of my new four part series exploring the Canadian navies newest project
Projects.
Lots of Projects.
So many projects that Noah has a new excel file to keep track of them. The Department of National Defence officially has over sixty-five capital project in various stages along the procurement pipeline.
This includes everything from sleeping bags and jackets, to satellites, submarines and a host of digital projects that no one ever seems to remember exist, except for me and Alex Rudolph, of course.
So whenever a project appears in the pipeline, I take great interest in it, almost obsessively so, and none has peaked interested more in the last year than the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette (CMMC) project.
The Canadian-Multi Mission Corvette project aims to identify possible replacements for the current fleet of Kingston Class MCDV.
At least that's the aim in theory. Truthfully, CMMC has caused quite a stir, with loose definitions, rampant, almost contradictory rumors, and a lot of industry speculation that has clouded what the projects end goal may be.
The Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs) were originally designed and constructed in the 1990s for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) with a focus on mine countermeasures, coastal surveillance, and patrol duties.
They were intended to be versatile, cost-effective ships capable of operating in Canada's vast coastal waters and supporting domestic and international naval missions.
Of course, the class is now approaching thirty years old and are at the end of their lifespan. Another refit will not happen, and several remain non-active, with some, such as HMCS Whitehorse, having not set sail for now over a thousand days.
Needless to say, any potential investment in a replacement is needed sooner rather than later, as the fleet becomes financial unsustainable to further maintain.
This will be part one of a four part series, where I will be breaking down the project, it's potential avenues and likely outcomes.
Identifying CMMC
How does one talk about something that doesnt truely exist? It might be a bit hyperbolic to say it like that, but the truth is that CMMC remains, as of now, in its ‘Napkin’ Phase of identification.
CMMCs current team consists of a handful of people, whom have been tasked with identifying what the B echelon of the Royal Canadian Navy shall look like.
The project is likely to ramp up as the last Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV) comes into service, and people can be redistributed to bolster the few people tasked with this.
Until then, there are no set requirements, no documents, no official sources. Anything we know of the project comes from what little info has leaked, and from mine, and a handful of others, attempts to gather information.
I first heard the term CMMC last year, around the time of CANSEC 2023. It wasn't the first name I've heard for this project, but was the first one to gain any sort of outside traction.
It would be at CANSEC that VARD would break the seal on the project with the reveal of it's Vigilance class proposal. They would be the first outside the rumor mill to make mention of this project as a Kingston-Class replacement.
Initially, I expected this to run fairly straight forward, and indeed in the following months more and more people started speaking on the RCNs newest project.
Truthfully, it was nothing overtly spectacular. The initial layout was for a lightly armed, modular vessel of around 1500-2000 tons to replace the Kingston-Class.
Unlike the Kingston, these vessels would be tailored as Multi-Role vessels out the gate, designed to fill a number of tasks the current Kingstons undertake, including Minesweeping, disaster response, policing, SARS and coastal patrolling.
A big focus of all my early discussions on CMMC came down to a few key points. These vessels would be:
Highly Modular
Autonomous
Globally Deployable
Lightly-Armed
This isn't to far off from the current generation of Offshore Patrol Vessels being proposed, such as the City-Class or Venari-85, whom both follow a similar philosophy and concept as our proposed CMMC.
These vessels are now expected to perform a much wider range of roles, ranging from surveillance and reconnaissance to mine countermeasures and humanitarian aid.
As a result, designers have begun prioritizing flexibility and long-term adaptability. The newest generation have grown significantly larger in size to accommodate these demands, such as the accommodation of unmanned systems, and to allow them to fill roles traditionally undertaken by larger, more specialized ships.
There are two key concepts that define this generation, modularity and autonomy.
Modularity
Now, I know no one like the modular term. It's overuse has made it almost groan inducing, and invokes the image of ‘modular’ designs that truthfully aim to accommodate for a lack of anything better.
So, when it comes to naval vessels, what is modularity?
At it's core, the idea behind modularity is to offer "mission-oriented" rather than "platform-centered" capabilities, enabling navies to adapt swiftly to different requirements. This includes the increasing incorporating of things such as "plug-and-play" capabilities, containerized modules, and dedicated mission bays.
This modularity allows for significant flexibility and future-proofing. For instance, a vessel can be fitted with minehunting systems during one deployment, and then quickly reconfigured to carry unmanned vehicles or humanitarian aid equipment in another.
This can be done through systems like SH Defences’ CUBE. I briefly spoke on the CUBE system in my post about the Vard Vigilance.
The Cube is a containerized, modular payload system designed by SH Defence for naval vessels.
These payloads come in a ISO-standard container footprint sizes 20’ to 40’ and are designed to be swapped out depending on various missions. Each Cube container can house equipment related to a wide variety of tasks, such as mine-laying, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, or surveillance.
With over 150 possible payloads, SH defence has signed on with numerous partners to integrate the CUBE onto a multitude of different platforms, including various Navantia vessels, BAE Systems’ Adaptable Strike Frigate, and famously the Vard Vigilance.
This makes CUBE by far the best standard we have for a modular payload system, though it is still young. The system has only been integrated fully on a small number of vessels, and while plans are in the works, it is still in the teething stages.
Of course another major benefit is cost saving. Navies can buy fewer hulls while maintaining a broad operational capability. Moreover, mission modularity reduces the need for building specialized vessels for each task, as a single OPV can perform multiple roles simply by switching out the containers in its mission bay.
This design can support future technological advancements, making these vessels adaptable to new challenges, though sadly, while admirable, this doesn't always work out for the best.
I'm sure many of you will remember the hype that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) pushed out about its modular design, and how revolutionary it would be for the U.S. Navy.
That didn't work out. as many know, with the LCS long history of technical issues, cost overruns, and now early retirement.
So, personally, I can understand skepticism when one discusses this topic. I myself am not sold on the ‘Containerization’ craze, as I have said before, and while I can get behind the concept, I still can not say I'm sold on putting containerized missiles onto a patrol boat and calling it a day.
Modularity shouldn't be an excuse to force vessels to be a jack of all trade, something I have highlighted before in my Vigilance post, but for a multitude of smaller, backend tasks, larger OPV have the potential to provide a flexible solution for navies whom might not be able to support, or want to support, a multitude of different fleets for similar tasks.
Modularity though is only half the equation. While you can create the space and flexibility as much as you want, it means little when you can't actually use that space effectively.
Autonomy
Modern OPV are increasingly integrating autonomous systems to enhance their capabilities, enabling them to conduct a wider range of missions with minimal crew involvement.
Indeed, these vessels can, at their core, be described as Autonomous Motherships, integrating a number of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV), and Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) to enhance their operational flexibility and reduce risks to human personnel.
For vessels such as the City-class, these autonomous systems form the ‘toolbox’ that allows them to conduct their minehunting operations.
These systems typically operate in a networked environment where multiple autonomous or remotely controlled vehicles work in coordination to detect, classify, and neutralize underwater mines.
Operating at a safe distance from the Mothership, a potential mine is detected, more specialized uncrewed vehicles, equipped with higher-resolution sensors or cameras, are used to further classify the object, distinguishing between mines and benign debris.
Finally, unmanned systems can also deliver and deploy neutralization devices, such as explosive charges, to safely dispose of confirmed threats.
Beyond Minesweeping, Autonomous systems provide the Mothership beyond line of sight capbilities, offering support in rolws such as real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), coastal patrols, or intelligence gathering, while allowing her to remaincout of harm's way.
That's a very rough idea, but it carried the point across. The reason I bring these two up specifically is because theyre a constant topic of CMMC.
Autonomy and Modularity have come up so many times, by so many people I've talked to, that it feels drilled into my head. These vessels need to be flexible, able to commit to a wide range of roles.
At least, that was what it had been for a long time, until recently.
Gathering the pieces
CMMC remained fairly simple for a while. Info was scarce, and most I talked to either only knew of it'd existence, or again provided vague speculation on things like modularity and size.
Vard made several references to the project in turn, in various interviews and discussions, presenting the project in a similar light, a medium sized OPV capable of global operations, eith a high degree of autonomy. A true evolution of thr Kingston Class.
The first bit of info I saw outside this was in November, when going over a briefing that Davies gave to the Standing Comittee on Government Operations and Estimates.
Although brief, there is a part here that gave me a bit of interest, specifically on the size of the vessel that Davies was expecting to come out of this project.
This was the first I had heard anyone mention Corvette sized, as well as any size estimate above 2000tns. It was interesting, but in honesty, I somewhat brushed it off. In hindsight, that was foolish of me, but follow me for a moment.
Truthfully, modern navies will attach their own rules and standards when designating their ships. Of course, you can say that the terminology has always been open for debate and quite different depending on who you would ask.
A Halifax-class Frigate and Pohjanmaa- class Corvette are both of similar size and armaments. The Moudge-class frigates of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), at 95 meters long amd around 1500 tons, are much more akin to traditional corvettes or modern Offshore Patrol Vessels in size.
Without making this topic an essay, names, especially with projects like this, can be a bit misleading to a glancing eye. We can't truly use it for anything definitive in terms of what to expect from the project.
As such it was my belief that we cannot merely take the term 'Corvette' to mean anything more than a naming convention for the project, and given the info at the time, this is where I landed.
All discussions I had seen, and all the people I spoke with came to the same idea, an Offshore Patrol Vessel, and so, despite this, I stuck to that concept.
Then came December, more specifically the Naval Association of Canada Speaker's Evening event. It was here that Vice-Admiral Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy would speak for the first time on the future CMMC.
Here is a transcript of the relevant parts:
I have lots of thoughts on that. It would be great to have something, some form of high-end Corvette…they can take some of the burden off of the Halifax class and the future Canadian Surface Combatants all the way down to know what do we really need…and if the mission is just understanding what's happening on and under the waters and more of a constabulary role, then we can replace them (major warships) with something that's a lot like what they are right now, (the MCDV) which is a relatively simple ship, not heavily armed.
And so, the Force Development Team and our Director of Naval Strategy is doing an awful lot of work right now looking at options around the world and trying to figure out, what is it, what are the missions that we need this ship to be able to do…what makes the most sense given the context of a fleet of 15 Canadian Surface combatants and 2 JSS, 6 AOPVs and some number of Canadian Patrol submarines. What’s the gap that we need to fill in all of that?
Maybe it is some sort of light amphibious ship to be perfectly honest, right? Like, what the (US) Marine Corps is looking to build…something that's a simpler ship in many respects to operate, not designed to operate in the cover or something else. Maybe it is, like I said, a high-end Corvette or a frigate of some sort that really can be an adjunct in battle to the Canadian Surface Combatant.
We're not sure. We really want to make sure we take the time to try to find that requirement as best we can. And maybe the answer is not a single platform. Maybe the answer is a couple of different things. Recognizing that, you know, the more different classes, you add, the more complex your training system, (and) your maintenance system becomes. But, if all of those ships have the same basic sort of bridge navigation system, bridge setup…the same sort of prime movers in the sense of, you know, generators to produce power, very similar, you know, solutions, in terms of how we manage the marine systems…then that burden may not be as great as it seems.
And so my interest was peaked. This was the first I heard of CMMC aiming for a true warship, at least maybe? Yet even still, I remained firm in my belief of ehat CMMC would be.
This statement didn't feel like any Cort of commitment to anything, merely throwing ideas to the wind, the mention of multiple classes, amphibious assault ships, and the like, made me treat this more as a way of saying that everything was being investigated in some way, and that Topshee had his own ideas, as everyone does, but that CMMC, for now remained the same.
I trusted in what industry had said, and what people had told me, the lovable fool I am, enough to put this on the backburner as an interesting concept, but more of a fantastical one, thrown to the wind as with many others I had seen over the last two years of researching CAF projects.
And so the year passed, 2024 came with little news, a few more mentions and discussions. The team was small, the project young, and there was no real info to even leak.
So I put it to the back of my mind, even as more talks on Corvettes popped up, slowly trickling into the infospehere. It was around March when I found the Corvette talk escalating.
It was subtle, but the idea was starting to be discussed more seriously, treated more seriously than the speculation and fantasy talks of the last year before.
Perhaps they wanted the OPV more armed than expected? Or perhaps they truely just wished something bigger than the current 1500-2500 ton range I had been working off of?
Then CANSEC 2024 came, and with it Vigilance had been reworked, the design changed, and a new Flight II added. This was admittedly at the time quite amusing, a containerized Vigilance, armed with Mk.70 launchers and NSM, decked out as I termed it the FrankenCorvette.
I chalked it up again to another Canadian shipbuilder throwing concepts to the wind. It happens quite regularly, shipyards and firms throwing designs like G-LAM out into the universe in hopes of capturing interest.
At worst, I thought it was a reaction to the uncertainty, a hype into a new vessel, to show off the capabilities of what it could do, if only given the chance amd funding.
Now I know better, that Vard was preparing for a competition that might ask for radically different concepts, one they have to make sure the Vigilance can compete in on both ends, perhaps preparing for a project that demands more than one mind of vessel.
Yet a part of me asked, could this be legitimate? Is the Corvette actually in the conversation? By this point, it was fairly hard to ignore that, at the least, there was some desire for a Corvette, or at least the ability to uparm the vessel.
It's not the first time I've heard of the idea. There have been numerous proposals to uparm the DeWolfe-class, from containerized platforms like Vigilance, to more conservative plans, such as upgrading the 25mm gun.
Futureproofing? It made sense, but still, it felt strange to make such a demand of an OPV, so it went into the pile of concepts aimed to sell an idea.
August rolled around, and Canadian Defence Review was ready to release their fourth issue of the year. Those who are active in the space already know where this is going.
Admiral Topshee joined CDR to speak on a number of topics (I highly recommend the podcast with Topshee) including on the future of the MCDV:
The nuance that I would offer is that the MCDV replacement will not be an MCDV. We have started some theorizing around what would a Canadian Multi-mission Corvette look like? It’s a nod to our history — I love the fact that we were a corvette and destroyer navy in the Second World War.
What we’re probably building is something that’s going to be more capable than what might come to mind with a corvette because it has to be a real warship. The driving philosophy behind whatever comes is that it needs to be what we could not quickly replicate in a time of war.
I think what we need to make sure we do with what’s being called the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette, is figure out the core sort of warship systems that we need to have, the type of thing that you can’t build quickly in wartime. The first part of any project is always that sort of initial identification of requirements, and that’s very much the phase of the thinking that we’re at right now.
Again, I highly recommend the CDR podcast, as the Admiral goes into more deeper details on the concept, and why this direction is being aimed for.
A point brought up constantly here is what do we actually need to build now? What can't we build in the event of conflict? What capabilities can we easily, and what ones can't we?
It is true, a fairly barebones and simple OPV, such as the Vigilance, are easy to construct, inexpensive and can be something that can be procured quickly and easily in the event that we need their capabilities.
There is no hiding that this is a single chance opportunity. There is unlikely to be another major ship project coming in the pipeline after CMMC, at least for the foreseeable future.
Whatever capability we acquire through this project will be where our cutoff is, so to say. That has been made abundantly clear here.
Of course, by now, I cannot ignore the range of CMMC has expanded beyond the points that I expected of it. There is to much evidence against it for me to merely sit here and pretend that it is some fantastical wish of the upper echelon, or an idea on the chalkboard destined to be wiped away as so many others have.
Yet despite this all, despite all the evidence, there is still a vocal crowd whom have stuck to the original idea of CMMC, that it shall remain an evolution of the Kingston-class.
All the pieces, but no box
I often use the quote “All the pieces, but no box” when discussing these topics, where everything is laid out for you, but no clear picture to create a proper image.
That is where CMMC remains right now, a project in pieces, waiting to be properly assembled. We have two competing ends, a Lower-End OPV and a High-End Corvette.
There remains also a middle ground, a heavily armed OPV? Or perhaps a Lightly Armed Corvette? To fully establish what to expect, we need to figure out exactly where we are.
There are a few common themes shared between both ends. Both are likely going to have some focus on Modularity, as this is a common topic brought up no matter what capability we procure.
Both will also require the ability to be Globally Deployable, with ranges likely to exceed 4500+ Nautical Miles, allowing them to transit past the Atlantic or Pacific.
We don't have much info on hand about what CMMC may be, but we can create a rough shape…
This chart lays out the basic requirements we might see form each end of CMMC. There is obviously room for discussion here, but I am fairly confident in this assertions with the info available.
At the low-end we have a vessel ranging from 1500-2500 Tons, and around 80-95 meters in length. These vessels would be a step up from the existing Kingston class, able to act independently and be globally-deployablez be it to the seas of the Mediterranean, or assisting in policing in thr Caribbean.
They would be relatively lightly armed, likely similar to the DeWolfe-class, with the potential existing for the ships main gun to be scaled up to something like a 30mm or 57 mm, depending on the demands of the RCN on such a vessel.
These vessels would act as motherships as well, integrating a number of UAS, USV, and UUV to assist them in tass such as Minesweeping, SAR, and ISR, at a higher-end OPV, we might also see the vessel maintain a full-sized flight deck to support take-off and landing operations of maritime helicopters.
We will talk in more detail about these types of vessels in part two
On the High-End we have our Corvette. When it comes to Corvettes, and what exactly a high-end means, you'll often run into different answers.
Truthfully, high-end Corvettes tend to blur the line between themselves and Light Frigates, and by blur, I mean they truthfully aren't that different, to the point that you can call them either or and no one would be truely able to tell the difference.
Our High-End Corvette would like range above 3000 Tons, with a fairly large crew of between sixty-ninety people. It would stick with modularity, featuring a modular mission bay capable of being reconfigured with any number of containerized platforms, from small hospital units, to USV, minelaying, and whatever else we could cram in there.
These vessels would maintain both a dedicated flight deck and hanger able to maintain and launch UAS and maritime helicopters. I won't go to far into the sensor suite, but at the high-end it would be likely comparable to the current Halifax-class in service.
Truthfully, these vessels would stand out in their armamamnt. Of we are aiming for as high-end as possible, our potential Corvette could feature a potential combination of:
57/74mm Main Gun
2×4 Naval Strike Missiles
4×4 Mk.41 VLS
2×3 Torpedo tubes
CIWS
A loaded out Corvette is a fighting vessel, comparatively armed to the current Halifax-class. Proposals such as the Navantia Tasman-class for Australia, or the MEKO A-100 Light Frigate, both viable candidates, offer along these lines.
Of course, there is also a healthy middle ground here. We don't need Corvettes this armed if we choose not to, nor are OPV limited to the basics. There is room to work with.
A larger OPV could feature a dedicated hanger for helicopters, or be more heavily armed, both with extra defenses, such as the integration of RIM-162, or through containerized weapons modules, as Vigilance Flight-II has proposed.
Similarly, a Corvette could be as minimally armed as one of our higher-end OPV. You can ditch the Mk.41 and replace it with something ExLS or RIM-162, while maintaining the anti-ship capability.
You could exclude the torpedo tubes, or perhaps drop the VLS count to twelve. There are quite literally dozens of potential combinations one can choose from.
The point of this is to establish exactly where our minimums and maximums are, and they are quite the gap. There is a healthy middle, yes, but I plan on discussing that more in part two and three respectively.
This is merely to introduce the project and potential playing field to you, instead of breaking down competitors. We're organizing the pieces before we start trying to construct the puzzle.
Putting it together
So this is where we're at. A project with a gap so big that neither end truely compares to each other, eith minimal info and a host of people with different wants and views.
And that's a good thing…
When the rare opportunity comes up for us to discuss our wider capabilities, and what we want of them, we should be exploring every possible avenue that could potentially crop up.
If we want a similar example, look no further than our sisters in Australia, whom have now moved towards the Tier I aad Tier II concept for their future navy.
The Tier I fleet will be composed of larger, more capable surface combatants that focus on high-end warfare, including air and missile defense, multi-domain strike, and anti-submarine warfare. This will include the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and the future Hunter-class frigates, the same as our River-class destroyers.
In contrast, the Tier II fleet consists of smaller, general-purpose frigates. These ships are designed for tasks like maritime security and patrolling, with less emphasis on advanced warfare capabilities. The Australian government plans to introduce 11 new Tier II frigates to replace the ageing Anzac-class. These ships are expecting to start entering service from 2030 onwards.
It's not unreasonable to assume that we might run in to the same conclusion, albeit on a potentially smaller scale. As I said before, there is no other project coming after this.
This will be the one opportunity the RCN truely has to potentially develop a Tier II fleet for itself. If CMMC goes with an OPV, or worse fails, there will be little chance of any sort of concept coming to light.
I understand the mentality, the want to focus on acquiring ships that we won't be easily able to replace, to actually increase out capabilities and add on new ones instead of just replacing what we already have.
It's about closing gaps and deficits. It's been acknowledged, even by Topshee himself, that the 24 Mk.41 cells of the River-class might prove inadequate in the future, and represents a possible deficiency in the navies wider magazine depth, it's ability to expend munitions in conflict.
It is likely a factor to why the recently announced Canadian Patrol Submarine also specifically asks for a Long-Range, Land-Attack capability, a way to help make up for this precieved deficiency.
A corvette, able to take some of the burden from the River-class, with a potential sixteen cell capability, adds much needed depth, and frees up the River-class to focus on tasks where it is best, such as Ballistic Missile defence.
Similarly, these potential vessels provide much needed flexibility to the RCN, giving them a new, Halifax-Equivalent ship that has the capability to operate independently of the River-class.
This allows them to be a cheaper alternative that can commit to a wide range of missions that do not require the high-end combat capabilities of the Rivers, performing lighter tasks such as patrolling, interdiction, anti-piracy, and humanitarian relief operations.
With all that in mind, it's no wonder the Admiral really seems to be pushing for these kinds of vessels. They have their roles to fill, and would be a major capability boost to the RCN.
But, this isn't my own endorsement of the idea…
Indecision
A part of me loved the Tier I/II concept. How could you not? Taking a moment to disregard any factors, who would truely argue against it?
It would be a major change to how the RCN operates, how it structures itself. It would be a major capability that would forever reshape our doctrines. It would provide the navy a new, major capability, open avenues for new collaborations and partnerships, and allow us a new level of flexibility that we wouldn't have without it.
Yet despite all my thinking and writing, I'm still yet to be fully sold on the Corvette concept, for a number of reasons, despite how much I want to accept it.
The first and major problem for me comes in the form of the projects vulnerability. The truth is that a corvette will be a multi-billion dollar procurement, likely stretching over the two billion dollar mark, depending.
With the looming conservative government coming in 2026 we can't discount that every project will be safe from potential cuts, and while I'm not as worried as other people on this matter, it is still something that must be discussed.
Of all the major projects CMMC will likely remain one of the easiest to cut without making any major sacrifices to current capabilities. We don't need a Corvette, our current plans would remain even if CMMC vanished.
That makes it an easy sacrifice to an already cash-strapped budget that might face further cuts in the future, especially if other platforms come into the watching eye of a future government.
By no means should we make any cuts to the fifteen planned River-class ship, nor should we sacrifice any future Canadian Patrol Submarines to help fund a motly crew of corvettes.
Any Corvette should come with the expectation that the current plans remain the same, and that it won't be used to start slashing from our tier I vessels.
Then there is the issue of people. Any High-End Corvette is likely to require a crew of between sixty-ninety people to operate.
If we are to make these Corevttes a sustainable capability, we are required to procure enough to allow for whatever lines of tasking the navy has in mind.
I plan to talk much more on this is Part III, but for now, I will say that my personal minimum for our CMMC would be eight such vessels, allowing for two to be available at any given time.
That means a lot of new sailors will be needed to crew these new vessels, in a navy where there's a deficit of over a thousand sailors, with some trades facing gaps of upwards of forty percent.
It's been a commonly discussed issue, especially in the last year, with Admiral Topshee given his own words on it with CDR:
We are challenged by personnel. I'm quite comfortable describing it as a personnel crisis at the moment because we are 20% short in the trained effective strength — that's the sailors that we need to do the jobs for the Navy. We're working hard to recruit and attract Canadians into the Navy, and we're revamping the training system so that as we bring people in the door, we can get them trained to be effective and contribute as quickly as possible. But nothing's going to change the fact that it takes five to ten years to build five to ten years of experience of naval operations. So, we are going to be dealing with this for a period of time.
With fifteen Rivers and upwards of twelve Submarines, adding a new fleet of ships that will require hundreds of additional sailors presents a risk that we shouldn't ignore.
Admittedly, the slow introduction of the Rivers, set to take place until upwards of 2050, does allow some time to boost the numbers, and allows for a much more paced out demand for sailors, stretched over a now twenty-five year period.
Along with that, the retirement of the Kingston and Halifax ships as these enter service will free up additional personnel, obviously.
Combined these with the navies renewed recruitment efforts, including a highly successful Naval Experience Program, and the situation, while critical, does have leeway.
In fact, one could argue that CMMC could present the opportunity to retire some of the Halifax even earlier, assuming a High-End. Given the similar capabilities, and the over a billion dollars planned out for Halifax refurbishment, a scenario where some Halifax are retired and filled in by this CMMC shouldn't be tossed out so quickly.
Again, these are a few challenges and issues, and I plan to go much more in depth as we go through these parts. For now though, I wanted to lay down the groundwork, the basics of what we might see put of this project.
This covers the basics of CMMC, what I know, amd an introduction to what ships we might see out of it. This is the first of four parts I will be presenting.
Next, we will be taking a look at the Lower-end of CMMC, followed by the Higher-end. The last part will be dedicated to me breaking it down fully, with my own full analysis.
I don't have an exact timetable, but would like to do one over the course of the next three weeks, if time will allow me.
We still need a MCDV replacement. Something cheaper to run. The low end offering could do that if it doesnt grow too large. But we dont have the people for the ships. We have to bring the AORs online too
Two other candidates worthy of consideration. Saab's Luleå-class combat ship with reduced crew size and increased lethality, built for arctic waters and weather conditions. The other is Fincantieri's PPX OPV. Both are latest and greatest and are in process of being built for their respective navies.