What of the Hero-class?

The National Post reported over the weekend that the Hero-class Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels were scheduled to exit service within the coming years.

This wasn’t exactly a guarded secret. If you have been around the defence space long enough you would have heard of the curse of the Hero-class. Despite coming from the widely successful, well-loved Damen Stan Patrol family, the Hero-class—both through our own failings and bad luck—failed to live up to expectations.

It would have been a depressing, whimpering end to a family of vessels that one could consider the predecessors to the modern National Shipbuilding Strategy. Sadly, it seems like that’s the stage we’re at.

I spent part of the weekend asking around about the Hero-class, and while I have yet to get anything concrete, I can say that I have heard the National Post story is accurate.

This will leave an obvious gap, one that will need to be filled by a new platform. What could that platform look like? Let’s take a look at it.

The Hero-class

The origins of the Hero-class can actually be traced back to March 2005 when the Paul Martin government announced the procurement of four Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels and two Off-Shore Fisheries Research Vessels.

A month later a new $300-million, five-year package of initiatives was announced. This package was meant to “further enhance the security of Canada’s marine transportation system and maritime borders.”

With this package, those four original vessels would be joined by a second batch of four, bringing the total MSPV fleet to a proposed eight—at least in theory. There was never any funding actually budgeted to this effort, as in January 2006 the Martin government was booted out by Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party.

The Harper government then inherited this project, along with others like the Joint Support Ship. While there was no funding allocated for the project in 2006, the government, lucky for everyone involved, did at least commit to keeping the project as envisioned.

The first RFP for the detailed design and construction of the MSPV was released in November 2006. Yet there was still a critical lack of funding tied to the project. That would change the next year.

2007 would go on to be a fairly substantial year for announcements. We not only got the initial announcement of Nanisivik, but we also got the announcement of the AOPS in July. Fun fact: the original concept of the AOPS envisioned a class of three PC 3 icebreakers, which—after everyone realized that wasn’t it—was shifted to the 6–8 PC 5 AOPS we all know today.

Also in 2007, we got our first budget commitment to the MSPV, with $324 million committed to the purchase and maintenance of four MSPV and the two Off-Shore Fisheries Research Vessels as Martin originally envisioned.

The Harper government also took the time to commit to a third batch of MSPV in that same budget, bringing the total proposed number to twelve. That’s not a small increase. You could almost be mistaken for believing that things were starting to look up.

Spoiler alert: they weren’t. That first RFP? The initial solicitation was cancelled in July 2007 under the reasoning “that the understanding between bidders and the Crown concerning bid evaluation requirements was insufficient to allow the process to proceed.”

A minor hiccup, though. We did get our second RFP in December 2007, which surely would go along smoothly after the failure of the first one.

On August 22, 2008, the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), Christian Paradis, announced the termination of the procurement process for both the Joint Support Ship and the Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels.

Why, you may ask? Let’s look at the press announcement:

“PWGSC has also announced the cancellation of a competitive process for the acquisition of twelve mid-shore patrol vessels on behalf of the Canadian Coast Guard. A Request for Proposal was issued in December 2007. However, the bid prices exceeded the anticipated costs.

“These vessels are a key priority of the Government of Canada. However, the government must ensure that Canadian taxpayers receive the best value for their money,” said Minister Paradis. “The Department of National Defence and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans are currently considering the next steps. The government is committed to procure, repair and refit vessels in Canada according to the government’s Buy Canada policy.”

So that was the second attempt bursting into flames. It wouldn’t be until February 2009 that we got our third—and luckily final—RFP. This came with reduced performance requirements and discussion of reducing the fleet size to ten vessels.

That number actually got lower, as on September 2, 2009, the Government of Canada awarded a $194-million contract to Irving Shipyard for the construction of nine MSPV.

Above the eight envisioned by Martin but still under the twelve discussed through the previous RFPs, and below the then-rumoured reduction to ten. These vessels would be based on the popular Damen Stan Patrol 4207 design.

It was a proven, off-the-shelf design already in service across the world with the likes of the Netherlands, UK, Vietnam, Albania, Jamaica, and Barbados. All of whom, as far as I can tell, were and remain quite happy with their vessels.

So the platform made a natural fit for the CCG. The Stan Patrol 4207 comes in at 42.8 metres in length with a beam of 7.0 metres. It has a draught of 2.8 metres, and propulsion provided by two MTU 4000M diesel engines producing 4,992 kW (6,694 hp). These specifications provide a range of 2,000 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 14 knots and an endurance of 14 days.

The Government of Canada took the 4207 design and “Canadized” it to fulfil desired requirements. Almost anyone who has dealt with Canadization knows where this is going.

It isn’t inherently bad to tailor a platform to your requirements. It also isn’t unreasonable to expect domestic content. There is nothing inherently wrong with Canadization.

I stand by that when many others don’t. However, the history of these efforts tends to end in expensive, faulty platforms that neither work as needed nor achieve their original goals.

With the Hero-class, numerous changes were made. The most often discussed is the removal of the stabilizer fins. There were other changes, though none as significant as that.

The issues began almost immediately. The Union of Canadian Transportation Employees (UCTE) raised several issues during and just after construction. Among the complaints were failures of watertight integrity seals, inadequate bulkhead penetration seals, rolling stabilization issues, concerns about lowering lifeboats with crew onboard, and major fire-protection issues.

Upon delivery—and within the first few years—numerous issues including faulty wiring, polluted water tanks, premature corrosion, and gearbox failure were identified.

Irving responded by acknowledging the problems but characterizing them as “minor,” while stressing that the vessels had been certified by CCG officials and Lloyd’s Register.

The UCTE disagreed, stating the ships were not sufficiently up to safety standards and that problems were not mitigated when the vessels were designed and built. They said they “could not understand why the Coast Guard accepted the ships in this condition.”

The removal of the stabilizer fins was long the source of stability issues, with the CBC reporting in 2019 that the vessels were “rolling like crazy” at sea, making crews seasick and keeping some ships in port during weather conditions they should have been able to operate in.”

A plan to add stabilizers in refit never occurred. They weren’t the only issues. The galleys on five of the Hero-class vessels had to be redesigned due to cooking-related issues.

CCGS Corporal McLaren MMV was taken out of service in May 2016 due to corrosion issues in the stern, less than three years after entering service. She was docked at Canadian Maritime Engineering in Nova Scotia awaiting repairs.

In November 2018, while in overhaul, CCGS Corporal McLaren MMV sank at its moorings. Police determined it was the result of intentional vandalism or sabotage; someone cut the cradle cable and safety chain, causing the vessel to slip back into the water. While hull damage was minor, the vessel’s interior—including sensitive electronics—was submerged in saltwater for a week before being refloated.

She bounced between various shipyards before ultimately being taken out of service with the intent to dispose of her. Marine Recycling Corporation of Ontario was awarded a contract to scrap her this year.

But we still aren’t done. CCGS G. Peddle S.C. suffered a complete failure of its two main diesel engines in June 2020 after only six years of operational use. This catastrophic failure required lifting the vessel out of the water to remove and replace both engines. She was out of service for well over a year.

The Hero-class just can’t catch a break. It seems like everything that could go wrong has, and if it hasn’t yet, you can bet it eventually will. It’s easy to see why the Coast Guard has been so keen to get rid of them.

Of everyone I know, no one likes the Hero-class. An attempt to push them off on the navy failed, and while the last few years have been fairly quiet in terms of major issues, they remain unpopular.

So it’s no wonder—given the cost and long-standing issues—that the Coast Guard is now looking at options to replace them. To many, they were never truly the best fit, and with a new security mandate one does have to wonder if they’re up to the task.

Many call them too small, too inadequate for the job. Many criticize the focus on speed. Many believe the hull design itself was never adequate. All valid concerns, given that the MSPV also maintain secondary roles like SAR and environmental response.

So what comes next?

Where does that leave us now? The Coast Guard obviously needs a mid-shore patrol vessel. That is non-negotiable; it’s a core part of the fleet. We know that there will have to be a replacement project.

However, the timing presents a unique opportunity. At the same time that the Coast Guard is looking for options to replace the Hero-class, the Royal Canadian Navy is also looking for a similar vessel.

For those who have not seen my Topshee interview from Saturday, one of the things we discussed was the Orca-class. The Navy plans to expand upon the class with new vessels—and urgently.

The loss of the Kingston-class, and the loss of capacity and sea hours available to both reservists and trainees, has accelerated the need to expand the Orca-class.

There’s no possible way that the current fleet of eight Orcas can supplement both this loss and the desire to increase training capacity. That’s before we talk about their limitations.

Beyond that, the class is aging; the youngest Orca is now seventeen years old. They did undergo a refit a few years back, but replacements will be needed in the next few years.

At this moment, we don’t really know what either service wants from these future vessels. We have an idea of what the Navy wants: they will maintain their primary training role (as expected). They will have the ability to be armed. Some people think this means something like a 25 mm gun; however, that’s not at all what I’m thinking.

Remember that you can stick a .50 on an Orca too. That requirement doesn’t inherently mean a platform beyond the current Orca-class. Although, from talking around, I have heard that the Navy wants something bigger than the Orcas.

How much bigger and how capable, we don’t know. It’s still a very early concept, and nothing is funded or approved.

The Coast Guard seems to want something bigger than the current Hero-class, although how much bigger and how much more capable we don’t know. As of right now, both of these replacements are hypothetical. We have no idea what anyone wants, what they will look like, or what capabilities they need.

However, the opportunity is there for both services to explore the concept together and see if there’s potential for cooperation. I am a fan of the Stan Patrol series. I don’t blame the family itself for these issues.

So perhaps the solution is to stay in the family but look bigger. Something like the Sentinel-class cutters currently employed by the United States Coast Guard could be an option.

The Sentinel-class Cutter

They’re slightly bigger, more capable, and by all accounts well-liked and without major issues. They present a familiar but more capable solution for the Coast Guard. They still come from the same family and heritage—they wouldn’t be entirely new.

You could go bigger than the Sentinel if you really wanted, but that gets into a territory where I think they’re too big, especially if we want a Navy-Coast Guard joint program.

For the Navy, we can’t allow this to become a patrol vessel project. These are primarily training vessels; they need to remain training vessels. It’s fine if we want them to do patrols or have a security role. However, we can’t lose track of what they’re supposed to be.

Scope creep is real and kills projects fast. I don’t want to say we need to put deliberate restrictions into an RFI to force a less capable platform just to avoid temptation. That’s not what I’m saying. But we can’t focus on the secondary role to the point that it harms the primary role.

Despite that, I think the opportunity is there. And we’re now presented with a very unique situation where both the Navy and Coast Guard can potentially look at sharing some commonality. With the Coast Guard’s new position under DND and their new security mandate, trying to align both the Coast Guard and Navy is a good thing and should be encouraged.

There are vessels out there that could fill this role. Vard’s 7 045 or 7 055 designs are in similar size categories, although the 055 might be on the bigger side. The truth is that you can find these kinds of vessels anywhere. There are hundreds of potential options, so there are no limitations on what we could do.

It’s going to be interesting to see how both evolve in tandem. I think the opportunity is there and that we will at least see the idea explored—that’s just due diligence. Either way, it’s going to be an interesting time to see what both services looking for more capable patrol vessels, with a larger focus on their security mandates, will do.

Time shall tell.